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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS: THEORY, METHOD AND ARGUMENT
This thesis examines relations between organised labour and the colonial and post­
colonial state in Fiji in the period 1942 - 1985. It highlights some of the dynamics of 
labour/state relations, focussing particularly on strategies of containment and co-option 
employed by both the colonial and post-colonial state to control organised labour, and 
especially labour militancy. The thesis argues that, in the period under study, both the 
colonial and post-colonial state, in its relationship with organised labour, had an agenda of 
controlling trade unions and containing labour militancy. This was pursued both through 
outright coercion and through more covert strategies of control, and often with the 
complicity of moderate labour leaders.
The theories which inform and guide the thesis relate generally to the state in 
capitalist society and its variants, the colonial and post-colonial state. The theories of the 
state which are drawn upon are principally Marxist rather than democratic pluralist and I 
mainly draw on ideas which address the state in relation to labour. The approach is 
eclectic, the function of theory being to provide a framework for analysis.
The State and the Capital/Labour Relation
Theorisations on the state under capitalism by Marxist scholars challenge the 
democratic pluralist notion of the state as an autonomous entity, mediating between the 
competing interests of a plurality of organised and represented groups. Instead, the state is 
recognised as crucially supportive of capital. Indeed, Marxists argue that capital is unable
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to secure its own reproduction without the assistance of the state. The capital/labour 
relation, they argue, is characterised by struggle - class struggle - and it is in capital’s 
interests to maintain dominance of the process of class struggle by controlling and 
subordinating labour. This capital cannot do without the assistance of the state.
The role of the state is in fact crucial. In Marxist political theory, the state in 
capitalist society abstracts from the economic to the political level the functions of 
guaranteeing the necessary conditions for capital and of maintaining dominance in class 
relations (Berman & Lonsdale 1979:489). Indeed, to the extent that the state organises 
structures indispensable for the functioning of capitalist society, it can be called a 
capitalist state (Jessop 1977). "Above all the coercive instrument of a ruling class" 
(Miliband 1973:7), the state’s over-riding role is, according to Marxist theorists, to 
reproduce the capitalist social formation or to prevent its disintegration. For, not only is 
capital unable to secure for itself its own reproduction but it would, paradoxically, destroy 
the social formation if left to its own devices. As Stewart (n.d.:8) explains:
Those who accumulate capital can identify and pursue their interests as 
capitalists, but in general they are not able to identify and maintain the 
necessary conditions needed to reproduce the social order in its entirety in 
the face of changing circumstances.
How does the state perform its role for capital? Until Gramsci (1971) developed a 
coercion/consent analysis of the state and expounded his theory of hegemony, the classic 
Marxist theory of the state was essentially concerned with showing its repressive role 
(Poulantzas 1973). Post-Gramsci theories of the state affirm the equal importance of the 
state’s ideological and repressive roles. The system of the state, as Poulantzas saw it,
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comprises several apparatuses, some of which have a principally repressive role (the 
government, army, police, tribunals, administration), while others have a principally 
ideological role ( the church, political parties, non-revolutionary trade unions, the schools, 
mass media and the family). It is through the interconnected functions of the repressive 
and ideological apparatuses, the latter of which are concerned with the ideological 
inculcation and transmission necessary for engendering consent, that bourgeois hegemony 
and the capitalist social formation are preserved or reproduced.
Marxists note that, in performing its ideological role, the state may be compelled, 
paradoxically, to make concessions to dominated classes - even concessions which might 
appear to run counter to the short-term interests of capital. This paradox however, arises as 
much from the state’s own need for legitimation, as it cannot afford to be seen as the 
handmaiden of capital. The seemingly contradictory roles that arise from performing a 
balancing act between ensuring conditions for capital on the one hand, and ensuring 
legitimation for itself on the other, partly explain the persistence of the notion of the 
state’s ‘autonomy’ or ‘relative autonomy’(Poulantzas 1973).
Corporatist Theories of the State
The concept of ‘corporatism’ has been developed to explain a political structure 
employed by the state in advanced capitalist societies to help it perform its role for 
capitalism. Corporatism was defined by Schmitter (1979; 13) as:
a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are 
organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, 
hierarchically-ordered and functionally-differentiated categories, recognised 
or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate, 
representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for
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observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of 
demands and supports.
Corporatist theorists argue that the modern state, as it expanded its regulative and 
integrative tasks in performance of its role as the "indispensable and authoritative 
guarantor of capitalism" needed:
the professional expertise, specialised information, prior aggregation of 
opinion, contractual capability and deferred participatory legitimacy which 
only singular, hierarchically-ordered, consensually-led representative 
monopolies can provide (Schmitter 1979;27).
The "singular, hierarchically-ordered, consensually-led representative monopolies" 
referred to are peak organisations of employers (organised capital) and of trade unions 
(organised labour). Although corporatist theorists linked corporatism to the state’s function 
as the guarantor of capitalism, they did not expose it as a mechanism through w’hich the 
state, by legitimating a particular fonn of political representation, and by formalising 
consent at the political level, is able to control the major obstacle to capitalist 
accumulation - organised labour. Instead, corporatist political and economic systems were 
proffered as an alternative political model which might replace pluralist democracy.
It was left to critics of corporatist theory to elucidate the process of domination 
that corporatism institutionalises and the interests in which corporatist arrangements are 
made. Accordingly, corporatism was redefined as "a strategy by the dominant class to 
subordinate labour by means of income policies, social contracts and the like" (Panitch 
1979). As such, it was seen as primarily concerned with state-induced class collaboration 
(Offe 1981). This critical view of corporatism focuses on the subordination of labour and 
sees the wider significance of trade union incorporation for labour as a whole. Trade
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unions are seen as playing a critical role for the working class, as agencies of struggle, of 
representation, and, if included in corporatist arrangements, of social control (Offe 1981). 
As such corporatism is "disabling and detrimental to the interests of labour as a whole, 
while functional for the interests of capital as a whole" (Stewart 1984).
Labour’s voluntary participation in corporatist arrangements in advanced capitalist 
states, however, suggested that corporatism entailed a trade-off for organised labour:
Corporatist structures, in the form of economic planning and incomes policy 
bodies, involved the integration of trade unions in economic policy-making 
in exchange for their incorporation of capitalist growth criteria in union 
wage policy and their administration of wage restraint to their members . 
(Panitch 1980:174).
Involvement in economic policy-making entails gains for organised labour such as 
improved welfare, social security, unemployment, education and health benefits. Such 
gains notwithstanding, corporatist arrangements in advanced capitalist democracies do not 
empower organised labour vis-a-vis capital (Panitch 1980:175). Indeed, as Panitch sees it, 
the
marked imbalance between union representational ineffectiveness in terms 
of policy output on the one hand and their effective legitimation of state 
policy not only in general terms, but in the concrete material form of wage 
restraint, on the other ... constitutes the contradiction of corporatist 
structures in liberal democracies (1980; 175).
Because of this contradiction, which leads unions to periodically disengage from 
active co-operation, corporatist structures are inherently unstable and often require 
reinforcement through state coercion (Panitch 1980:175). As Panitch explains it, state
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coercion functions not to break the unions as organisation but to "require...union discipline 
over the rank and file" who may show greater militancy, engage in unofficial strikes or 
elect new union leaders. In such a context corporatism functions to reinforce the 
moderate union leaders who embrace such arrangements.
In Third World states, corporatism is most often forcibly imposed by authoritarian 
regimes (Malloy et. al. 1977). Deyo (1971), in a study of ‘voluntary’ corporatism in 
Singapore, offers the theory that voluntary corporatism in Third World states stems from a 
general tendency towards "political unionism". This is a tendency to "pursue collective 
goals through political rather than economic means" and to be "closely associated with 
national political parties and elites". Deyo suggests that political unionism predisposes the 
labour movement in these societies towards participating in corporatist arrangements. 
Political unionism derives in part from the
typically weak bargaining position of unions in the context of labour 
surpluses and economic stagnation (which encourages unions to) turn to 
government for protection against employers and more generally to pursue 
bargaining goals through government intervention (Deyo 1971).
Political unionism is offered as a general explanation for voluntary participation in 
corporatist arrangements in the Third World. Deyo’s theory suggests that corporatist 
arrangements strengthen and advantage organised labour vis-a-vis capital in the Third 
World and engage the state in a protective role towards labour and trade unions. He 
ignores both that the new role assigned to unions under Singapore’s corporatist system 
was enforced with "deregistrations, detentions and permanent threat of destruction" and 
that the beneficiaries of labour’s incorporation have unequivocally been foreign investors
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(Luther 1978:219).
Generally, corporatist theorists and their critics share a reductionist perspective on 
why the state institutes corporatist arrangements - because it is functional for the 
accumulation of capital. The accumulation process is, moreover, assumed to take place 
outside of the sphere of the state. Only Deyo offers a theory of corporatism that counters 
this functional-for-capital view and suggests benevolent paternalism on the part of the 
post-colonial state.
The reductionist perspective ignores the possibility that the post-colonial state, or 
those who control it, might also be serving its/their own political and economic interests 
by instituting a corporatist arrangement, particularly in contexts in which the state is itself 
involved in the accumulation process and where economic surpluses are used in part to 
support a governing class.
The Colonial and Post-Colonial State
The earliest theorisations of the colonial and post-colonial state appeared within the 
debate which began in the 1970’s with the publication of Hamza Alavi’s 1974 article in 
the New Left Review. This debate focussed on notions of the overdeveloped post-colonial 
state and its ‘relative autonomy’. Alavi saw the colonial state as unequivocally serving the 
interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie while the post-colonial state derived relative 
autonomy from the existence of competing fractions of the ruling class between which it 
mediated. Alavi’s main concern was with the predominant position of the bureaucracy and 
the military in post-colonial states. Writing on Pakistan and Bangladesh, he explained the
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overdeveloped post-colonial state as arising from the prior existence of an overdeveloped 
colonial state before it, comprising a powerful bureaucratic-military apparatus whose 
function was to subordinate the native social classes (Alavi 1974). Saul (1974), writing on 
Tanzania, in addition saw the overdeveloped superstructure of the colonial state arising 
from a need to subordinate pre-capitalist, non-feudal social formations to the imperatives 
of colonial capitalism.
Although the discussion of the colonial state in this debate is peripheral and 
subsumed within the discussion on the post-colonial state, there is a shared view that the 
colonial state functioned especially to aid the process of capitalist accumulation in the 
periphery. This view is shared by other scholars. As Von Freyhold (1977:75) put it:
the main economic task of the colonial state...(was) to make inroads into 
pre-colonial economies, opening them up for private accumulation by 
metropolitan capital.
Equally shared by theorists of the colonial state is the perception of the colonial 
state as essentially coercive. Writing much later, Chandra (1980:281), described the 
colonial state not as a "superstructure erected on the base of the colonial economy" but 
rather as an "integral and intrusive element in the structure and functioning of the colonial 
economy". As such, he said, it relied more heavily than does the (advanced) capitalist state 
on domination through its political, coercive apparatuses. The interventions it had to make 
to ensure the establishment of capitalist social relations necessitated a reliance on 
provisions for the use of force. Berman & Lonsdale (1980) noted the role of the colonial 
state in Kenya in ensuring, through coercion, both an adequate labour supply and that 
African labourers stayed at work. They also noted the colonial state’s active assistance to
8
merchant capital accumulation and its critical role in appropriating African land. Such 
interventions, necessary for the creation of capitalist social relations, posed problems for 
the colonial state’s legitimacy particularly as they necessitated provisions for the use of 
force to deal with the consequences of the expansion of capitalism.
Neo-Marxist dependency theorists like Frank (1972) see the post-colonial state as 
essentially continuing to serve the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie or of 
international capital. The post-colonial state is seen as the essential and active link 
between the national and international economy: it mediates between national capital and 
labour and international capital and it does this to the benefit of international capital, at 
relative cost to national capital and at the absolute expense of local labour. Neo-Marxists 
see the role and function of the post-colonial state as differing little from that of the 
colonial state, although it is acknowledged that the post-colonial state performs other 
functions that its predecessor did not - such as, for instance, directly appropriating a large 
part of the economic surplus which it uses in bureaucratically-directed economic activity. 
This, it is recognised, creates a new and relatively autonomous role for the post-colonial 
state. It has also given rise, it was argued, to a new social class, the "bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie".
Theorists of the post-colonial state do indeed suggest that the post-colonial state is 
the instrument of this "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" (Alavi 1974; Saul 1974; Shivji 1976). 
This class, comprising senior civil servants and politicians, inherited state power at 
independence and derives considerable economic power from the state’s management of 
resources and appropriation of nationally-generated wealth. It is a class which, as Saul
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shows in the case of Kenya, often directly benefits from certain state policies such as 
special financial arrangements, training programmes and from manipulating licences (Saul 
1974). It entrenches its power by extending the state’s control over the national economy. 
As such, it may be said to be a class with objective interests of its own. These interests 
are usually intertwined with those of both local and metropolitan capital and are 
"antagonistic to the interests of the mass of the population" (Saul 1974:355).
The notion of the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" contributes to a class-based 
explanation of the tendency towards authoritarian forms of the state in post-colonial 
societies to the extent that it is this class, in its use of the state as a vehicle for private 
accumulation, which is most threatened by criticism and demands for reform.
The Theoretical Framework, Structure and Argument of the thesis
The foregoing theoretical ideas then are those which have informed this study and 
which have provided a framework for analysis. I take a generally Marxist perspective
of the state. The state (colonial and post-colonial) is seen as generally performing a critical 
function in capitalist social relations, especially with respect to containing class conflict by 
controlling and subordinating labour. The thesis is mainly concerned with highlighting 
this function and showing the continuities in practice between the colonial and post­
colonial state in Fiji. It seeks to highlight the coercive and cooptive strategies used, to 
show how the foundations for corporatist control of organised labour by the post-colonial 
state were laid by the post-war colonial state, and to explore the extent to which the post­
colonial state, or those who control it, may have had objective interests of their own in 
instituting a corporatist arrangement.
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The notion of the "relative autonomy" of the post-colonial state appears to have 
relevance in the Fiji case. Indeed, this study will suggest that those who control the post­
colonial state have objective interests of their own, and that these assume greater 
importance in times of political crisis. Although the interests of the class of state-power 
holders, at the economic level, are generally intertwined with those of capital and 
primarily concerned with domination and control of the labouring class, at the political 
level, these interests are also concerned with maintaining the legitimacy and power of a 
ruling elite or governing class. Furthermore, it is these latter interests, I will argue, which, 
in the case of Fiji, lay behind the post-colonial state’s institution of corporatism as a 
cooptive strategy vis-a-vis organised labour. The interests behind - and the contradiction 
inherent in - voluntary corporatism, as well as the instability or unreliability of the 
corporatist arrangement as a mechanism for the long-term containment and control of 
organised labour are explored in the last section of the thesis.
This thesis takes as its starting point a recognition of class divisions in Fiji and 
rejects as inadequate and misleading approaches based on the pre-eminence of race both in 
shaping developments in Fiji and in determining social, political and economic interests. In 
doing so, it departs from traditional approaches to studying Fiji which have tended to 
dwell on the significance of race in interpretations of historical development and political, 
social and economic change.1 The "collective legacy" of what Sutherland (1984) calls 
"bourgeois historiography and social science" with respect to Fiji has, according to 
Sutherland "...served to reinforce the dominant ideology of race, an ideology which holds 
that the-problems confronting Fiji both now and in the past, have to do largely with racial 
tensions" (Sutherland, 1984:2). Departing from this tradition, Sutherland and other more
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recent scholars 2 provide alternative interpretations of Fiji history. Sutherland’s study of 
the state and capitalist development in Fiji argues that the root causes of Fiji’s problems 
are "underlying class contradictions" which are masked by racial conflict. In other words, 
in Fiji, class conflicts have assumed a racial form (Sutherland 1984:2).
The Significance of Race
It cannot be denied that race has been a significant factor in Fiji. It is considered, 
however, that its significance lies in its deployment as a means of obscuring class conflicts 
and thereby maintaining existing relations of domination. A preoccupation with race has, 
for instance, obscured the century-long conflict between workers and employers, labour 
and capital. Throughout the period of British colonial rule in Fiji, manifestations of this 
conflict were projected in racial terms: strikes were by ‘Indian canefarmers’ or ‘Indian
public works employees’ or by ‘Fijian mineworkers’, as if the roots of discontent, the
causes of industrial action, lay not in wages and conditions of work but rather in ethnicity.
The fact that certain occupations or industries in Fiji had evolved distinctively 
segregated patterns of racial hiring and wages were structured differentially for different 
racial categories, contributed to the tendency to project capital/labour conflicts as conflicts 
of a particular racial category with employers. But there was also at work the
construction of racial ideologies which projected Indians as avaricious, troublesome and
politically-motivated and Fijians as backward, indolent, easily-led and unaccustomed to the 
discipline of wage employment. It will be argued that labour’s challenges to capital were 
most often explained by means of these racial ideologies to obscure and deny the
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existence of class conflict. Other racially divisive strategies were also frequently employed 
by the state to counter militancy in the labour movement.
These and other, covert strategies used by the state to control organised labour and 
contain labour militancy in Fiji form the subject of this thesis. While overt forms of 
containment (especially through constraining legislation) have been substantively 
documented (Hince 1971,1981; Howard 1987; Lai 1983; Bain 1988), the more covert 
strategies of containment have not. The thesis highlights the complicity of labour leaders 
in the state’s domination and control of the Fiji trade union movement and exposes the 
interests that directed their cooption. It argues that the post-colonial state’s crowning 
achievement in cooption - the Tripartite Forum - instituted in 1977 with the voluntary 
participation of a section of the labour movement, was directed by short-term political 
interests on the part of both the state and a section of labour, and its success in containing 
labour militancy was short-lived.
The sources from which empirical evidence has been drawn to support the 
argument of this thesis include the small number of substantive works that have been 
written on the trade union movement in Fiji, a number of published and unpublished 
articles, Government reports and other official documents, and, for the period up until 
1955 (the period of access at the time of research), files of the Labour Department and 
other colonial government files relating to labour held in the National Archives in Suva. 
Selected files held in the Fiji Trades Union Congress archives in Suva were also searched. 
Corroborative evidence was sought from both personal interviews with individuals who 
were involved in events and from newspaper reports.
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Structure of the Thesis
The thesis begins by highlighting the essential role of the colonial state in Fiji in 
creating and maintaining conditions for early capitalist development, particularly by 
ensuring a cheap and bonded labour force. As both the maker of law and policy and as 
the maintainer of law and order, the colonial state was the institution upon which capital 
critically depended. Through the instrument of law and, in instances of unrest or 
confrontation, through the show or actual use of force, labour was overtly and coercively 
controlled. Chapter 2 covers the entire early period of Fiji’s colonial history from 
European contact up until 1942. The assurance of a cheap labour supply and the necessity 
for controls on labour emerge as continuing themes in both the colonial records and in 
public debate, as evidenced in the press.
By the 1930’s however, overt coercion could no longer be sustained in the context 
of civil libertarian Britain or under the ever-watchful eyes of the International Labour 
Organisation. Moreover, the spontaneous organisation of labour in the colonies began to 
be feared as a likely prelude to a wider political movement. And the demand for labour in 
the war years significantly altered the nature of employment and the perceptions of 
labourers in the colony. As a consequence of all these factors the colonial state altered its 
practice - outright coercion was replaced by a formal policy of encouraging responsible, 
moderate trade unions and promoting collective bargaining between workers and 
employers.
The contradictions between the colonial state’s policy and practice with regard to 
organised labour in Fiji in the period 1942-1969 is covered by Chapters 3 and 4. While
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projecting itself as an impartial arbiter in the relations between capital and labour, the 
colonial state actually set in place and employed a number of mechanisms - legislative, 
institutional and ideological - to facilitate the containment of organised labour. Chapter 3 
looks critically at the early stages of implementation of the new labour policy in the 
period 1942 - 1956. Chapter 4 examines the means employed to deal with the problem of 
labour militancy which emerged in the late 1950’s, challenging the state as much as it did 
capital, and covers state/labour relations up until 1969, the year before independence.
The response of the state to the resurgence of militancy after independence is 
covered in Chapters 5 and 6. The post-colonial state, like its colonial predecessor, set in 
place and employed a number of mechanisms - legislative, ideological and institutional - 
to contain organised labour. Chapter 5 shows that in the early period from 1970 - 1976, it 
was primarily blue-collar, private sector unions controlling foreign industries which 
showed militancy and needed to be contained. In this period the post-colonial state set in 
place legislative and institutional mechanisms for doing so. The formation in the latter 
part of the 1970’s of the Tripartite Forum - as a corporatist arrangement concerned with 
national wage-setting, dispute settlement and labour policy formulation - was a major 
accomplishment for the post-colonial state. In this period, with the consent of organised 
labour, wage restraint was achieved and trade union moderacy legitimated. Chapter 7 
summarises the thesis and draws some broad conclusions about labour/state relations in 
Fiji.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE COERCIVE LABOUR POLICIES OF THE EARLY COLONIAL STATE
‘The labour movement has its roots not in politics but in 
work. It grows out of the nature of that work, the economic 
and social position of the worker and his response to that 
position. To view it solely from the top is to miss the 
dynamic which powers the movement...organisation and 
group consciousness among workers is created by the 
workers themselves...’ (Iliffe 1975:40).
Introduction
This first chapter briefly surveys labour-state relations prior to the period covered 
by the thesis. It focuses particularly on the labour policies of the early colonial state and 
its responses to collective labour action and efforts to organise. This provides a 
background to the examination of the colonial state’s policy and practice in Fiji from 1942 
to 1969 that follows and which focuses on the establishment, within the context of an 
outwardly liberal policy towards organised labour, of new, state-devised mechanisms of 
control, and the use of the strategy of cooption.
Labour history should hold a central place in Fijian historiography. Europeans 
came to Fiji in the first instance for sandalwood and beche-de-mer. Both these trades, and 
particularly the latter, engaged indigenous Fijians for the first time in wage labour and 
entailed the introduction of firearms, which were readily traded for both access to 
resources and supply of labour and provisions (Narayan 1984:16). The real rush to Fiji 
began in the early 1860’s, after these resources had been exhausted, and it was primarily 
in search of land and labour that Europeans settler farmers came. The acquisition of land 
in the early years proved largely unproblematic. The goods for which land was exchanged
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(mainly firearms) were, in the context of existing tribal tensions and contradictions in the 
Fijian polity, in high demand. By 1876, when the first substantive Governor to Fiji, Sir 
Arthur Gordon, put an end to any further alienation of Fijian land by Europeans, a total of 
854, 956 acres or 19% of the total area of Fiji had been claimed by foreigners (Narayan 
1984:23).1
But land alone could not bring prosperity to the ‘planters’. They were planters in 
name only. Their function in the plantation economies of the New World originally based 
on slave labour was that of overlords in a system which depended for its success on 
unfree or bonded labour. The Fiji Times, from its earliest beginnings a voice of planter 
interests, put it plainly in one of its first editorials:
Paramount in importance and before which all other questions - whether of 
native wars, Fijian politics or ruling authorities - fade into insignificance is 
the material one of labour. All the varied and multiform advantages of 
tropical soil, climate and vast productions are useless without the motive 
power of human life. (FT 4.6.1870)
That it was specifically non-white, bonded labour that was sought and seen as necessary, 
was made equally clear by the paper:
Not labour from a European point of view, where it is a mere question of 
quality and price. We might employ in Fiji tomorrow all the vast excesses 
of population contained in the overgrown cities of the old world and they 
would not produce a bale of cotton. Cotton and sugar - their method of 
production present some curious pages in the world’s history and seem 
fated not to prosper without the aid of slave labour. (FT 4.6.1870)
At the time this editorial appeared, a labour trade had been operating since 1864, 
amid much controversy, to supply plantations in Queensland and Fiji with cheap and
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bondei labour. In Fiji, between 1864 and 1911, more than 20,000 so-called Polynesian (in 
fact Velanesian) labourers from the Solomon Islands and New Hebrides were estimated to 
have erved terms of indenture under ‘contracts’ of three years. The product of the kind 
of thiiking exemplified in the Fiji Times editorial was indeed a "new kind of slavery". 
Underying the popularity of island indentured labour were two related beliefs. These 
were, irstly, that islanders worked better when away from their own island and dependent 
on ther employer for food and, secondly, that "men from different islands would never 
combiie" (Morrell 1960:171).
The operation of the Pacific Island labour trade did not mean that indigenous 
Fijian, had not also been coercively recruited for plantation work in this period. Fijians 
had iideed been introduced to the experience of coercive wage employment during the 
years )f the sandalwood and beche-de-mer trades for which indigenous labour was usually 
procued by means of fraudulence and outright coercion on the pan of recruiters. Crucial 
to the system of coercive recruitment of Fijians to these trades was the chiefly system, 
with is ability to compel the labour of both commoners and those defeated in tribal wars. 
Indeei, traders often relied for their labour needs on the cooperation of Fijian chiefs who 
commtted the labour of commoners and appropriated their ‘wages’.
Planters likewise recruited Fijian labour to work their plantations by bribing chiefs 
and chefs most often used direct force to raise their labour quotas (France 1969:94-95 
cited n Bain 1988:122). During the early years of the 1860’s "a good number of Fijian 
laborers went not of their own free will but at the command of chiefs" into wage labour 
on Eiropean plantations (Seigel 1985:47). Even with the influx of Pacific Island labourers
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after 1864, pressure on Fijians to take up labouring work on plantations did not cease. 
Legge (1958:254) notes that the Western districts of Ra and Ba and the Yasawa Islands 
were the main sources of forced Fijian labour for European plantations at the time of 
Cession. Routledge refers to the hiring out by Cakobau of the defeated Lovoni people in 
1871, an act which senior colonial officials "bluntly condemned...as an act of 
slavery"(1985:141). The charge was later reiterated by Gordon who indeed alleged that 
other campaigns had been conducted with the "avowed object of aiding the exchequer by 
obtaining lands to sell and prisoners to dispose of" (Routledge 1985:141). The allegation 
that they were "disposed o f  by being hired out to white planters is clear.2
Between 1871 and 1874 Fijians were also being forced into plantation employment 
by the imposition of a poll tax of one pound per head for every adult male and 4 shillings 
for every adult female, payable in cash, by the "Cakobau government". This government 
was, in reality, a plantocracy which had appointed Cakobau, a chief from the island of 
Bau in eastern Fiji, as its puppet head of state (Reddy 1974:14). Under force of the 
Cakobau government’s poll tax, Fijians, "out of fear and ignorance", contracted "for a year 
or more of gratuitous service to planters willing to advance their taxes." (Bain 1988:122) 
Thus began the state-sponsored system of "contract labour" in Fiji.
Managing Labour Demand and Supply: the policies of the early Colonial State
The ceding of Fiji to Britain in 1874, motivated to some extent by mounting 
pressure in Britain to control the now scandalous Pacific Island labour trade, brought an 
end to that trade and to the poll tax system, both of which had been introduced to 
guarantee planters a supply of labour. Siegel (1985:91-2) points out that Pacific Island
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abour continued to be recruited for Fiji plantations until 1911. However, many of those 
ecruited were "old hands" brought from Queensland by agreement between the 
Queensland and Fiji governments following the adoption of the ‘White Australia’ policy 
tnd the consequent deportation of Pacific Island labourers. Their numbers were not 
efficient to meet the growing demand for labour in the colony. The abolition of the poll 
ax system and the subsequent introduction of a number of ‘native’ laws, which affected 
;ase of access to Fijian labour, were to exacerbate the problem.
Under an initial new tax law implemented immediately after cession, adult Fijian 
males were required to render 20 days labour a year on public works (Bain 1988:122). 
Two years later this labour tax was abolished and, in its stead, in accordance with what 
has been commonly interpreted as a protectionist native policy, introduced by Governor 
Arthur Gordon and followed by subsequent colonial administrations, indigenous Fijians 
were required to pay a tax-in-kind in the form of produce for export by the colonial 
government (Bain 1988:122). Ostensibly aimed at protecting or preserving the traditional 
order, the tax in kind had the effect of promoting commodity or cash-crop production by 
Fijians, who were now obliged to grow tax crops 3. This forced confinement of 
indigenous Fijians to peasant farming within the colonial economy (Moynagh 1981:18), 
achieved with the help of a number of purportedly ‘protectionist’ native labour ordinances 
which maintained Fijians as a convenient class of migrant peasant/labourers, meant that, as 
a ‘reserve army’ of labour, Fijian villagers could be conveniently used by capital and the 
colonial state as these interests demanded.
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Naidu (1988:115) draws attention to the fact that between 1875 and 1880, planters 
continued to use Fijian contract labour and cites Governor Des Voeux’s and Colonial 
Secretary Thurston’s despatches to the Colonial Office indicating that in 1884 "about a 
quarter of adult males worked in capitalist enterprises for varying durations under 
contract". He argues that the colonial state introduced the Native Labour Ordinances as 
regulative mechanisms to slow the process of Fijian proletarianization and that these 
measures have been erroneously portrayed as ‘protectionist’, concerned with safeguarding 
the interests of the Fijian people.
Certainly the "protectionist" labour policy for Fijians must be seen in the context of 
the wider and supposedly protectionist native policy of which it was a part. The policy 
was motivated less by a concern to protect Fijian society from the destruction that would 
have followed its unmediated exposure to capitalist market forces than by sheer colonial 
expediency. As Gordon himself explained it:
the question how a large native population should be governed by a handful 
of white aliens - a question often raised but seldom satisfactorily answered - 
had once more to be dealt with. (Quoted in Moynagh 1981:15)
The answer, for Gordon, lay quite simply and logically in establishing legitimacy by ruling 
with the consent of chiefs (Moynagh 1981:15). The policy of indirect rule, however, 
necessarily entailed conserving, and indeed reinforcing, both the mode of production and 
the social relations by which chiefly rule was maintained and reproduced4. The 
orthodoxy and ideology it gave rise to were to have lasting implications for both Fijian 
political culture and class and race relations in Fiji.
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The cornerstones of the colonial state’s ‘protectionist’ native policy were the
preser/aion of Fijian ownership of land; the conservation of the traditional domain of
chiefly mle - the Fijian village; and the reinforcement, though compulsion of law, of
traditnnil ‘obligations’ of Fijian villagers to their chiefs. Indigenous Fijians were to be
made pnsoners of certain social customs now universalised to the whole of Fiji and 
codifFd in colonial law. They were to be governed under a separate, ‘native’ 
adminstration by their own traditional leaders. Their movements and freedoms were to be 
severdy constrained by a number of ‘native’ laws some of which were intended to 
especially constrain their freedom to engage permanently or at will in wage labour.
In 1876 and 1877 the first two of a number of native labour laws, the Native 
Laboir Ordinances 1876 and 1877, were introduced (Bain 1988:123). Supposedly 
desigied to prevent a mass exodus from Fijian villages and to regulate the recruitment of 
Fijian labour, these ordinances in fact maintained a migrant system of contract labour for 
Fijian;. They required all employment contracts for longer than one month to be in 
writirg, restricted contracts to no more than twelve months in total and required them to 
be signed by a stipendiary magistrate. They regularised working hours (10 per day) and 
requbsd employers to provide rations and a statutory wage and to repatriate workers (i.e., 
pay tie cost of return transport) on completion of their contracts. Recruiters were now 
techncally required to have a licence to recruit labourers outside areas (i.e. provinces) of 
emphyment. The ordinances also made it illegal for coercion and/or fraud, falsehood or 
intimdation to be used in the recruitment of workers, although they did not outlaw the 
payment of "yaqona money" by recruiters to chiefs, a practice which essentially secured 
the c<operation of chiefs since the yaqona money constituted an advance or down-payment
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(Bain 1988:125).
Chiefs continued to be the linchpin in the system of Fijian labour recruitment and 
they faced the dilemma of deciding between immediate advantages in cash and kind and 
the longer-term consequences of reduced manpower, diminished tributes and the erosion of 
their traditional authority (Bain 1988:125).
Although Bain (1988) demonstrates the fallacy and ineffectiveness of protection 
offered by these and subsequent native labour ordinances, their introduction, at least on the 
surface, was suggestive of stringent controls on the use of ‘native’ labour. As such, they 
"unleash(ed) a furious response from the planter community" (Bain 1989:123).
The Indian Indentured Labour Scheme
Having put constraints on the use of native labour, and on the importation of island 
labour, the colonial government was now obliged to provide an assured supply of cheap 
labour to white planters, many of whom were in debt. More particularly, it had to assure 
labour supply to the Colonial Sugar Refining Company of Sydney (CSR), which extended 
its activities to Fiji in 1880. The CSR had been persuaded by the colonial government to 
set up operations in Fiji partly in the hope that the introduction of large-scale commercial 
capital would relieve the state’s financial insolvency.
Gordon, who had earlier seen the operation of Indian indentured labour schemes in 
Mauritius and Trinidad, had proposed to planters soon after his arrival in the colony the 
introduction of a similar scheme in Fiji. As reported in the Fiji Times, he argued that:
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An ample and steady supply of labour is absolutely essential to the Colony. 
From whence and under what management shall we obtain it more certainly 
and most cheaply and with the least possibility of abuse?...I am of the 
opinion that it should be undertaken by government. (FT 8.9.1875)
Specifically, he proposed the engagement by the government of indentured labour from 
India:
The supply of labour which is to be obtained from India is practically 
boundless. The amount of wages ordinarily given to Indian coolies is well 
known. I hold in my hand some statistics as to the probable expenses of 
their introduction here. My calculations are 3 pounds 18 shillings the 
expense for recruiting; 10 shillings a head per man for the agent; passage 
money 12 pounds 18 shillings and 8 pence; we obtain a coolie servant for 
five years with his wages of 5 pence a day additional with rations. (FT 
8.9.1875)
The curious irony of the British colonial government introducing, indeed 
underwriting, an indentured labour scheme in the colony to replace the scandalous Pacific 
Island Labour Trade was seemingly lost in the defence that procurement of Indian 
indentured labour would be regulated by colonial authorities at both ends of the scheme 
and would therefore be above abuse. Systems of indenture had in fact been introduced 
‘successfully’ to most of Britain’s colonies in the Caribbean and to Mauritius and 
Malaysia following the abolition of slavery in 1834 and the consequent threatened demise 
of these plantation economies. British colonial administrations had been centrally involved 
in these indenture schemes and their interests were not simply to ensure the economic 
viability of the colonies but, more importantly, to aid the establishment of capitalism 
(Saunders 1984). The case of Fiji was little different.
25
Gordon’s proposal was not at first popular with the planters who believed Pacific 
Island labourers were cheaper and superior. The CSR, however, opted to pioneer the 
engagement of Indian indentured labourers on its estates. Between 1879 and 1916, when 
the indenture system was finally abolished after a long campaign in India, Britain and Fiji 
against its many abuses, 60,553 men and women had fulfilled employment contracts - 
usually lasting 10 years - under the scheme. Paid wages that fell below the declared 
statutory minimum, and labouring under conditions of extreme coercion and degradation 
that have left their imprint on the Indo-Fijian psyche, the Indian immigrant labourers were 
not passive. Theirs was an experience of continuous and enduring struggle and resistance 
and of intermittent revolts against the combined might of capital and the colonial state.
By 1879 then, the colonial state had resolved the problem of assuring a supply of 
labour, especially for sugar capital. The only remaining problem with labour now was its 
control. The problem that combined action by workers could pose for the colonial state 
made it necessary that the state provide the very means by which labour would be 
controlled - legislation and the machinery for its enforcement. Needless to say, legislation 
prescribed both the terms of contract labour and the penalties for breaches of contract 
overwhelmingly in the employer’s favour. As Bain (1989:129) aptly puts it:
the state ultimately endorsed a relationship between master and servant 
which was unambiguously one of domination and subordination. The 
criminalisation of a labourer’s breach of contract through the application of 
penal sanctions was one of the more conspicuous marks of this relationship.
The controversial penal sanctions for failure to work that underlay the colony’s labour 
laws would remain on the statutes until 1947 despite pressure from the Colonial Office in
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London fron 1916 for repeal of the Ordinances to delete these clauses. Their retention by 
the colonid state was a testimony to the power and influence of sugar capital which 
vehementb opposed the idea of removing the clauses from the labour laws. The CSR 
even went so far as to lobby the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the matter in 1923, 
urging hin to "set his face against any attempts by the Indian Committee to upset matters 
in the colcny’ (MP 4285/23). The company saw the penal clauses as both necessary and 
appropriate to the system of "labour agreements" in the colony given the "classes of labour 
employed'
‘Whatever may be the position in advanced democracies it is futile to claim 
tha with the classes of labour employed in the Colony there should be no 
meins of enforcing the observance of agreements and though we realise that 
in he present temper of political ideas there would be little chance of these 
daises finding a place in a new ordinance, it is surely better in the 
cir.umstances above to leave well alone’ (General Manager of CSR to the 
Gcvemor 7.5.24 MP 637/24).
And so le^ ve well alone the colonial government did, in respect of its controversial labour 
laws. Th.t these and other draconian laws provided the main means by which both Indian 
and Fijiai labour were controlled is evident in the following account of control and 
resistanceup until the late 1930’s.
Control aid Resistance: Indian Labour
Inentured Indian labourers were mainly employed on the sugar plantations, where 
they worbd as field labourers. A significant proportion were also engaged in skilled and 
unskilled work in the mills while a much smaller, ‘privileged’, number were put to work 
in the lhoies of their European bosses. In the fields the workers were expected to work 
five days* week and were paid 12 pence for nine hours of work or upon completion of a
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‘task’ - which was set as the "amount of work an ordinary man could do in six hours’ 
steady work" (Naidu 1980:11). Women were paid 9 pence for nine hours of work or on 
completion of a task which was set at three quarters of a man’s task. Failure to complete 
a task or refusal to do so incurred prosecution under the Immigration Ordinance and a fine 
or imprisonment on conviction, together with the extension of indenture to cover the 
number of days lost (Naidu 1980:12).
The provision for penal sanctions under the Immigration Ordinance underlined the 
coercive nature of the indenture system under which men and women were "contracted" to 
perform, for a minimum of five years, tasks set by the employer for rates of pay 
unilaterally determined by them. The contract was never renegotiable, its duration was 
unfairly long, there was no right to withdraw labour in protest over abuses and indeed 
failure even to fulfil the contract’s daily requirements resulted in arbitrary extension of 
contracts as well as a fine or imprisonment. More significantly, the penal sanction 
underlined the role of the state as the upholder of the interests of employers. Although 
labour ordinances stipulated minimum standards and conditions of employment to ‘protect’ 
the workers from extreme abuse, there were fewer penal sanctions provided against 
offending employers and indeed it was difficult to prosecute companies which breached 
the laws (Naidu 1980:31).
Wages provided by employers to the indentured workers were meagre. What is 
more, although a legal minimum daily wage was set at 1 shilling for men and 9 pence for 
women, in reality deductions made for sickness, absenteeism and non-completion of tasks 
often whittled down wages to well below the legal minimum. Workers were often
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subjected to extreme brutality at the hands of overseers and endured extremely poor and 
dehumanising living conditions. Housed in "lines" (barracks) in which rooms measured 
10’ x 7’, the labourers lived three and four to a room. So wretched were these conditions, 
they were described by the labourers as ‘narak’ or hell and the abnormal social relations 
imposed by the indenture system contributed to illness and despair amongst the workers. 
This is illustrated by the high rate of violence - suicide, rape and murder - amongst 
workers in the lines (Naidu 1980:43-75).
Although, as Lai (1986) points out, workers generally survived by avoiding open 
resistance5, covert resistance in the form of go-slows, absenteeism and other means of 
subversion was commonly practiced. Moreover, Indo-Fijian labour history is punctuated 
by a number of incidents in which workers took overt action in solidarity, most often 
spontaneously, in reaction to their poor wages and the harsh working and living conditions 
to which they were subjected.
The first of these actions occurred in 1886 and took the form of strikes by Indian 
indentured labourers at Navuso and Koronivia. The cause was over-tasking, underpay and 
the vindictive attitude of management (Gillion 1962:83; Lai 1984:145). The Koronivia 
revolt involved a march to Suva from Koronivia by indentured labourers, armed with 
knives and sticks, to deliver a complaint to the Agent-General of Immigration. The revolt 
resulted in the ringleaders being fined and, more significantly, following investigation and 
an appeal for greater control over the labourers by the planters,6 in the passage of the 
colony’s first punitive labour law - Ordinance No XIV of 1886 (later amended by 
Ordinance No VI of 1887). Unashamedly hailed by the Fiji Times as "an enactment
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posithely unique in the history of Fiji (i.e.) an Ordinance framed in the interests of 
emplo/ers", the ordinance stiffened existing penalties for failure to complete tasks or for 
absente from work. It made a six-month prison sentence mandatory for a third 
consecutive offence of absence from work, forbade Indians to smoke or use fire in any 
part o' a plantation except the lines and, most importantly, made it illegal for more than 
five labourers employed in the same plantation to absent themselves without obtaining 
leave 'or the purpose, even to lay complaints. Significantly, the Ordinance also prevented 
labouers from taking combined action against their employers (Lai 1984:146).
Further strikes by indentured Indian workers occurred in 1888, 1907 and 1913 
(Gillicn: 1962:88,48,49). At Labasa, for a period up until 1903, unrest and disturbances by 
laboin were so intense and continuous that the situation was described as "almost a state 
of civl war" (Gillion 1962:115). So extremely harsh and humiliating were the conditions 
of incenture that most of the immigrants, after completing their terms, were loath to seek 
wage employment for the free wage of 1 shilling a day for more than short periods at a 
time md settled instead on land leased from Fijians. Consequently, with the cancellation 
of all remaining indentures in 1920, the CSR and European planters faced an acute labour 
problem, a shortage that was only partially abated by a rapid increase in the recruitment of 
Fijian labourers for the sugar industry under the Masters & Servants Ordinance 
(Mchaught 1982:102).
The end of indenture in fact sounded the death knell for plantation agriculture in 
Fiji. The CSR, aware that only with a system of small-holding family fanns which free 
Indiais could manage without the need of externally contracted labour could it survive the
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crisis in production, encouraged European planters to quit their lands with the advice that 
they would not survive and should cut their losses and sell out (Narsey 1979). Then, in an 
ingenious move, the company reorganised its production, dividing its estates and those 
acquired from the planters into small farm lots and offering them to Indian farmers on 
lease. By this means Indians were transformed from labourers to tenant-farmers. 
However, since they now assumed the burden and costs of cane production for the CSR, 
which retained a monopoly on milling, the material conditions of their existence changed 
little, if at all. Not surprisingly, the first efforts to unionise workers (or fanners as they 
now were) emerged within this industry. Although attempts to establish growers’ unions 
began in the 1920’s, none was successful until 1937 when the Kisan Sangh (Fanners 
Association) was successfully formed7. Other farmers unions, including the Akhil Fiji 
Krishak Maha Sangh (All Fiji Farmers’ Union), and the Rewa Farmers’ Union followed. 
In 1940, a Sugar Workers Union (Mazdur Sangh) was fonned.
In 1920 and 1921, two significant strikes were staged by Indian workers. Although 
both strikes were over wages, the cost of living and conditions of work, they were 
interpreted by the colonial government as political agitation inspired by the nationalist 
struggle in India, rather than as struggles of a labouring class to increase their wages.8 
Both strikes ended with the deportation of Indian nationals identified as the principal 
instigators of the trouble because they acted as counsels or representatives of the workers. 
Significantly, both strikes resulted in new control mechanisms being adopted by the 
colonial government to contain what was essentially the beginnings of labour militancy.
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The 1920 strike began with Indian labourers employed in the Public Works 
Department in Suva. The first strike in which the colonial government was involved as an 
employer (Ali 1980:46), it soon spread to employees of the Suva Municipal Council, the 
CSR and the Vancouver-Fiji Sugar Company estates in Rewa and Navua and to 
government and municipal workers at Levuka. The colonial government interpreted the 
strike as political and Governor Rodwell "intended to coerce the strikers into returning to 
work" (Ali 1980:46). Twelve Fijian and 20 European constables and the machine-gun 
section of the Defence Force were brought out to disperse a crowd of 1000 workers which 
gathered to try to rescue three fellow-strikers imprisoned on charges of intimidation. 
Restrictions were imposed on the movement and gathering of Indians (Ali 1980: 46-47). 
The Defence Force was mobilised for action in both Suva and Nausori and the Governor 
also sought (and was assured of) assistance from abroad for a "show of force" (Ali & 
Mamak 1979:85-87; Ali 1980:46). From Australia, he was promised "ninety ratings, a 
gunboat and a light cruiser".
The arrival of a New Zealand warship and troops during the strike provoked acts 
of violence by strikers - namely the destruction of the Nasinu and Nausori bridges and the 
cutting of telephone wires linking Suva and Nausori (Ali 1980:51). But the two main 
incidents during the month-long strike were firstly, a riot which broke out following an 
attempt by a European Constable and his Fijian Special Constable to arrest an Indian 
woman strike supporter9 and secondly, a clash between police and "two or three hundred 
Indians" at Samabula which resulted in an armed constabulary opening fire on a large 
number of strikers, fatally injuring one of them (Ali 1980:51, 54). The latter incident 
abruptly ended the strike. As an immediate consequence of the strike, however, a further
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legislative control was introduced. The Public Safety Ordinance, speedily enacted in 
February 1920, was immediately used to convict and imprison the strike’s ringleaders 
while a prominent Indian lawyer and supporter of the struggle of Indians in Fiji, Manilal 
Maganlal Doctor, was summarily deported.
The 1921 strike by sugar workers lasted for six months. The colonial government 
recognised that the strike had been precipitated by the Company’s intransigence over 
improving the terms and conditions of its labourers and noted the unsympathetic attitude 
of company managers towards their labourers (Ali 1980:82). Nonetheless, it considered 
the major force and inspiration behind the strike, "newly-arrived missionary from India", 
Basisth Muni, a political agitator who was bent on fostering non-cooperation with the 
colony’s British rulers and on fomenting dissent among Indians in areas where no 
grievance had been voiced (Ali 1980:94). Muni, it seems, was responsible for drawing up 
a 14-point log of claims for the striking workers. These claims led Europeans in the 
colony to conclude that Indians "really wanted equality with whites" (Ali 1980:80). 
Certainly the workers did demand fair treatment as labourers, on a par with their white 
counterparts in Australia and New Zealand10. Muni was deported one month after the 
strike commenced but this merely strengthened the strikers in their resolve. For a further 
five months they held out, growing food and retaining food surpluses for their own 
consumption in order to survive.
The colonial government took the usual precautionary measures - prohibiting 
assemblies of more than 20 without permits and banning public meetings. Additionally, it 
employed a new and effective strategy to defeat the workers. By soliciting the help of
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indigenous chiefs, who brought in Fijian villagers as strike breakers, it introduced the 
practice of divide and rule - pitting indigenous Fijian labour reserves against Indian 
workers. Brewster (1922) lauded the ingenuity of the move:
The DC, with a happy flash of genius, called in the local Fijian chiefs to 
aid him by their advice. They at once took the bull by the horns and called 
their people to come to the rescue of their white brethren. They issued a 
manifesto that they understood Britain always stood by those in trouble and 
now was the time to show they were true Britons and one of the empire. 
The result was that the able-bodied Fijians took the places of strikers in the 
fields and the mills. Their timely aid broke the strike and caused the Indians 
to resume work (Brewster 1922:301).
This first successful exercise in coopting Fijian chiefs to contain or subvert labour 
militancy was to be repeated many times by the colonial government.
After the 1921 strike and up until the 1940’s, overt strike action by Indian workers 
became less frequent testifying to the effectiveness of the colonial state’s coercive/cooptive 
policy of labour control. However, industrial conflict in the sugar industry, in which 
Indians were mainly engaged, continued unabated from the 1920’s into the war years. 
This conflict increasingly became manifest as one between growers and the CSR company.
Control and Resistance: Fijian Labour
Control over indigenous Fijian labour was ensured mainly through the maintenance 
of a system of migrant contract labour, effected by means of the Native Labour 
Ordinances. Restrictions imposed by the first two Native Labour Ordinances have already 
been mentioned. After 1883 the Native Labour Ordinances also required labourers to 
have, in addition, written contracts for any engagements outside of their designated "home
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district" and the consent of their chief (buli) and village headman (Turaga-ni-Koro) before 
being registered by a European stipendiary magistrate (Bain 1988:123)". Government 
was also given discretionary powers in 1883 to close districts to further recruitment and 
adult Fijian males could be prohibited from contracting if their employment was judged as 
conflicting with their communal obligations in the district (Bain 1988:123). Also, from 
1880, following complaints from the Council of Chiefs, employers were required to 
repatriate workers to their villages within 14 days of the expiry of their labour contracts. 
From 1899 until 1912, chiefs were empowered to prosecute "unauthorised absentees" 
under the Native Trespass and Vagrancy Order 1899. Although this was not effective in 
practice, due to the fact that many Fijians contracted under the Masters & Servants 
Ordinance of 1890 which did not require labourers to obtain the consent of the Buli or 
Turaga-ni-Koro (Bain 1988:127), the provision existed as a constraining device and could 
be invoked.12
The Native Labour Ordinances provided other mechanisms by which Fijian labour, 
once contracted, was controlled. The contract system was an indenture system and in 
many respects as Bain puts it:
Indentured Fijians were subjected to a scale of oppression comparable with 
that of their Melanesian and Indian counterparts. Once signed, contracts 
were not renegotiable; and even at the outset of an engagement, the cultural 
norms of Fijian society dictated that the terms were usually negotiated by 
non-labouring traditional chiefs (1988:129).
Penal sanctions in the ordinances, which European planters considered "vitally necessary 
for the proper control of native labour", criminalised a labourer’s breach of contract. 
Under the 1876 Native Labour Ordinance, second-time absconders who were absent for 5
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consecutive days were liable to a maximum of 60 days’ imprisonment with hard labour. 
"Wilful misconduct" and "ill behaviour" were "punishable offences" which could incur a 
fine or 9 months’ imprisonment with hard labour (Bain 1988:130). The Native Labour 
Ordinances also allowed the payment of part or all of a worker’s wage to be deferred until 
the end of the contract. And, from 1886, employers were permitted to pay by task rather 
than by the hour, enabling exploitation of Fijian labourers on an intense scale. (Bain 
1988:131-2).
Generally, the system of migrant contract labour, enforced by means of the native 
labour ordinances, militated against the emergence of a fully-fledged Fijian proletariat and 
the development of worker organisations amongst Fijian labour. It also functioned to shore 
up chiefly control of Fijian commoners while ensuring a controlled reserve labour system. 
The provisions in the native labour ordinances safeguarding employers’ absolute control 
over contracted workers underscored the colonial state’s subordination of Fijian labour to 
the interests of plantation capital.
Despite the constraining effects of the system of migrant contract labour, combined 
action by Fijian labourers did occur. Bain (1988:132) refers to an "outbreak of 
disturbances on labour lines in Lautoka in 1900" by Fijian labourers reacting to CSR’s 
implementation of the 1895 Fijian Labour Ordinance, which allowed employers to now 
pay a Fijian worker less than the full minimum daily rate if he failed to complete a 
task.13 Other hidden forms of labour protest were also apparent.
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Additionally, there were at least two early attempts by Fijian workers to form 
workers’ organisations. Both these efforts involved European "instigators" w'ho were 
evidently approached by the workers for support and assistance. Hince (1981) has 
documented the first effort by Fijian workers to form a trade union. The abortive attempt 
to form the Fijian Wharf Labourers’ Union in 1916 during a four-day strike by native 
labourers employed at Lautoka wharf by the CSR and Union Steamship (USS) companies 
drew swift action from the colonial government. It considered deporting the strike’s 
instigator, a European, Edward Sanday, for agitating the natives, the consequences of 
which could have been ‘serious to the general peace and good order’ (Hince 1981:9). It 
also considered retiring and cancelling the pension of Sanday’s closest Fijian supporter, 
Seteriki Nasoki, a Buli in the native administration, and introducing new legislation "to 
deal with persons agitating the coloured labour and thereby causing strikes" (Hince 
1981:11). The strike was broken by the Companies’ shipment of 50 scab workers from 
Suva aboard a government vessel, accompanied by six constables and a non-commissioned 
officer "partly full armed without ammunition" as temporary reinforcement for the Lautoka 
police (Hince 1981:6). Sanday was advised that
His Excellency is unable to view with favour any organisation amongst 
Fijians which is likely to lead to strikes amongst native labourers. The 
Governor is of the opinion that the objects which he understands you have 
in view might be served by other means and he is confident that if there are 
just grounds for complaint as regards to the quality of the food supplied to 
the labourers, representation on the subject by the labourers in the lines will 
receive the consideration they deserve. (Hince 1981:13)
No more was heard of the Wharf Labourers’ Union.
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Eight years later, in 1924, Fijian labourers on CSR estates apparently made 
numerous representations through their Fijian ‘sirdars’ or overseers to a European lawyer 
at Ba, Mr N.S. Chalmers. He, in response, called a meeting on his property with the 
object of forming a Fijian and Indian Workers Union and pressing for reform of the 
colony’s labour laws - in particular, the abolition of its penal clauses. In a meeting with 
the Governor, Chalmers said discontent amongst Fijians over conditions of work, and 
especially over existing penal clauses in the labour laws which were resulting in vast 
numbers of them being imprisoned for being absent from work for a day, would lead to a 
general strike; indeed that the Fijians had told him they were going to strike. As it 
happened, no strike took place and Chalmers did not form the union he had in mind, but 
the fact that he had held a meeting of Fijian labourers had ruffled feathers. In order to 
allay continuing interest in the matter by Fijians, it was considered necessary to place a 
paragraph in the government’s Fijian language newspaper, Na Mata, explaining that the 
government had informed Chalmers that the matter of amending the labour laws was in 
hand. Chalmers was castigated by the Governor for even contemplating forming a labour 
union of Fijian workers:
You know it is always a risky thing to inculcate into the minds of native 
labour what you might call an idea of mass action. In native countries it 
cannot be anything but dangerous. (MP C9/24)
Twenty-two Fijians, all workers on CSR Estates, were prosecuted by the CSR for 
labour offences in connection with the incident. The charge was "neglecting to perform 
duty". The court heard that they had walked to Rarawai to attend the "big meeting" at 
Chalmers’ property, returning with "swollen knees and feet" from the walk. One of the 
labourers, Eramasi, questioned closely about what transpired at the meeting, why they had
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gone, what Chalmers had told them and what fees they had paid him, told the court 
simply:
Ve were having to work so hard (dredre) in the lines, we hoped there was a 
chance he (Chalmers) might tell us something that would lessen our work.
(VIP C9/24)
The otter twenty-one endorsed Eramasi’s statement, saying he "speaks for us all" (MP 
C9/24).
On the matter of legislative reform, Chalmers was apparently assured that 
amendments were already in hand. A committee, he was told, had been set up to look 
into them. A report was to be considered by the Executive Council and a draft of an 
amended law would soon be sent to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (MP C9/24). 
However, the suggested amendments never reached the Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
They were opposed outright by CSR and other companies who were consulted by the 
colonial government. The penal clauses - the main bone of contention - remained on the 
statutes until 1947 when they were finally abolished with the passage of Labour Ordinance 
No 23 of that year.
The only other significant attempt by Fijians to organise themselves into a union 
before 1940 occurred in 1933. In this instance too, the formation of the Fijian Teachers’ 
Association was instigated by two Europeans - the Director of Education and the Principal 
of Queen Victoria School. The FTA’s formation, however, constituted a breakaway move 
by indigenous Fijian teachers from the Fiji Teachers’ Union (Thiele 1976:34) and the role 
of the two Europeans was divisive. The Fiji Teachers Union had itself been formed in
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1931 through a merger of two teachers unions which were also originally established by 
Europeans employed at Methodist and governments schools in 1924 and 1928. These 
efforts followed the formation by Europeans of an association of civil servants in 1921. It 
is significant to note that while the colonial government opposed the idea of organisations 
of Fijian labour, European white-collar workers were permitted to organise.
In the early colonial period then, the critical role played by the colonial state is 
apparent: firstly in procuring labour for capital on terms favourable to the latter; secondly 
in coercing labourers who had been contracted to perform work for their employers by 
criminalising labourers’ breaches of contract; and thirdly, by suppressing collective action 
by workers and frustrating or subvening their efforts to organise. Long after the abolition 
of both the Pacific Island labour trade and the Indian indenture system, and despite the 
existence of purportedly protective native labour ordinances, Fijian and Indian labourers in 
Fiji remained ‘unfree’, in bondage to employers under a contract system of labour that the 
colonial state enforced. This was an era of unabashed, undisguised coercion by the state 
on behalf of capital.
The Change in Colonial Labour Policy
As the 1930’s drew to a close, however, and later with the effects of changes 
ushered in by the Second World War, the colonial state in Fiji, in conformity with colonial 
labour reforms throughout the British empire, altered its practice of overt coercion. A 
more subtle strategy of control, based on the nurturing of moderate labour unions and the 
cooption of its leaders, was adopted.
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The radical change in colonial labour policy that occurred in the 1940’s resulted in 
the establishment of a labour office, the enactment of legislation to give formal rights to 
trade unions and the adoption of a conscious policy of forming labour unions. These 
developments were in keeping with the first comprehensive labour policy adopted by the 
Colonial Office in London. The four cornerstones of the policy involved: enacting 
legislation to give formal rights to trade unions; establishing a labour office or department 
within each colonial administration and seconding experienced British trade unionists to 
these offices; actively encouraging the development of the trade union movement; and 
creating Labour Advisory Boards within each colony with equal representation of 
employers and workers. Extolling the virtues of Britain’s new labour policy for the 
colonies, B.C. Roberts wrote:
what has been unique about the development of trade unions in (the 
colonies) is the fact that they were actively promoted by the United 
Kingdom government. At a time when there had been few manifestations 
of the desire to organise, the British government introduced a policy which 
deliberately encouraged the growth of unions and the establishment of a 
system of industrial relations modelled on that which had emerged in 
Britain’ (Roberts, 1964: xv).
The new labour policy did not simply represent enlightened or prescient judgement as 
Roberts suggests. Nor did it emerge in a context in which there had been "few 
manifestations of the desire to organise", as Roberts claims. The policy change was 
primarily motivated by self-interest and emerged in large part as a direct response to 
events taking place in the colonies. It was also partly the result of international attention 
paid to what was happening in the colonies by the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO).
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Prior to 1930, the Colonial Office had had no labour policy as such (Roberts 
1964:170-171). Colonial administrations were afforded a free hand in determining policy 
on labour matters and, as we have seen in the case of Fiji, most often they did so with the 
interests of European capital foremost in mind - introducing and ‘regulating’ indenture 
labour schemes that involved the transportation of labour from one colony to another to 
supply plantations and mines operated by European capital and/or adopting policies 
compelling indigenous people to take up wage employment. In both cases, legislation 
usually provided both the means of assuring capital of a contracted labour force and 
measures with which to ensure that workers did not combine to take action against either 
the owners of capital or the state.
The fact that colonial administrations took upon themselves wide powers of 
discretion in matters of labour policy did not necessarily mean that the Colonial Office 
was unaware of their policies or actions. By the end of World War 1, however, and 
particularly with the creation in 1919 of the ILO, which focussed international attention on 
labour standards in the territories of ILO member nations, the Colonial Office began to be 
held accountable for what went on in the colonies. Labour conditions in Britain’s East 
African territories became the uncomfortable subject of several petitions and parliamentary 
debates during the 1920’s and a number of despatches were sent to the Governors of these 
territories by the Secretary of State to the Colonies.14 By the 1930’s, the Colonial Office 
was also confronted with the growing reality of nationalist movements and other 
manifestations of popular organisation and resistance in the colonies. Recognising the 
wider political implications of workers organising spontaneously or independently, it began 
to see wisdom in promoting worker organisations, so long as they could be made to
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conform with a model of unionism circumscribed by law and be sympathetically 
supervised and guided to ensure their ‘proper development’ (Roberts 1964:178).
Ii is in this context that the despatches to the colonies from Secretaries of State for 
the Colonies, Sidney Webb and W.G.A. Ormbsy-Gore in 1930 and 1937 respectively, 
should be read. Indeed Webb’s dispatch, which directed colonial governments to pass 
legislation to give formal rights to trade unions,15 stressed the importance of supervising 
organisadons of labour. Webb emphasised that without such supervision workers could 
fall under the ‘domination of disaffected persons, by whom their activities might be 
diverted to improper and mischievous ends’ (Bowen 1954:4). He specifically 
recommended, to those drafting legislation, the compulsory registration of trade unions 
(Roberts 1964:178). Provision for compulsory registration was a significant feature of 
India’s Trade Union Act, introduced in 1929 in an effort to control militant unionism. As 
Roberts (1964:172) recounts, the alleged involvement of Indian and British ‘communists’ 
in the rapid flowering of Indian trade unions in the 1920’s and in the upsurge of labour 
strikes in that decade led the Indian colonial administration to arrest leading Indian 
communists and to introduce a Trade Union Act.16 As with the passage of the Trade 
Union Act in India, actual implementation of the new labour policy in other colonies 
would follow events in those colonies and would essentially be aimed at containing and 
controlling the incipient challenge presented by newly-emergent labour movements to the 
colonial state.
Although not much happened in the colonies for ten years following Webb’s 
dispatch, by 1940 a revolution of sorts began to take place throughout the empire,
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stimulated in part by the Colonial Welfare and Development Act (1940), which made 
economic assistance from Britain for capital works conditional upon the existence of 
"reasonable facilities for the establishment and activities of trade unions" and upon "fair 
conditions of labour (being) observed in carrying out the works".17 A report issued by 
the Colonial Office in 1941 and tabled at the ILO Conference in New York that year, 
entitled ‘Supervision of Conditions under which Labour is Employed in the Colonial 
Empire’, detailed the rapid progress that had already been made in implementing the 
policy. The development of free labour organisations was being encouraged as was the 
establishment of advisory boards, arbitration courts and conciliation and wages boards. 
New Labour Departments had been formed and legislation introduced to improve working 
conditions and raise the standards of living. Experienced British trade unionists were 
trained to go out to the colonies as labour advisors to "help native workers to realise their 
ideals" and experienced officers of the Ministry of Labour were seconded to colonial 
governments. The number of colonies with labour departments rose in four years from 11 
to 23 (CSO FA 115/26/1).
The Establishment of a Labour Department in Fiji
In Fiji, the colonial administration apparently took voluntary steps to implement the 
policy late in 1939. Without awaiting the secondment of an experienced officer from the 
Labour Department in Britain, it appointed one of its former colonial officers, Stuart Reay, 
as Industrial Relations Officer. At the time of his appointment, Reay was in England on 
leave. Preparation for his new job included a few weeks at the Ministry of Labour in 
London and visits to the labour departments of Mauritius - "to study modem treatment of 
labour problems" - and North and Southern Rhodesia, the Belgian Congo and the Rand
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and Natal in South Africa, before returning to Fiji in January 1940 (Annual Report of the 
Industrial Relations Officer 1940). Two years later, with the establishment of a Labour 
Department, Reay became the first Commissioner of Labour, a post he held until his 
retirement in 1953. It was in these first 14 years that the Labour Department enacted 
legislation to give formal rights to trade unions and embarked on a policy of promoting 
the formation of trade unions. This radical change in the colonial state’s official stance on 
labour unions in Fiji, from one of "overt hostility to active promotion" (Howard 1985:2), 
is what we now turn to examine.
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Endnotes
1. Many of these land claims were highly suspect and a Lands Claims Commission 
appointed in 1875 (which reported back in 1882) recognised only 414, 615 acres as 
having been properly alienated to Europeans (Narayan 1984:24). Between 1905 
and 1908, a further 104,142 acres of Fijian land were alienated under the 
governorship of Sir Everard Im Thurn.
2. Routledge argues that Gordon’s inability to quote examples weakened the force of 
his allegations, and that the allegations of slavery stemmed from prejudiced minds 
that did not understand the Fijian polity. Routledge’s argument is that the rules of 
war in the Fijian polity gave the victor the right to "do as he pleased" with the land 
and people he conquered. As he put it: "conquered people knew what to expect. 
An (isoro) would be demanded, its presentation indicating that the land and people 
were for the victor to do with as he pleased" (1985:141).
3. Between 1875 and 1879 export earnings from the produce of Fijians accounted for 
30 per cent of total state revenue. Sutherland points out the significance to capital 
of this contribution: "to the extent that the state’s financial needs were met by 
peasant taxes, the tax pressure on capital was correspondingly reduced" (1984:86). 
Peasant production, in other words, contributed generally to the reproduction of 
European capital. By 1884, Fijians were producing 8,884 tons (about 12 per cent) 
of the total cane crushed that year, by 1900, their output had reached 15,447 tons. 
Moynagh (1981:18) notes the extreme duress under which Fijians produced cane 
and their hostility to the compulsion to do so.
4. By ‘mode of production’ I mean the "way in which surplus is produced and its use 
controlled" (Bottomore et. al. 1983:337). In the Fiji context, the pre-capitalist 
mode of production to which I refer has been variously termed a "chiefly mode of 
production" (Naidu 1988:62) and a "tributary mode of production" (Sutherland 
1984). In this mode of production chiefs were the "centres of accumulation and 
redistribution" (Naidu 1988:65).
5. This is not to say that open resistance did not occur. Sixty-one percent of reported 
charges by indentured labourers against employers in the years 1886-1897 
concerned incidents of battery and assault (Leckie 1990). Moreover, workers 
sometimes delivered violence against supervisors and properly (See Naidu 1980:56- 
69).
6. According to Lai (1984:146), Ordinance No XIV was Governor Thurston’s 
response to planter anxieties about "growing Indian insubordination", and to their 
complaints to the colonial government that the economy, "already in a desperate 
state, would collapse" if the problem was not dealt immediately. He also mentions 
a statement from one Inspector Caruthers that the Koronivia strike represented "a 
growing disregard for the power and punishment of the law" and that greater 
control over the labourers was required.
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7. The earliest effort at unionisation was made in October 1920 when the ‘Fiji Indian 
Labour Federation’ - a union of Indian cane growers and labourers - was formed. 
The "driving force behind the union was a Bengal-born teacher resident at Nadi, 
N.B. Mitter, who was elected President. The Union presented a log of claims to 
the CSR but was denied recognition by the colonial government and the company, 
the latter seeing the Federation as headed by "agitators incapable of representing 
the best interests of the workers" (Ali 1980:77). The company’s intransigent 
attitude towards demands put to it by the Federation led to the 1921 strike.
8. The 1921 Colonial Report for instance, while acknowledging that there was "little 
doubt...that the fundamental cause" (of a strike by Indian workers in the sugar 
industry that began in February that year), "was economic in character consequent 
upon..increased cost of living", went on to add that "political agitation .in sympathy 
with the national movement in India" had "fanned the discontent". The CSR and 
other planters insisted that the aim of the strike was political not economic and was 
one of "fomenting sedition by making economic redress impossible through 
extremism" (Ali 1980:80). The 1920 strike was similarly reviewed as political by 
Governor Rodwell (Ali 1980:46).
9. Ali discusses the role of Indian women in the 1920 strike, citing Rodwell’s view 
that "gangs of women of the lowest class were organised to intimidate workers 
with obscene language and filthy practices" and the Fiji Times’ (9/2/20) warning 
that "Indian women are being organised into intimidation parties of six and eight" 
(1980:148-50). In the February 11 riot, Indian women strike supporters beat up 
two policemen who tried to arrest one of them.
10. Details of the strikers’ 16 demands are outlined in Ali (1980:79-80).
11. The provision requiring consent of the chief (buli) was withdrawn in 1888.
12. Bain points out the fallacy of protection afforded Fijian labour by the Native 
Labour Ordinances and says many planters and Fijian labourers escaped these 
controls by contracting under the Masters and Servants Ordinance of 1898 to which 
practice the colonial government in Fiji turned a blind eye.
13. The 1895 ordinance explicitly defined task work for Fijian labour. The definition 
was that used for task work where Indian labour was concerned and meant: "any 
work the pay for which is estimated by the amount performed irrespective of the 
time occupied in its performance" (cited in Bain 1988:132).
14. Of particular embarrassment was Kenya where forced labour and other extreme 
measures were sanctioned by the colonial government to ‘encourage’ workers to 
enter wage employment.
15. The despatch of W.G.A. Ormsby-Gore contained similar urging and declared that 
"workers are entitled to a fair share of the improvements in the financial position 
of the colonies" (Roberts 1964).
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16. As Roberts explains it, the events in India - particularly the arrest of active 
communist members of trade unions and their trial at Meerut for seditious activity - 
provoked a storm of protest in Britain and sharply divided opinion within the 
British labour movement. It was largely for this reason that, on its return to power 
in 1929, the Labour Government of Ramsay MacDonald gave some priority to 
colonial labour matters (Roberts 1964:172-174).
17. This provision in the Act was "permissive" rather than "mandatory" according to 
Morgan (1980:124), who suggests that the Colonial Office and colonial 
governments did not take the purpose of Section 1(2) (a) of the Act - ie the 
encouragement of trade unions - very seriously at all. He cites the case of an 
inquiry from the High Commissioner of Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and 
Swaziland where there was no legislation recognising trade unions. The High 
Commissioner was assured that "providing he was satisfied there was nothing in 
the law to prevent trade unions being formed and functioning, the scheme in 
question might be commenced" (Morgan 1980:124).
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CHAPTER THREE
THE LABOUR POLICY AND PRACTICES OF THE COLONIAL STATE IN FIJI
1942-1956
Introduction
The new labour policy adopted by the colonial government in Fiji and the practices 
of the Labour Department as a new office or agency within the colonial state were aimed 
at both managing the ‘labour problem’, latent or apparent, and preventing the emergence 
or development of an independent, militant and politically-conscious labour movement in 
Fiji. This chapter covers the period from 1940 - when the foundation for a Labour 
Department was laid with Reay’s appointment - to 1956, just prior to the emergence of a 
new phase of trade union militancy. It examines the enactment of the Industrial 
Associations Ordinance of 1942, the first ordinance providing for the existence of trade 
unions, within the context of independent attempts to form general workers’ unions; the 
passage of the Industrial Disputes (Conciliation and Arbitration) Ordinance in the same 
year, an ordinance designed in the interests of the colonial economy and of capital; the 
seemingly contradictory roles played by the department in creating trade unions amongst 
unorganised Fijian workers on the one hand, while employing various mechanisms and 
ideologies to contain and disorganise them on the other; the co-option of the first peak 
organisation of labour unions and the subversion of unions which defied the approved 
model or otherwise did not meet with the department’s approval. It is argued that the 
function of the Labour Department, as part of the apparatus of the colonial state, was 
essentially political, that is, to contain and co-opt labour through the enactment of 
constraining legislation, the encouragement or establishment of unions (especially within
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najor unorganised industries dominated by indigenous Fijian workers) and, where 
lecessary, the creation of alternative industrial relations machinery.
When Reay took up his appointment in January 1940 the Masters and Servants 
Ordinance of 1890 and the Fijian Labour Ordinance of 1899 were still on the statutes. 
The survival of the contract labour system and of penal sanctions in these laws was both a 
testimony to the colonial state’s continued role in safeguarding the interest of employers 
(as opposed to that of workers) and a continuing source of embarrassment to the Colonial 
Office. Several times over the previous two decades the Colonial Office had impressed 
upon the colonial government in Fiji the urgent need to repeal those laws, but without 
success (See MP 637/24; MP 4285/23). In 1939, just prior to Reay’s appointment, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies had written to the Administration in Fiji asking for an 
overhaul of the colony’s labour laws and the abolition, in particular, of its penal clauses. 
He pointed out especially the need to delete the penal clause relating to harbouring 
workers who had left their employers before their contracts were complete (Minutes 
18.8.41 F36/32). The request was ignored and two reminder cables had to be sent before 
the Governor, Sir Harry Luke, sent a reply two years later.
Although some officers of the colonial government might have shared the opinion 
of the Colonial Office that the contract labour system and penal sanctions were repugnant 
to modem conceptions of labour relations, there was a great deal of reticence about 
actually amending the laws. The government most often found itself catering to the 
interests of plantation and commercial capital, especially the Colonial Sugar Refining 
Company, the colony’s largest employer whose interests it always took into account and
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whom it often consulted. It thus circumvented or simply ignored directives from the 
Colonial Office (MP 637/24; MP 4285/23). It was also given to rationalising the retention 
of the contract system at least for some industries, notably the copra industry.1 And 
capital’s view that penal sanctions were necessary came to be tacitly shared by colonial 
officials. As late as 1939, colonial officers were arguing that any new legislation should 
incorporate penal clauses (Minutes 8.14.39 F36/32). Knowing that no new legislation with 
such provisions would make it past the Colonial Office, but that the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies
‘might not feel obliged to order the repeal of such clauses from existing
legislation (Minute from Attorney General, 16.1.39 F36/32)
the colonial government effectively decided not to tamper with the laws, although it went 
through the motions of drafting a bill to repeal them in 1943. Consequently, the 
ordinances remained intact until 1947, when Labour Ordinance No.23 was finally passed 
by the Legislative Council.
This is not to say that the drafting of labour legislation was not considered a 
priority by the colonial government in this period. Two bills drafted in 1941 were in fact 
considered urgent, the Industrial Associations Ordinance and the Industrial Disputes 
(Conciliation and Arbitration) Ordinance. Both laws were necessary for the
implementation of the colonial government’s new labour policy as we shall see.
Subverting the Development of General Unions
When the proposed Industrial Associations Ordinance was first debated in the 
Legislative Council late in 1941, European MLC’s, fearing the bill would encourage trade
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unions, strongly opposed its introduction arguing that it was unnecessary given Fiji’s long 
history of industrial peace, and that such organisations would only become centres of 
division and dispute (Mayer 1963:68). The government responded, perhaps more frankly 
than it realised, that since unions were already in existence, the only course was to see 
that they followed constitutional methods. The Industrial Associations Ordinance has been 
commonly judged as a positive development for the trade union movement in Fiji, 
providing as it did for the legal existence of trade unions and protecting them from 
liability to prosecution for being "in restraint of trade" (Kumar 1974). That it was devised 
more as a means to contain and control trade unions is, however, clear.
Until 1942 when the two new ordinances came into effect there was no legislation 
covering either trade unions or the settlement of trade disputes. Under an English Act 
which then applied to the colonies, unions or industrial associations could be formed but 
could not be registered. They were therefore not legal bodies (Reay 1951:1). In one 
sense this left them in an advantageous position in that they were able to exist without 
being subject to any form of control. Indeed Reay confirmed that prior to the passage of 
the new law, trade unions did have a ‘much freer hand’ (Minutes 23/7/41, F36/185). 
However, in the absence of employer recognition, such status was meaningless. 
Moreover, in the context of the colonial situation where workers were ignorant of what 
rights they did have under British law and where the colonial government dealt punitively 
with those seen as agitators of labour, such theoretical freedom was similarly meaningless. 
Although the first effective industrial association, the Kisan Sangh or Farmers’ Union, had 
gained recognition from the CSR in 1940 and was negotiating with the company on behalf 
of growers in May of the following year - that is, before the Ordinance was introduced - it
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was only through pressure from the colonial government that the company had conceded 
recognition of the union. The colonial government had been primarily concerned about 
the law and order implications of continued company resistance as cane fanners were then 
in a serious dispute with the company over a proposed new method of calculating the 
price of cane (Moynagh 1981:161). It had actually threatened that if the company did not 
recognise the union, it would introduce legislation for compulsory recognition of trade 
unions and arbitration in the case of unresolved disputes. The company, not wishing to 
have collective bargaining imposed on it in a way that allowed for outside intervention, 
conceded, hoping to appease both the growers and the government (Moynagh 1981:161).
The Industrial Associations Ordinance, when it came, however, did not make it 
mandatory for employers to recognise trade unions. Indeed it was only with the help of 
pressure or persuasion from the Labour Department that recognition for many workers’ 
unions was won in the next few years. This gave the department a very crucial role and a 
significant degree of power. The Ordinance was to be the means by which the state 
would legitimately take action against any trade unions which did not conform to either 
the model structure or model practices laid down in the ordinance and promoted by the 
colonial government. Moreover, there is some evidence that the Ordinance was designed 
to prevent the emergence of large and powerful general unions. The Ordinance might in 
fact have been enacted sooner than planned to curtail attempts to form such organisations, 
as will be shown below.
Between 1940 and 1944 at least four attempts to form large general unions 
foundered or were subverted. The first of these was the Mazdur Sangh (Workers’ Union),
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formally constituted at a meeting in Wailailai, Lautoka in July 1940 (Hince 1971:370). 
The Sangh was conceived as a large general union, intended to cover workers in all 
industries and was the manifestation of an idea which had been around for some time. 
Indeed, the foundations of the Mazdur Sangh were laid as early as 1938 when, with the 
help of leaders of the Kisan Sangh, it was tentatively formed with the support of sugar 
mill workers. In 1944, four years after its formal establishment, the Sangh changed its 
constitution, confining itself to the sugar industry (as the Chini Mazdur Sangh or Sugar 
Workers’ Union). This course of action was taken to enable it to register under the 
Ordinance. Earlier attempts to register as a general union had been unsuccessful.
A second attempt to form a general union was made by a builder and contractor 
named Arthur Groom. Although this union did not materialise, the colonial government’s 
reaction to its proposed formation reveals the intentions behind the Industrial Associations 
Ordinance which was then being drafted. Groom had written to the Colonial Secretary 
saying he had been requested by
‘quite a number of mechanics to commence and organise a Union to be
known as (The Workers Union)’(F36/185 1941).
Aware that the government was about to pass legislation providing for the existence of 
trade unions he asked if there would be any objection to his ‘starting off with one’ 
(Groom to Colonial Secretary 11.7.41 F36/185). Groom’s idea was to include both Indian 
and Fijian labourers but to exclude clerks and salesmen in stores. This was probably 
intended to exclude the European workers who were predominant in the latter job 
categories. The idea of forming a single union of both skilled tradesmen, who were
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mainly mixed-race, and unskilled labourers, who were mainly Fijian and Indian, was 
clearly intended to cut across the racially based occupational structure that underlay the 
colonial economy.2
A second letter from Groom, a month later, reiterated the intention to form a union 
and the desire to enlist members as soon as possible in order to come into operation by 
January 1, 1942. Seeking an interview with the Governor, he wrote:
Once we start and call a public meeting and enroll names it will cause quite 
a stir amongst the workers particularly amongst the Indians (Groom to 
Colonial Secretary 19.8.41 F36/185).
The Acting Colonial Secretary, Johnson, informed Groom that the action he 
contemplated was ‘premature’ as the whole question of trade union legislation was 
presently under consideration (Johnson to Groom 7.8.41). He was denied an audience 
with the Governor but invited to make representations to the Government once ‘any 
legislation which the Government eventually decided to introduce is published in the 
Gazette’ (Johnson to Groom 8.9.41 F36/185). Johnson noted that Groom ‘had the 
reputation of being useless and lazy’ and was of the opinion that the two letters from him 
were instigated by someone else and not the outcome of Groom’s own energies (Minutes 
2.9.41, F36/185). The suggested presence of an Indian agitator behind Groom is implicit. 
It is Reay’s comment on the matter, however, which is most revealing of the colonial 
government’s concerns about such developments and of the intentions of the planned new 
law. In direct reference to Groom’s endeavours, he wrote:
What success these efforts will meet with will remain to be seen but I 
would point out that the legislation now in draft which, it has been
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suggested, will encourage trade unions, is specifically designed to prevent 
federation. It was South Africa which devised this form of legislation and 
Mauritius is the only part of the empire to have adopted it. Having got its 
legislation the Mauritius government hastily organised a number of small 
trade unions in various industries and districts with the object of defeating 
the intentions of the Indian Labour Party who wished to weld all workers 
into one powerful group. Under the legislation, if a union of sugar workers 
exists in, say, Ba, government could deny any other union the right to 
include Ba sugar workers in its membership. Until we get this legislation 
we are powerless to prevent this sort of thing and if a ‘One Big Union’ gets 
established before we have that power it will be difficult and perhaps 
impossible to dislodge it. Safety lies in restricting unions to trades and 
localities. As things are now, pre-1875 English legislation gives trade 
unions a much freer hand than is intended under the draft bill (Minutes 
23.7.41 F36/185).(Emphasis added)
Reay’s minute discloses both the source and the real intention of the new ordinance 
- to defeat what were considered politically inspired efforts to form large general unions 
which could be used as political bases, especially by Indian politicians. The carte blanche 
that colonial administrations had in devising new laws to give formal rights to trade 
unions in accordance with the policy directive from London, is significant. In the hands 
of Reay, who, it should be reiterated, was neither an experienced officer of the British 
Labour Ministry nor an experienced British trade unionist but rather an agent of the 
colonial government in Fiji, the legislation that had been drafted was designed to be an 
important tool of control.
Although no more was heard from Arthur Groom, a public meeting was held at the 
Lilac theatre in Suva in July 1942 to establish a general workers’ union, the Workers’ 
Trade Union. Its instigators apparently were a well-known elected Indian Member of the 
Legislative Council, Vishnu Deo and a storekeeper and political agitator, Sahodar Singh. 
About 150 people reportedly attended the meeting, but this was far short of expected
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numbers and it was thought many might have stayed away from fear. The meeting was 
also amended by the acting Indian Assistant to the District Commissioner Southern, who 
filed a report to the Colonial Secretary on what transpired. According to this report, Singh 
told the meeting that labourers in the colony were not treated as humans and were being 
‘worked to a standstill’; that in other countries where there were unions wages were much 
higher and hours of work and conditions were regulated. He called on workers to state 
their grievances, saying they had nothing to be afraid of and if the Labour Ordinance was 
brought into force the body they were forming could be registered and their claims 
recognised (Acting Indian Assistant to DC Southern to Col. Sec. 13.7.42 F36/90).
The meeting formed a body to be known as the Workers’ Trade Union and 
formulated a constitution. Singh was elected president. All of the men elected as office 
bearers of the union were self-employed or white-collar workers but evidently a majority 
of the 150 who attended the meeting were labourers. Both Vishnu Deo’s and Singh’s 
addresses to the meeting turned on the wages and conditions of labourers and emphasised 
that workers themselves should be office-bearers of the Union for their own interests 
(F36/90). The meeting passed a resolution that the Union seek a 7/6 minimum daily wage 
for unskilled workers. Over the next three months the Workers’ Trade Union wrote 
numerous letters to the colonial government. A file of correspondence between the union 
and the Colonial Office bears testimony to the union’s activity. Amongst the issues it 
raised were demands for a minimum wage of 7s 6d a day, for a commission to look into 
the cost of living of all classes in the community and prevailing salaries and wages; and 
for effect to be given to all ordinances relating to labour and labour organisations without 
delay to "enable workers to legalise their position and improve their lot". The WTU also
57
drew to the government’s attention other matters such as workers being dismissed without 
cause from work sites (Singh to Colonial Secretary 21.7.42, 5.8.42, 11.8.42 F36/90).
Reay’s relationship with the Union and with Deo was cordial. He replied to each 
of the Union’s letters and acted twice on the matter of dismissed workers, placing them in 
alternative employment (Reay to Singh 24.8.42). He also saw Deo to explain matters to 
him and suggested he ‘send along his president’ as well. Despite this de facto recognition 
of the Union and the cordiality of relations between Deo and Reay, the emergence of the 
WTU under Vishnu Deo’s leadership was not, in fact, a welcome development. Reay’s 
real feelings were made clear in a Minute he wrote in July 1942. In this he disparaged 
Deo’s past efforts at organising workers in the colony, but added that :
the pinch of rising costs is being felt, particularly by Indians, and this plays 
into the hands of the men - nearly all non workers - who for their own 
political ends try to organise the masses. If too much notice is taken by the 
government of representations like these here it is likely to strengthen the 
hands of the men we want to keep out of these unions. (Minutes 26/7/42 
F36/90)
Written requests from the union to the Colonial Secretary, for representation on all 
committees government might appoint to deal with matters relating to labour, employment, 
industrial disputes, conciliation and regulation of wages (21.8.42, 2.10.42, 14.10.42 
F36/90), drew a contradictory response from the government. Up until this time the 
government’s war-time committee dealing with labour, the Central Labour Committee, had 
no representatives of labour on it for the stated reason that "labour was not sufficiently 
organised to be able to select a representative of workers" (F36/90). Although there was 
now a general workers’ union in existence and seeking to represent labour on this
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committee, the government repeatedly told it that the Committee was "not assigned to 
represent either employers or workers (Minutes 26.7.42 F36/90). The Union was 
persistent in its demand. By September, a new argument could be used to deny its request 
and to end correspondence with it. In that month the Industrial Associations Ordinance 
was gazetted and a few days later it came into force. Its timely enactment enabled the 
government to inform the union (initially through the Secretary for Indian Affairs) that 
until it had complied with the law and obtained registration government could neither 
recognise nor correspond with it as an association representing workers (Minutes 3.11.42; 
Reay to Singh 8.11.42 F36/90). The union was informed in October that, as then 
constituted, it could not register. The significance of the legislation as a means of 
controlling unions is then apparent.
The fact that the Secretary for Indian Affairs communicated the government’s 
response to the union also indicated that the colonial government was treating the union as 
an organisation of Indians, rather than of workers. While it may well have been a fact 
that most of the workers involved in the formation of the WTU were Indian, its leaders 
did not project it as a communal organisation but rather as an all-encompassing union of 
workers. The colonial government’s action in treating it as such was as indicative of its 
usual tendency to see things racially as it was of its intention to marginalise the 
organisation. In November 1943, when the union had still not been dissolved in 
accordance with Section Three (Subsection 5) of the legislation, the Attorney General 
wrote to its leaders warning that contravention of the legislation was an offence (25.11.43 
F36/90).
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The case of the WTU demonstrates both the intention and the effectiveness of the
new law in terms of limiting trade unions to specific industries and giving the state a high 
degree of control over them. This did not immediately put a stop to efforts to form one 
big union. The appearance of a General Labourers’ Association, apparently around the 
time of the WTU’s dissolution, giving rise to the suspicion that what had occurred was "in 
substance a change of name intended to defeat the Ordinance" (Attorney General to 
Commissioner of Police 5.10.44, 16.10.44 F36/97), drew the attention of the authorities 
five months later. The Commissioner of Police was directed by the Attorney General to 
investigate the existence of an organisation called the ‘General Labourers’ Association’ 
with a view to prosecuting its office bearers for failing to register under Section 14(i) of 
the Ordinance, which made it an offence to fail to register an industrial association within 
one month of its formation. Sahodar Singh had, in fact, written to the Attorney General on 
29 November 1943 on General Labourers’ Association letterhead to say the WTU had 
been dissolved. Following investigations, the Commissioner of Police informed the 
Attorney General that although the GLA was proposed as a substitute for the WTU, 
support had not been forthcoming and it had foundered (Commissioner of Police to AG 
1.11.44 F36/97).
Whether the WTU was ever properly advised as to how it should constitute itself 
in order to register, and whether its leaders would have been prepared to forego the 
concept of a general union and opt, as the Mazdur Sangh did, to concentrate in one 
industry instead, is unclear. When Vishnu Deo raised a question in the Legislative 
Council in May 1944, the government claimed that assistance and advice had been given 
by the Commissioner of Labour and the Registrar of Industrial Associations to unions in
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preparing their constitutions and rules of association for registration and that such advice 
was always available to those who wished to form labour associations. But it was clear 
from the WTU episode that Singh and Deo were men the colonial government wanted to 
keep out of unions. Deo was regarded as an agitator, interested in "organising the masses" 
for his own political ends. Singh was noted for his outspoken criticism of the colonial 
government and his sometimes "subversive outbursts" in the vernacular Indian press 
(Confidential Memo from the Adviser on Native Affairs and DC Southern to Colonial 
Secretary 31.7.42 F36/90). Neither fitted the colonial government’s model of men suitable 
to lead the sort of labour unions it would encourage over the next decade. That these 
unions were intended to be responsible organisations led by moderate men is clear. In 
1951, Reay wrote proudly:
It is satisfactory to record that, so far, the labour section of the trade union 
movement (unlike the farmer section) has not got into the hands of 
politicians. In some unions venality and irresponsibility are to be found but 
none of the labour unions can be described as militant. Still less is there 
evidence of communist influence and those employers who once suspected 
this influence every time a man tried to form a union, no longer allege it.
(Reay 2.8.51)
The idea of forming "one big union" did not immediately subside. A weekly 
workers’ newspaper, Mazdur, that began publishing in Hindi in May 1949 printed 
numerous articles and letters from trade unionists reiterating the desire and need to unite 
workers and form "one big union" (F62/353). The newspaper, which was translated by the 
government’s Public Relations Officer, L. G. Usher, and carefully monitored for 
‘communist influence’, was aimed at uniting workers. Articles repeatedly called for a 
single union for Public Works Department Employees and for a "federation of all trade 
unions in Fiji". As we shall see the federation of labour unions that was eventually formed 
in 1951 was facilitated by the colonial government and functioned as a co-opted agency.
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As for the new law, although it did confer rights and immunities on industrial 
associations and, in so doing, laid the basis for collective bargaining, it by no means 
provided for the compulsory recognition of trade unions by employers and was therefore 
hardly an enabling mechanism for trade unions. Little was gained through this legislation 
for the union movement. The ordinance was clearly a controlling device, making it 
mandatory for all industrial associations (whether of employees, employers or fanners) to 
register under the Ordinance. In order to be able to do so, all associations had to meet 
certain statutory requirements. Amongst other things, their constitutions had to have 
provisions for membership qualifications, the conduct of meetings and elections, keeping 
of accounts and the maintenance of membership lists. Such provisions provided enonnous 
power to the state which had the means of subjecting associations to official inquiries 
under provisions of the Ordinance. Moreover, associations had to be confined to a 
particular industry. Although the government justified these restrictive aspects of the 
legislation as necessary to protect workers’ organisations from becoming vehicles for 
politicians, it is clear that generally the Ordinance did provide the government with the 
means of closely supervising the affairs of such organisations and of allowing or 
disallowing unions to exist. The Administrator General was made the Registrar of 
Industrial Associations, charged with responsibility for seeing that all Associations formed 
met the requirements of the Act, were registered (or dissolved), and were complying with 
their constitutions.
The Industrial Disputes (Conciliation and Arbitration) Ordinance, also enacted in 
1942, was equally significant. It made provision for conciliation "on conventional lines" 
and in addition permitted the Governor in Council to require the parties to a dispute to
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submit to and be bound by the decision of an arbitration court. Although no arbitration 
court was appointed under this ordinance until 1951, the provision for compulsory 
arbitration, which Reay described as "most unusual" and "existing in only one other 
colony, Mauritius" was, as he explained,
intended for use in a major dispute threatening the economic life of the 
colony where all other means of settlement have been explored without 
success. (Reay 1951:1)
In other words, it was intended to provide the government with a means of quickly settling 
any serious dispute that threatened the interests of European commercial capital, 
particularly sugar capital. The act was an adjunct to the Industrial Associations
Ordinance. While, on the one hand, the colonial government was giving legal rights to 
trade unions, it was taking the precaution of ensuring that, should any serious dispute 
between a union and an employer arise, it could be swiftly and compulsorily settled.
Having established the legislation to ensure that unions could be controlled, the 
department took the next logical step, as the colonial government in Mauritius did, and 
hastily created a number of trade unions in the main unorganised industries. Its interests 
in taking this action were primarily to contain labour militancy, actual or potential, within 
these industries. Where its trade union creations did not produce the desired result, it 
sought to abandon them and to try alternative institutions.
Organising and Disorganising Workers
The department’s activities in creating unions did not commence immediately 
Reay took up his appointment. The Public Works Department Employees Union, the first
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jnion formed by the department, was in fact not registered until 1946. The reason was that 
for the first two years after his appointment to the job, Reay was assigned the task of 
raising and organising labour gangs for wartime services. It was the labour war effort that 
opened Reay’s eyes to the fact that government needed to take swift action in the areas of 
promoting unions, establishing a labour advisory board and generally supervising the 
conditions under which labour was employed in the colonies if it wanted to stay on top of 
things.
Not only did war bring an unprecedented rise in the cost of living but the nature of 
the wartime labour demand placed labour, Reay recognised, in a stronger bargaining 
position vis-a-vis increasing wages. In contrast to an observation he made in 1941 that
The Indian population at the moment is nicely balanced to the requirements 
of industry and in the Fijian villages is a reservoir of labour available at call 
but not vitally affected by contractions in demand (Report of the Industrial 
Relations Officer 1941),
in 1942, Reay commented:
Things are moving quickly in the labour sphere in Fiji and it looks to me as 
if government’s hands will be forced in many directions. (The) condition is 
changing completely and the amount of work - much of it very urgent - is 
in excess of the available labour supply. This situation, puts the labourer in 
a very strong position and it is becoming increasingly the case that 
labourers are turning the situation to their own advantage and at any time 
government may find itself seriously embarrassed. (Minute to the Acting 
Colonial Secretary, 8.6.42 F36/84)
Reay’s concern was not that the amount of work was in excess of the available 
labour since there was, as Reay himself stated in 1941, a reservoir of labour in the
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villages.3 It was rather that the large-scale contraction of this reserve army into wage 
labour threatened to upset the delicate balance the colonial government had always striven 
to maintain whereby Fijians were primarily occupied in the production of food and other 
agricultural commodities but available at call for short term demands on their labour. 
Fijian labourers contracted to work for protracted periods in wartime wage employment 
might, he feared, continue to stay in the towns and seek continued employment rather than 
return to the village to resume a subsistence existence. Reay’s concern was that the 
government might then have to contend with the combined force of a Fijian and Indian 
labouring class.
The first course of action Reay considered necessary was to persuade employers to 
adopt a common stance on wages, to agree not to compete for their labour requirements 
and to see the labour situation in a wider social, economic and political context. He had 
already convened round-table discussions with a number of Suva employers - mercantile 
firms, contractors, the army, the Public Works Department and aerodrome services. The 
competition for labour had, Reay said, brought many difficulties and the cost of living had 
risen to a point where ‘unless government takes the initiative, it will probably come from 
the workers’ (Minute 8.6.42 F36/84).
Secondly, Reay was now also convinced of the need for a Labour Advisory Board. 
He had earlier opposed the concept since "it would have to include unofficial 
representatives of labour and...this would lead to increased pressure on government for 
labour reform which government was either not in position to undertake or for other 
reasons not prepared to undertake" (Minute 8.6.42 F36/84). Now he proposed "a carefully
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chosen labour board on which government, employers, Indian, Fijian and possibly half- 
castes, should be represented" (Minutes 8.6.42 F36/84). The role he envisaged for the 
Board was to advise government on matters relating to labour, labour conditions, 
legislation and problems as they arose. The Board, when it came into existence in 1945, 
was the first tripartite body convened by the government for the ventilation of grievances 
and for discussion and interaction between employers and workers.
Thirdly, Reay saw an urgent need for more personnel within his department. 
Labour matters required more than a "one-man department". He felt out of touch with 
labour matters in Nadi where more than 2000 Fijians were employed by a single 
employer. He needed, he said, the assistance of a "Fijian and Indian of mature years..." 
for at least until the end of the war period. These should be men who possessed qualities 
which would permit him to send them on errands he would not be able to spare the time 
for - men, moreover, that he could "trust" (Minute 8.6.42 F36/84). Revealing a particular 
concern about Fijian labour, he wrote:
There is a real need for closer contact with labourers and overseers and 
with the native authorities whose confidence it is necessary to secure. To 
explain what I mean about the latter, I refer to those areas in the southern 
district from which shipping and stevedoring firms recruit their labour. I 
foresee a strong possibility of trouble with stevedoring labour and it is very 
necessary that I should become known to the chiefs and Bulis of the 
districts from which they come. I am having to lean heavily on Ratu 
Sukuna in this respect and he is not always available. This stevedoring 
work at the present time is of course of vital importance (Minute 8.6.42 
F36/84).
Lastly, Reay saw the organisation of unions in key industries as essential. Priority 
was to be given to those industries where ‘trouble’ was expected or already occurring. The 
colony’s largest employers were the government itself, the CSR and the mining company.
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Together these three employers accounted for about 75 per cent of the regular 
wage-earning labour force (Report by the Industrial Relations Officer, 1941 F36/70) and 
the wage policies of government and the sugar industry tended to influence the whole 
wage structure of industry in the colony (Labour Department Report 1948). Also 
significant in terms of the number of workers in its employment - particularly during war­
time - was the shipping and stevedoring industry which, though not controlled by a single 
employer, was dominated by a small number of large firms. As sugar mill workers had 
already been organised independently under the Chini Mazdur Sangh, it was to its own 
public works department and to the mining and stevedoring industries that the Labour 
Department turned its attention in terms of organising unions.
The Public Works Employees Union
The first union the Labour Department formed was the Public Works Employees’ 
Union. Registered in December 1946 and recorded as having a membership of more than 
1000 in 1947, it was, according to Reddy (1974) both ineffectual and shortlived and was 
deregistered and replaced by an independent rival association, the North Western Public 
Works Employees’ Union, four years later in 1950. It seems curious that the PWEU was 
struck off the register in 1950; it had successfully negotiated a wage increase for its 
members in 1949 despite the fact that the government was intent on keeping its wage bill 
down and was rethinking the practice carried over from the war years of making automatic 
cost-of-living adjustments to wages. From articles in the Mazdur, it appears that the union 
was being challenged by a rival union in 1949 (F62/353). Whether the colonial 
government played a role in the formation of the rival, regionally-based PWD union is 
unknown. However, the Labour Department reported "strained relations" between the
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Public Works Employees’ Union and the PWD in its 1952 Report and revealed that the 
PWD considered that the Union represented only a section of PWD workers (ie. unskilled 
workers). The Department proposed the establishment of an alternative machinery. This 
did not eventuate but, a year later, an exclusively Fijian union of PWD employees was 
formed (Labour Commissioner’s Report, 1952). The Public Works Fijian Workers Union 
was registered on 27th November, 1953. While the Labour Department professed concern 
over the racial exclusivity of the union and the fact that there were two unions in the 
industry, it nonetheless allowed it to register, thereby tacitly encouraging the splinter 
union.
The chequered history of the PWD Employees Union appears to have been the 
result of covert colonial government action vis-a-vis the organisation of workers under its 
own control. Such action could only have been motivated by the objectives of keeping 
wages down, workers’ leaders in check and labour under control. The North Western 
Public Works Employees’ Union became the Public Employees Union (Hince 1971:3), 
which continues to exist today.
The Department’s concern to organise the stevedoring and mining industries was 
motivated by a desire to control the frequent unorganised breakdowns in order by Fijian 
labour in these industries. It is useful at this juncture to consider why the colonial 
government was so concerned to contain Fijian labour in particular. Firstly, Indo-Fijian 
labour in the sugar industry (the one industry that Indo-Fijians dominated) was already 
divided, not only occupationally in terms of growers (farmers) and wage labourers, but 
also organisationally, with the splintering of growers into several fanners’ associations. At
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the end of 1947, the year after the first trade union was formed by the labour department, 
there were seven farmers’ unions in existence.4
Secondly, since gaining recognition from the Company, the Chini Mazdur Sangh or 
Fiji Sugar Industry Employees’ Association had primarily devoted its energies to annually 
reviewing working conditions in the industry and negotiating modest annual or biennial 
wage increases with the CSR. It had posed no problem for the colonial government as it 
had never so much as called a strike and so had met with the colonial government’s 
approval. Indeed, in 1951 Reay wrote of the ‘Sugar Workers’ Union’:
This is a well led, well organised and well managed union. Since its 
formation in 1943 it has secured very substantial gains in wages and 
improvements in the conditions of employment by tough bargaining but has 
never resorted to direct action...The result is that labour relations existing 
between the CSR Company and mill workers are excellent. (Reay 1951:2)
In 1955, the CSR and the Union were described in the Labour Department’s annual report 
as "still setting a good example (Labour Department Report 1955).
Thirdly, in the event of trouble in the sugar industry the government could always 
rely, as it had done in the past, on using Fijian chiefly leaders to draw in Fijian villagers 
as scab labour to force a settlement and return to work by Indian farmers. In short, Indo- 
Fijian farmers in the sugar industry were sufficiently divided and the sugar workers’ union 
sufficiently ‘tame’ to pose little problem for the colonial government. A ‘reserve army’ of 
Fijian labour, moreover, provided additional insurance against havoc being wreaked in the 
economy by organised Indo-Fijian workers in this industry.
69
By contrast, the mining and stevedoring industries which had, of necessity, draw'n 
exclusively on indigenous Fijians for their labour needs, were not only in a state of 
continual unrest but also far harder to control. It was common for the colonial 
government to take a paternalistic, and indeed racist, view of things and to regard the 
situation as part of ‘the Fijian problem’ - that is, the problem of the Fijians’ ‘stage of 
development’. This attitude belied a deeper concern about Fijian wage workers and their 
capacity for organising and taking collective action, even in the absence of a trade union. 
It was with a view to containing uncontrolled or ‘wildcat’ labour actions that labour 
unions came to be formed by the colonial government amongst Fijian workers in the 
stevedoring and mining industries. The department’s efforts in organising the stevedoring 
and mining industries and its attitude to their respective success or failure testifies well to 
its intentions.
The Fiji Stevedores’ Union
The Fiji Stevedores’ Union was the second workers’ union to be organised by the 
department, apparently with the assistance of the Adviser on Native Affairs, prominent 
chief, Ratu Sukuna. This union, which was registered in April 1947, was held up as the 
department’s success story. Its formation was significant in that it followed a major 
reorganisation of recruitment practices in the industry.
During the war years, Reay had expressed concern about the stevedoring industry 
which, in order to carry out work vital to the war effort, was raising vast numbers of men 
from towns and surrounding villages to load and unload ships at the two main ports. In 
1942, some 2000 men had been marshalled into a Fijian Labour Corps (also called the
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Dock Labour Battalion) and were being maintained at the two ports. Reay had expressed 
concern at the strong possibility of trouble in the industry. It was true that minor disputes 
were commonplace on the waterfront. Indeed much of the time of the department’s labour 
inspectors was taken up with sorting out these disputes (Labour Department Report 1943). 
It was largely to deal with this situation that the department took steps to establish the 
union. But the union’s formation was only initiated after the industry had been re­
organised. This reorganisation was significant in terms of the intentions behind it.
In his 1945 report, Reay mentioned he had ‘initiated discussions between half a 
dozen Fijians well known to stevedoring labour and employers on the matters of new 
conditions of employment and on forming a union’ (Labour Department Report 1945 
F36/70). It seems that these discussions resulted in agreement on a proposal by the 
government for the recruitment of dock labour on a casual basis from villages surrounding 
Suva and Lautoka. Under the new system, no more than 150 Suva residents would be 
engaged by the stevedoring companies for dock work. The balance of the industry’s 
labour requirements would be met instead from the 120 or so surrounding villages within 
a 20-mile radius of the towns. These men were to be recruited through the ‘Rokos’ or 
‘Turaga ni Koros’ in these areas by employers who were obliged to transport the workers 
into the towns and accommodate them temporarily in huts made available by the 
government.
The system was not one which employers favoured. Indeed, later reports of the 
Labour Department refer to the fact that employers preferred to hire labour from the 
floating population in the towns and save themselves the costs of transport and
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accommodation and often did not observe the arrangement (Labour Department Reports 
1950, 1952 in F36/70). Reay at one stage in fact suggested that legislation might be 
necessary to compel them to do so. He argued that it was in the best interests of 
employers and of society (and government) in general "to prevent the growth of a large, 
urban-based casual labour force". The practice of recruiting from the villages surrounding 
Suva was "ideal" he rationalised, in that it did not disrupt the village way of life, supplied 
the villagers with income and was cheap for employers, who did not have to maintain a 
fully paid workforce to meet the occasional calls of ships. It avoided, he argued, "a much 
higher wage and bad social consequences" (Labour Report, 1950 F36/70).
Reay’s concern was not to save employers money, especially since they were not 
in favour of the scheme and saw transport and accommodation costs as additional burdens. 
It was rather to limit the growth of an urban Fijian proletariat in Suva and especially to 
avoid the development of solidarity and cohesion that had occurred amongst Fijian 
mineworkers. In the context of a shifting or changeable workforce, the establishment of a 
trade union would serve a primarily symbolic function. Reay was fond of stating that the 
mass of people in Fiji was "not wage-earning but peasants with an interest in the care of 
and an attachment to the land" (Labour Department Report 1941). He complained that
‘(this) fact..sometimes escapes the notice of those who advocate policies 
which have proved beneficial in larger labour communities elsewhere but 
which may be unsuited to Fiji’. (Labour Report 1943)
The notion of the semi-subsistent casual Fijian worker, more attached to his land than 
dependent on the wage, also served to justify the low wages paid to Fijian workers.
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Thus it was that when the Fiji Stevedores’ Union was registered in 1947, it 
recorded an imprecise membership of "between 1000 and 5000". Although it was 
technically true that up to the larger number were engaged over a period of time in 
stevedoring work, at any one time there was no more than 10 per cent of this number 
engaged at the ports. The union was set up after a school teacher by the name of Isikeli 
Daveta was recommended to Reay by his ‘Fijian Labour Inspector' as a "suitable man for 
the union" (Reay to Colonial Secretary 29.1.48 F36/161). Although he had had no 
previous experience of unionism, Daveta turned out to be Reay’s "ideal unionist". Under 
his exemplary leadership, according to Reay, harmonious relations developed between 
employers and the union and the industry stopped experiencing work stoppages. In 1953, 
the Department reported that there had been no strikes on the waterfront since the union’s 
formation. Daveta had an office at the wharf and was able to settle any difficulty which 
arose "quickly and amicably". He replaced labour inspectors as the channel for the 
settlement of grievances and, as a consequence, workers’ wages and conditions of work in 
the industry "vastly improved" (Labour Department Report 1953).
In the annual reports of the Union, Daveta does appear to have been vigilant in 
protecting his members’ interests. In 1947, for instance, he fought for priority to be given 
to his members for employment on overseas vessels that docked in Fiji. He called the 
companies’ hiring of unregistered men "promiscuous" and criticised the local firm of 
Williams & Goslings for its "we can hire anyone we like" attitude (Annual Report, Fiji 
Stevedore’s Union 1947, F36/161). In 1948, the union negotiated for improved conditions 
and for its members to work in ports in Samoa and Tonga. It reportedly interested itself 
in matters of concern to the stevedoring companies, such as ‘pillage’ and ‘output at the
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wharves’ (Reay to Colonial Secretary 29.1.48, F36/161). The union also kept close touch 
with the Labour Department. Both Reay and a Labour Advisor from Britain, Hollister- 
Short, were invited to attend its annual general meetings. The union’s annual reports, 
which were always circulated to Reay (who in turn always sent them on to the Colonial 
Secretary with glowing commendations), also suggest that Daveta was a man of didactic 
style and conservative wisdom. Typical of his philosophy is this passage from his 1948 
report:
Stop, Listen, Think. Beware of outside influences. A strike is a means to 
an end. There is no benefit (that) can be derived out of such. For example, 
if you struck and held up a vessel for a number of days, subsequently the 
freight of the cargo to be discharged here goes up. This will hurt the 
strikers in the price of those goods. Once the freight goes up automatically 
the price of goods concerned will go up and the public will suffer for your 
misbehaviour caused by outside influences. Keep your head. You are 
doing well (emphasis in original). Don’t let outsiders ruin you and the 
union. The government is waiting to help you provided you go the right 
way. (Report of the FSU 1948, F36/161).
Reay was always full of praise for Daveta and regarded him as the sole reason for the 
union’s success. He more than once expressed the fear that if Daveta ever left it would 
"fall into bad hands" or collapse (Reay to Colonial Secretary 6.6.50, F36/161). As he 
stated in a 1951 report on the trade union movement:
In an industry in which labour relations were previously bad and conditions of 
labour bad (the union) has produced good relations and vastly improved conditions. 
These results came from an outstanding union secretary and from the fact that the 
Labour Department was able to persuade stevedoring employers to accept the 
principle of collective bargaining where formerly they opposed it. However it is 
not considered that the Fijian rank and file understand trade unionism and should 
the present secretary leave the union, it is quite possible that it would collapse or at 
least become disorganised. (Reay 1951:2)
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Labour relations on the waterfront did start to show signs of strain in 1955. In that 
year stevedoring workers held a one-hour strike. Its immediate cause was the quality and 
monotony of food served in the workers’ canteen. But the department detected general 
discontent and unrest and dissension in the ranks of the union (Report of the Labour 
Department 1955). Discontent mainly arose from the practice of allocating work. There 
is no mention of Daveta but it appears that he had by then left the Union. All that is 
evident from the department’s reports is that a general meeting, called at the suggestion of 
the new Labour Commissioner, Pearson, elected a new executive and that labour relations 
reportedly improved soon after.
A new arrangement was also established in that year for allocating work to Suva- 
based casual stevedores, an arrangement the Union was not party to. It involved a system 
of issuing permits to Suva casuals to ‘ensure regularity of employment to those primarily 
dependent on stevedoring’. By the end of 1956, few Suva men had applied for permits 
and the companies had to draw almost entirely on the provinces and districts surrounding 
the capital. That it was not for want of men in Suva that this occurred is clear. The 
department’s report in that year alluded to the existence of a ‘large number of under­
employed Suva casuals’. It was, rather, to enforce the long-standing policy of keeping 
dock labour a temporary or migrant workforce and thereby disorganised and powerless. 
The Stevedores’ Union survived until the sixties, changing its name to the Fiji 
Dockworkers’ Union in 1964. With the demise of the Fiji Seamen’s Union at that time, it 
altered its name and constitution and became, in 1966, the Fiji Dockworkers’ and 
Seamen’s Union.
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The formation of the Fiji Stevedores Union was, it seems, a fairly successful pre­
emptive act by the Labour Department. The Union’s existence and its role in mediating 
between workers and employers appears to have ensured many years of industrial peace 
on the waterfront. However, the operation of the system of recruitment of dock labour 
introduced by the Department cannot be ignored as a vital factor in the explanation of this 
period of industrial peace. The system of recruitment, which harked back to the migrant 
system of contract labour operating under the old Native Labour Ordinances, was 
significant both in forestalling the emergence of a collective proletarian consciousness and 
worker cohesion amongst Fijian labourers in this industry and in ensuring that no 
organised action by workers could bring operations to a halt. The deliberate recruitment 
of labour from a vast ‘reserve army’ of village labour was perhaps the single most 
significant reason for the many years of industrial peace in the industry. Not until the 
seventies would this industry become strike-ridden and the dockworkers union emerge as 
one of the most militant trade unions.
The Fijian Mineworkers’ Union
The third union which the department established was the Fijian Mineworkers’ 
Union. While the Stevedores Union was considered an outstanding success, the 
Mineworkers’ Union was considered a dismal failure by the department. Their leaders 
were considered a contrast in styles and abilities: the one responsible and effective and an 
ideal unionist, the other a difficult man with an "intransigent temperament". Efforts to 
organise the union began late in 1947 and immediately followed a massive three-day strike 
by mineworkers in December that year. The union was registered in 1948. Like the 
Stevedores’ Union, this union represented an entirely Fijian workforce.
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The mining industry, from its beginnings in the mid-1930's, had been the site of 
numerous strikes and continuous labour unrest. The organisation of labour and the 
structure of wages at the mines were quite openly racially based, with Fijians occupying 
the lowest strata in the occupational and wage hierarchy as unskilled surface and 
underground labour, Part-Europeans and Rotumans occupying the skilled and semi-skilled 
positions above them and Europeans in managerial and supervisory positions at the top 
(Bain 1984). As in the organisation of the sugar industry in earlier years, Fijian labourers 
were housed within the mine compound in congested labourers’ barracks with only the 
most basic facilities. The colonial government, which in the 1940’s was still helping the 
company recruit mining labour, was wont to turn a blind eye to the structural causes of 
labour unrest, preferring to see it instead as symptomatic of the ‘backwardness’ of Fijians. 
Officials in the new Labour Department displayed the same attitude. Reay, for instance, 
in 1948, denied discrimination in wages existed at the mines, writing that "the three main 
races, Indians, Fijians and Europeans, compete on an equal footing in the employment 
market". He defended the existence of better housing for Europeans with the rationale that 
"such amenities must .. cater for the customs and habits of each community" (Labour 
Department Report, 1948).
In 1947, the department reported that the mining company had improved amenities 
at the mine with a view to increasing worker contentment and efficiency. But this did not 
quiet frequent labour unrest. In November, 1000 workers, mainly Fijian but including 
many Part-European workers (whom the department chose to believe were intimidated into 
joining the strike), stopped work at the Tavua minefield over the dismissal of a fellow 
worker. Although, following conciliation efforts by the department, the man was re-
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instated, the workers remained unsatisfied and demanded the dismissal of a senior member
of the company’s staff together with two of its subordinate officers. When these demands 
were refused, the striking workers "descended into lawlessness and hooliganism", stoning 
management houses. The strike was only broken by the intervention of Sukuna and only 
after he had requested the management to dismiss the two subordinate officers (Labour 
Department Report 1947).
The Tavua strike was typical of the kind of labour action that Fijian mineworkers 
staged, both in terms of its immediate, triggering cause - the dismissal of a worker - and 
in terms of its spontaneity or unorganised nature. The unstructured nature of worker 
protest and the fact that labour action was most often taken over non-wage issues led 
Reddy to conclude that the workers were acting less out of dissatisfaction with working 
conditions and wages and more out of unfamiliarity with the industrial work situation 
(Reddy 1974:59). Indeed, during the 1947 strike there was apparently no mention of 
discontent over wages and conditions and workers had in fact assured the Secretary for 
Fijian Affairs and the Commissioner for Labour that they had no such complaints (Report 
of the Labour Department 1947). Bain notes, however, that in the aftermath of the strike, 
a company-appointed Fijian workers’ welfare committee heard a wide range of complaints 
about "overcrowded barracks, unsatisfactory drainage, inadequate washing facilities and 
the sleeping problems of shift workers" as well as "requests for parity between Fijian and 
part-European holidays" (Bain 1990). In short, long-held grievances about racially 
discriminary terms and conditions lay at the base of mineworkers’ industrial action.
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The colonial government had long been concerned about the labour situation at the 
mines where it seemed workers were given to downing tools at the least provocation and 
where, during such times, leaders appeared spontaneously from among the rank and file to 
take command. Prior to the establishment of the Fijian Mineworkers’ Union, a Provincial 
Committee of traditional leaders had been set up primarily as a buffer body between 
workers and management at the mines. This committee consisted of a traditional leader 
from each province from which mining labour was drawn and functioned as a "tenuous 
link between management and workers" (Hince 1971:374), mediating in the relations 
between the company and its workers. The 1947 strike threw up a new leader and it was 
proposed that a new committee be established and constituted as a trade union. Before the 
year was out, the Labour Department had drafted a constitution and rules for the union for 
submission to a general meeting of mineworkers. It had also persuaded the mine 
management to recognise the union.
The arrival of the union did not, however, bring about industrial peace at the 
minefield. Strikes continued to occur spontaneously in response to any highhanded or 
provocative actions by the company or its personnel and continued to throw up ‘leaders’ 
other than those in the union. The Labour Department was quick to scorn the union, once 
it became obvious that it was ineffective, and to deprecate or disparage the wanton 
behaviour of the Fijian workers. A strike at the mine by 150 underground workers and 
125 open-cut miners in 1951 was described by Reay as a "typical Fijian reaction to a 
mistake over rations and once more it demonstrated the inability of the Fijian 
Mineworkers’ Union to control its members" (Labour Department Report 1951). The
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union was often found disclaiming responsibility for strikes but was powerless to prevent 
them happening (Labour Department Report, 1952).
Part of the reason the mineworkers’ union was ineffective had to do with the 
expectations of the role it was to play. Created externally and as a device basically to 
contain labour militancy at the mines by providing a channel for grievance settlement, it at 
first strove to work against workers’ impulses rather than with them. For this reason, and 
for the reason too that it was a creation of the colonial government, it failed to win 
workers’ trust and support. But the union had a second problem in that the Provincial 
Committee continued to exist after the union was established, making matters confusing 
for workers and difficult for the union.
The union felt the company was in fact deliberately retaining the Provincial 
Committee to minimise its influence (Labour Department Report 1952), an allegation 
which was supported by the fact that in the 1952 mine strike the company chose to 
negotiate with the workers not through the union, but through the Committee. The Labour 
Department also noted that the Committee’s continued existence was a "sore point" with 
the Union which regard(ed) the Committee’s retention by Management "as a device...to 
minimise the influence of the Union" (Labour Report, 1952). Company recognition of the 
Union as the sole body for industrial relations and collective bargaining only came about 
after the Union asserted itself and threatened to call a second strike in that year to enforce 
demands for increased wages and an end to food rations for mining labour.5 The dispute 
was referred to a conciliation board appointed under the Industrial Disputes (Conciliation 
and Arbitration) Ordinance for settlement. Although the ration system was retained, the
80
union won an increase of 6d. a day for mineworkers. This was the first occasion on which 
the government instituted a formal machinery under the 1942 Ordinance to attempt to 
settle a dispute. Employers would increasingly demonstrate a preference for government 
involvement in dispute settlement.
Although the Labour Department argued that the union would have had nothing to 
fear from the Provincial Committee if its leaders had had the full confidence of the 
workers, it was clearly an anomalous arrangement to have two competing bodies existing 
side by side. But the colonial government clearly did not accept any responsibility for the 
situation. Instead it used the situation to argue that indigenous Fijians were not only 
unaccustomed to the rigours of industrial work but unable as yet to comprehend the 
concept and principles of trade unionism. In 1949, Reay wrote:
It is doubtful whether the (Fijian) worker understands or can be made to 
understand at this stage of Fijian development, the principles of trade 
unionism. (Report of the Commissioner of Labour 1949)
In 1952, the year before he retired, he added:
The Fijian is not ready for trade unionism as the term is understood 
elsewhere and it may take a generation to make a trade unionist out of him.
(Report of the Labour Commissioner 1952)
He went on to suggest that perhaps another form of organisation, one "approaching the 
traditional concept of Fijian organisation, might achieve better results". The militancy of 
Vatukoula mineworkers led in fact to serious debate about whether the trade union was a 
suitable institution for Fijians, whether it should be made to conform more with
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traditional’ Fijian institutions and whether Fijian chiefs should lead unions.6 It also gave 
ise to theories about proletarianised Fijians. Governor Ronald Garvey, reporting on a 
najor strike by mineworkers in 1955 to the Colonial Office, remarked:
It is to be remembered that at Vatukoula, a second generation of Fijians is 
growing up who have never known anything but the environment of the 
mines. The life of the village with its communal obligations and social 
sanctions is little known to them and there is a tendency for them to 
develop into rather belligerent individuals with a disregard for authority. 
Coupled with this is the fact that the Secretary of the Mineworkers Union, 
Basilio Mate, is himself of an intransigent temperament. Nor can 
management of Vatukoula escape criticism for they at times are capable of 
displaying an unrealistic attitude. (Governor’s Despatch No. 499 21/9/56, 
F36/70-7)
't is important to note that by this time, indeed following the 1952 strike, the union did 
command leadership of the mineworkers and was taking action to improve the workers’ 
»vages in-hand. It continued to be maligned by the department, however, probably for the 
reason that it failed to play the role expected of it. Following the 10-day miners’ strike 
which the union led in 1955, Commissioner of Labour Pearson wrote:
I am afraid that the position at Vatukoula will remain uneasy for a long 
time possibly until the great majority of Fijians at Vatukoula adapt their 
ways to an urban industrial environment and freely accept and work with 
other races...[wjhile certain of the blame for the failure to establish 
satisfactory industrial relations lies with the mines management and the 
union secretary, it is probable that an important reason for the failure stems 
from the inability of Fijians to conduct industrial negotiations and from the 
fact that Fijians are not activated by economic ideas in the same way as 
Westerners and Easterners. (Minutes 1956, F36/65)
The colonial government here was erecting an ideological smokescreen to obscure 
the reality of social relations between labour and capital at the mines. Portraying the 
ongoing conflict as a problem of ‘the Fijian’ raised outside the controlling obligations and
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sanctions of the village not only denied the class basis of action by ethnic Fijian workers, 
but also absolved capital and the colonial government from any responsibility for the 
situation. It worked both to reinforce the orthodoxy of working through ‘traditional’ 
hierarchies to govern and control Fijians and to justify seeking alternatives to unions. 
Such alternatives to unions, sought in the name of finding institutions more appropriate for 
Fijians, were intended to disorganise Fijian workers within the most troublesome industries 
and to prevent the spread of labour militancy. Before considering these, it is important to 
discuss another significant initiative in organising trade unions that the Labour Department 
made in this period. This involved the formation of the first umbrella organisation of trade 
unions, the Fiji Industrial Workers’ congress. This organisation was central to the colonial 
state’s strategy of co-opting organised labour as we shall see.
The Fiji Industrial Workers’ Congress
The FIWC owed its existence to the colonial government. Its formation 
immediately followed a meeting between the Minister of State for the Colonies who 
visited Fiji in 1951 and representatives of a number of unions who had been invited to 
meet him. The FIWC’s formation was thus directly sponsored by the colonial government. 
The reason why the colonial government, which was so opposed to federations of labour, 
should act in such a supportive way to form a federation had again to do with preempting 
the autonomous emergence of such a federation. Certainly the colonial government was 
aware of tentative plans to form a federation of labour unions from its close monitoring of 
the Hindi workers’ newspaper, Mazdur.7 Led by Pandit Ami Chandra (founder of the 
Chini Mazdur Sangh), the representatives of the CMS, the Fijian Mineworkers’ Union,
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the Fiji Airport Employees Union and the Fiji Public Works Department Employees 
Union, signed a document which included the following statement:
We the representatives of the various unions assembled here today agree to 
form a Federation of Unions with the object of promoting and safeguarding 
the interests of the working class generally (cited in Sutherland 1984:199).
Thus was the FIWC, modelled on the British Trade Union Council, formed. While 
its formation did, in some respects, represent 4a milestone in the history of the trade 
union movement’ (Sutherland 1984:199), its moderate position and close association with 
the colonial (and later post-colonial) state and the power and legitimacy it derived from 
this, marked it from the beginning as a potential tool of the state. Two years after its 
establishment, the FIWC’s leaders met with the Governor and, in response to a proposal 
made by him, agreed to participate in ‘annual meetings (with) government officers’. B.D. 
Lakshman, who assumed the presidency of FIWC following the death of Ami Chandra in 
1953,8 kept the Commissioner of Labour closely informed of "labour problems in 
progress or latent". Within the FIWC, radical or militant tendencies were usually 
eradicated. Although, some leaders of the FIWC at times acted militantly (as Lakshman 
did in the late fifties), they did so in pursuit of personal political goals. Genuine militants 
had little recourse other than to mobilise support outside of the ambit of the FIWC and 
with a view to countering or challenging its control of the labour movement. We turn now 
to consider the Labour Department’s efforts to develop alternatives to unions.
Developing Alternativesto Unions
Whereas in 1950 the Labour Commissioner waxed lyrical about the success of 
collective bargaining,
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it has probably saved the country much unrest and has confounded 
pessimists who forecast dire consequences arising out of our trade union 
policy. (Minute, Labour Commissioner’s Report File, F36/70),
by 1955 the colonial government was concerned about a spreading labour militancy and 
recourse to strike action. The Labour Commissioner indeed commented in his 1955 report 
that although the Vatukoula strike that year had not given workers more than they would 
have received had they gone to arbitration and remained at work, it nonetheless might 
have given other unions the desire to strike that year. Certainly, the 1955 mining strike 
demonstrated incipient militancy amongst organised labour and the undeniable beginnings 
of cross-ethnic and anti-capital worker unity. In short, it demonstrated worker solidarity 
and militancy, both of which the colonial government was concerned to deny and subvert.
Constructing racial ideologies and projecting different categories of labour as 
representative of this or that ‘racial group’ was a principal means by which worker 
militancy was denied. Such racial ideologies, evident in the colonial records and in Labour 
Department reports, projected Fijian workers as errant and undisciplined, backward and 
easily-led - essentially needing the controlling, disciplining reins of an authoritarian 
‘traditional’ leadership, to conform with an idealised image as respectful and loyal natives, 
without which they displayed a disregard for authority and an intemperate belligerency. 
Fijian labour militancy was thus seen as arising from the problem of the (commoner) 
Fijians’ ‘stage of development’. On the other hand, Indians were projected as avaricious, 
manipulative and devious and stamped with a bitterness - the legacy of indenture - which 
conditioned their attitude and explained their hostility to the British.
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Developing alternatives to unions was a strategy used by the colonial government 
to control labour militancy from the mid-1950s. As early as 1954, the Labour 
Commissioner reported on the introduction of what he called a "new device for smoothing 
industrial relations" at Namaka Airport in Nadi. The device was a Works Committee or 
council made up of representatives of workers and employers in the industry. It was, he 
said, "working well, to the chagrin of the union" which had apparently opposed its 
establishment because it "detracted from (its own) power and prestige." Why would the 
Labour Department have wanted to set up an alternative body in an industry where there 
already existed a trade union? Why would it have wanted, in other words, to diminish an 
established union’s power and prestige? The answer seems to lie quite simply in a 
concern to erode the power and base of unions which it (and the colonial government 
generally) did not favour. This evidently was the case where the Fiji Airport Employees’ 
Union was concerned.9
A Works Committee had also earlier been proposed by the Labour Department in 
1952 for each main centre of the Public Works Department, following the development of 
"strained relations" between the Department and the PWD Employees Union (Report of 
the Commissioner of Labour, 1952). The Labour Commissioner’s Report for 1952 said 
that the Union Secretary was very active in the interests of its members but some 
employing officers "resented his attitude and approach and considered some of his 
demands unreasonable". This was reason enough, it seems, to consider an alternative to 
the union. The proposal was dropped, however, after the union insisted that it appoint the 
workers’ representatives to each works committee. This the PWD objected to (Labour 
Department Report 1952).
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In proposing works committees and other alternative machinery, the colonial 
government often claimed to be trying to develop an institution more suitable to the needs 
of Fijians. On the basis of the Namaka experiment, the Colonial Secretary suggested that 
works committees might better suit Fijians than a union and proposed its application at 
Vatukoula. Although this did not eventuate something very similar, which was simply 
called a "joint machinery", was introduced in 1956 following the recommendations of a 
Mr Barltrop, a visiting labour advisor from Britain. The company appointed a welfare 
officer and it was under his direction that this new machinery was set up. That this was 
in essence a resuscitation of the Provincial Committee seems obvious. Indeed it was 
described as such by the Governor who added that care would be taken to see that it did 
not deal with wage matters which were the union’s affair. The union’s longtime secretary, 
Mate, died in this year, and was replaced by a former Methodist minister with "little 
knowledge of unionism", although he had apparently participated in the 1947 strike. It 
was with the cooperation of the new leadership of the union that the department negotiated 
the setting up of the new consultative machinery.
Works committees were proposed by the Labour Department for other 
establishments, ostensibly "for those workers who were unorganised". In his 1953 report, 
the Commissioner of Labour stated that although opposition to such committees had 
originally come from employers, trade unions were now saying they would resist them 
unless they were permitted to nominate all worker representatives. These committees 
were evidently being established in industries where unions had already formed and 
clearly their purpose was to weaken or subvert the unions. That the unions were aware of
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this is indicated by their attempts to retain control of the machinery by insisting they 
nominate worker representatives.
Another institution debated in this period and later legislated for, was Wages 
Councils. The concept of Wages Councils had first been raised in the early 1950’s by the 
Labour Advisory Board which recommended that regulations be made under Section 20 of 
the 1947 Labour Ordinance for the appointment of Boards to determine minimum rates of 
pay within particular industries. Separate legislation seems to have been preferred to the 
unwieldy mechanism provided under the 1947 Act (Commissioner of Labour to the 
Colonial Secretary, 16.12.55, CSO F36/200 Enclosure 3). On 10 December, 1954, the 
subject had also been raised by a Fijian member of the Legislative Council during 
discussion of the Appropriation Bill of 1954. The concern of the council member was 
quite plainly to establish an alternative to trade unions for Fijians. The member claimed 
he had been approached several times by Fijian labourers working in Suva about the 
inadequacy of their wages. But he argued against trade unions for Fijians:
trade unionism seemed to cut across the grain with the Fijian labourer or 
the ordinary Fijian. It is quite alien to him to form a body to oppose his 
own employer. He is the product of a patriarchal society, his employer is a 
father. How can he be expected to go fully into the arts of trade unionism 
which combine against the people who are employing him? I therefore 
plead that government should find a means of having a wages council or 
some means whereby employers and employees could sit and discuss wages 
and problems that are common to industry. (Extract from Address of 
Fourth Native Member of Leg. Co., 10.12.54, CSO F36/200; end. 1)
The new Commissioner of Labour, Pearson, said in response that he would pursue 
the matter with employers and union representatives. He added that wages councils had 
been very successful in the United Kingdom in those industries where there was a lack of
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organisation on one side or the other. And he pointed out that they were usually 
temporary institutions which declined once "industries learned to manage their own affairs 
and both sides learned to conduct themselves without the need for such machinery". Eight 
months later, at an administrative officers’ conference held at Government House, Pearson 
would echo the sentiments of the Fijian Legislative Council member that Fijians did not 
understand trade unionism, even while they appeared to be strongly attracted to it 
(F36/199).10
In December 1955, Pearson sent the Colonial Secretary a copy of a draft Wages 
Council Bill for approval. In a covering note he said that, should the bill be passed, he 
had no intention of rushing in and recommending the actual establishment of wages 
councils, but such councils would be desirable for shop assistants, tailors and garment 
workers, commercial workers, and building and construction workers. He reiterated that 
wages councils were a temporary institution to cover a phase in the development of 
collective bargaining systems. The councils would be
continuing bodies with the purpose of permanently regulating the minimum 
wages of an industry until such time as it was superseded by collective 
bargaining. (Commissioner of Labour to the Colonial Secretary, 16.12.55,
CSO F36/200, end. 3).
Under the proposed legislation awards made by wages councils would amend 
existing labour contracts and be enforceable at civil law, an officer appointed under the 
ordinance would have the power to inquire into and sue in respect of breaches, and any 
breaches by employers of wages regulations, on summary conviction, would carry liability 
to a fine not exceeding 20 pounds for each offence.
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The bill was gazetted in November 1956. Employers in the colony were at first 
united in their opposition to it. The Suva Chamber of Commerce registered "strong 
concern" at the proposed legislation saying it was unnecessary, as the existing law was 
"adequate and suitable for the needs of the colony in the adjustment of wages" (CSO 
F36/200). The Chamber said it knew of no instance where wage negotiations had failed 
through shortcomings in the present provisions and added that legislation of this nature 
might upset "the present amicable relations between employers and employees 
organisations". It also argued, rather perceptively, that the bill could "weaken the position 
of the Union by apparently offering an alternative method of wage bargaining to the 
employee" and that it was liable to be discriminatory in its application in that it was
only likely to be effective against the larger employers who are already, 
perhaps, the most conscientious followers of negotiated labour union 
settlements. We cannot see how this bill could be effective or enforced 
amongst the very large number of small employers in the colony. (CSO 
F36/200)
While the Chamber’s arguments, particularly in respect of the bill’s enforcibility 
amongst smaller employers, may have appeared valid - indeed 30 years later the matter of 
enforcibility remains a problem where smaller firms are concerned - the main concern of 
its members in opposing the bill was to prevent wages councils being established in the 
larger commercial firms, including wholesale and retail enterprises and building and 
construction firms. These were still unorganised and were indeed the very industries that 
were targeted for wages council coverage. Yet, only five years later, the Wages Council 
came to be seen as the lesser evil and little resistance was raised against the establishment 
of the first such council. By then, in contrast with the situation prevailing in 1956, a large 
general workers’ union covering the wholesale and retail sector had been formed and had
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led a major strike.
For their part, and despite the implications of the bill, the trade unions affiliated to 
the FIWC supported the idea of Wages Councils in principle. Their reason for doing so 
was mainly that although the trade union movement was growing, its strength was 
confined to particular industries only and it needed the colonial state’s assistance to raise 
the wages of workers in unorganised industries. As Pearson’s minute to the Colonial 
Secretary on the subject of the Chamber’s letter noted,
The Chamber is not wholly honest. Few commercial employers negotiate 
with a union. If a Union does not exist then there should be other 
machinery (Minute, Commissioner of Labour to Colonial Secretary, 
29.11.56, CSO F36/200).
On 29 April, 1957 on the eve of the bill’s second reading in the Legislative Council, more 
opposition to the bill was expressed, this time from building firms in the process of 
registering as the Master Builders’ Association:
We look with considerable alarm at the suggestions made in the draft bill 
which is now before government and feel that no good purpose could be 
served by depriving the employer of the right to decide the worth of an 
employee (CSO F36/200).
The MBA argued that the relations between employers and employees in the colony were 
on the whole most cordial and said,
we regret that any move should be made to introduce machinery which will 
enable the disgruntled few to apply for interference in their relation to their 
employers. In short, sir, we can see no reason whatever in the 
establishment of a Wages Council as proposed and sincerely hope that this 
matter will be dropped (CSO F36/200).
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Despite employer opposition the bill was debated and passed by the Council later that year 
without a dissenting vote and became law. The Act, however, would not come into effect 
until the Governor in Council appointed wages councils by notice in the gazette. While 
the principle of being able to fix minimum wages by law was not new - provision was 
made under the 1947 legislation although no regulations had ever been made - now the 
machinery for doing this existed.
By 1959, no wages councils had as yet been established although the annual 
reports of the Labour Commissioner often made references to work conditions and wages 
in a number of unorganised industries. In April of that year, Mohammed Ramzan and 
C.P. Bidesi, representing the FIWC, presented a memorandum to the Governor asking for 
a Wages Council to be established to fix minimum wages for "unprotected workers" who 
were not as yet organised in trade unions. In particular, they mentioned workers in the 
catering and retailing trades and in transport services. In reply to a question from the 
Governor, Ramzan made it clear that he "did not want wages councils (established) where 
workers were organised, but only where they were unorganised, such as shop assistants 
and bus drivers" (F36/200).
Not until 1961 was the first Wages Council established. That this first council was 
formed to cover workers in the wholesale and retail trade, and at that particular time, 
suggests that it came as part of the reaction to the 1959 strike for which the Wholesale 
and Retail Workers General Union was responsible, and was intended to disempower the 
union. The fact that this first wages council received the support of the Fiji Industrial 
Workers’ Congress speaks volumes for the state’s strategy of cooption, using a federation
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of trade unions of its own creation. The FIWC was to play a crucial role in the next 
decade, a role which, in its later incarnation as the Fiji Trades Union Congress (FTUC), 
would culminate in its voluntary incorporation in tripartite arrangements devised by the 
post-colonial state.
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Endnotes
1. Luke’s despatch to the Secretary of State in 1941, for instance, pointed out that, 
although draft bills amending the Masters and Servants Ordinance and the Fijian 
Labour Ordinance had been prepared some time ago, their introduction to 
Legislative Council had been deferred for the reason that the copra industry, which 
would mainly be affected by the modifications, was experiencing a "crisis" at the 
time and it was therefore not considered an opportune time for drastically changing 
the law. Governor Luke suggested that it would be preferable to "await the time 
when a thorough overhaul of the Labour Ordinances becomes possible" than to 
carry out any further amendments to the existing laws (Despatch No 52 19.4.41 
F36/32). Even Reay in 1940 argued for the retention of contract labour in the 
copra industry on the grounds that the cost of recruiting "required that employers 
should be protected". Though he recognised the ‘evils inherent in the contract 
system’, he maintained that "the majority of employers adopt a sensible attitude 
and those that don’t, make a rod for their own backs" (Report of Industrial 
Relations in Fiji 1941). The fact that some employers had abused the penal 
provisions of the laws that very year, making it necessary for the government to 
intervene and cancel a number of contracts, was not, apparently, a matter of import 
to Reay (F36/70).
2. Not only did the ‘protectionist’ Fijian labour policy, the Indian indentured labour 
system, and, later, the recruitment of dock-labourers during the war years from 
Fijian villagers leave their legacies in an Indo-Fijian dominated sugar industry and 
Fijian-dominated mining and stevedoring industries; within these and most other 
industries, as well as in government departments, there was a distinctive racially- 
based occupational hierarchy: Europeans occupied management positions, Pan- 
Europeans dominated skilled occupations (trades) and Fijians and Indians 
predominated amongst the unskilled workers.
3. Indeed this reserve was being drawn upon for the war effort. Several thousand 
labourers were employed as a civilian force on military works during the war years 
while a further 2000 Fijians formed a standing military force.
4. The two largest, the Kisan Sangh (Farmers’ Association) and the Akhil Fiji Krishik 
Maha Sangh (All Fiji Farmers’ Union), represented not so much ethnic and 
religious differences between the growers as manipulation of communal rivalries by 
leaders of the latter organisation whose concern was to protect the interests of 
Gujerati traders. The Kisan Sangh threatened their interests by its efforts to form 
cooperative stores to provide farmers with cheaper essential store goods (Moynagh 
1981:164; Sutherland 1984: ). Moynagh points out that to some extent the unions 
were also agents of competition between the CSR and Indian businessmen for a 
larger share of the income from cane (Moynagh 1981:164). The company, though 
seemingly favouring the Kisan Sangh as the more moderate union, was not averse 
to the Maha Sangh’s existence. Divided growers posed less of a problem to it than 
a united growers’ movement and it was fearful of the Kisan Sangh becoming too 
strong. This fear was doubtlessly at the base of the company’s refusal to meet the 
Kisan Sangh’s request for a loan to establish a Cooperative Store.
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5. The cost of rations to employers was always regarded as a portion of the wage and 
companies which provided such rations, usually from their own stores, for which 
they purchased goods in bulk, were usually opposed to abolishing the ration system 
which would mean paying workers a full cash wage. This was the position of the 
mining company. The company’s argument that it was in the workers’ own 
interests to receive part of their wages in the form of rations was laced with racist 
paternalism. As paraphrased by the Commissioner of Labour the argument was that 
"The feckless Fijian is inclined to spend his wages as soon as he received them and 
the employers believe that most of the labour would not be able to feed themselves 
and their family for a month" (Report of the Commissioner of Labour 1952).
6. See, for instance, the Extracts from the Minutes of the Administrators’ Conference 
held at Government House from 3-5 August 1955, (F36/99).
7. Formed in 1949, the newspaper announced in one of its early issues, both a move 
to form one union of PWD workers and an intention to form a ‘Federation of 
Trade Unions’. Indeed, the theme of a federation of labour unions was a recurrent 
one in the Mazdur. The newspaper was closely watched by the colonial 
government, most of its articles being translated for effective monitoring.
8. The Despatch from the Governor to the Secretary of State on July 8, 1955 paid 
tribute to Ami Chandra, saying "His steadying influence and considerable ability 
will be missed, both in the Congress and by Government" (Despatch No 341 
F36/70-75).
9. This union was established in 1951 by a former MLC B.D, Lakshman, whose 
earlier power base in the Kisan Sangh had been destroyed by the fragmentation of 
the farmers’ union movement, leading to his electoral defeat. Lakshman sought and 
eventually secured an alternative power base in the labour movement in the 1950’s.
10. Pearson also asked at that meeting whether this represented Fijians’ desire to "get 
away from village life" and whether traditional leaders should take a greater part in 
the trade union movement or whether the leadership of the movement should have 
"fresh minds not bound up in traditional ways". Amongst those who replied to 
Pearson were Ratu Kamisese Mara, who rejected the first suggestion and said 
Fijian interest in trade unions stemmed from them "losing faith in government and 
needing to form themselves into some sort of mutually-supporting body", and Ratu 
Sukuna, Secretary for Fijian Affairs, who proffered the view that it was an 
:awakening desire to compete with other races" that caused Fijians to learn about 
trade unions (Minutes of the Administrative Officers’ Conference op.cit. August 3- 
5, 1955, F36/199). Both Fijian chiefs failed to see the factor of Fijians developing 
a consciousness of themselves as workers as significant in the development of 
unions amongst Fijians.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE RISE AND FALL OF MILITANT ALTERNATIVES (1957 - 1969)
Labour must be treated as an equal partner in industry, in no way inferior.
We need capital to come in, but it is unfair to let it come in to exploit the 
people of this country.
Jim Anthony, strike leader, in a public address, December 16 1959.
Introduction
The December 1959 strike by the Wholesale and Retail Workers’ General Union 
(W&RWGU) and the associated riots that occurred in Suva, sent disturbing shockwaves 
through the colony. The strike, which saw the town placed under curfew and police and 
army reserves called up, holds an unrivalled place in Fiji labour history for the serious 
challenge that it presented to both capital and the colonial state. That the challenge was 
posed by organised labour, and that amongst the premises singled out for violence and 
"practically wrecked" were the offices of the Labour Department, might seem ironical 
given the colonial government’s fostering of labour unions. Yet, as the previous chapter 
shows, such unions as were nurtured or encouraged were those that accorded with the 
colonial government’s notion of responsible unionism.
The challenge presented by the young militant leaders of the W&RWGU in 1959 
marked a departure from the moderate, "responsible" unionism of the 1940’s and early 
1950’s. Significantly it represented a challenge from organised labour united across the 
two main ethnic categories and the main targets of the violent rioting that accompanied the 
strikes were undeniably shops and business premises representing foreign capital. The 
strike also incited general hostility towards the colonial government, which was seen as
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siding with capital. The young militant leaders of the W&RWGU could hardly be 
dismissively disparaged as politicians exploiting the union movement for their own 
political ends. They were clearly genuine labour leaders, bent on improving the lot of 
workers in the colony and unafraid to take direct action. As such, they had to be thwarted.
The militancy that they personified did not become manifest overnight. Indeed it 
began to be seen in 1957 with the serious industrial tensions that overtook the hitherto 
unproblematic milling operations of the sugar industry, when workers aligned across 
racial/occupational boundaries to demand better wages and conditions and an end to the 
iniquitous colonial occupational hierarchy based on ‘race’. The denial of sugar labour 
militancy, implicit in the colonial government’s reduction of the problem to a matter of 
unwelcome external elements taking control of the mill workers’ union, was contradicted 
by its actual responses. The introduction of a new industrial disputes ordinance and, 
later, the amendment of the Industrial Associations’ Ordinance and the enactment of a 
special constraining law for the sugar industry, indicated the seriousness with which the 
colonial administration viewed this incipient challenge by militants.
From 1957 to 1969 we saw the rise and fall of militant alternatives in the labour 
movement. That the colonial state had much to do with the erosion of these militant 
alternatives is clear from the ideological, legislative and institutional means of containment 
introduced and/or employed in this period. I focus in this chapter on three unions (and 
their leaders) whose militant activities resulted in both the introduction and use of further, 
overt controls - particularly legislative controls - and in the pursuit of other, more 
subversive controlling strategies by the colonial government. The latter strategies included
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encouraging the revival or formation of ‘moderate’ unions and sponsoring ethnically- 
exclusive breakaway unions; establishing wages councils (with the FIWC's help) to cover 
organised sectors controlled by militant unions; and introducing joint consultative 
machineries through which favoured union leaders could be coopted and non-favoured 
leaders marginalised. The formation of the Fiji Employers Consultative Association 
(FECA) and the state-aligned FIWC’s survival (with the state’s help) after a serious 
challenge by an alternative, militant, federation of labour unions are significant 
developments in this period.
The Emergence of Sugar Labour Militancy
Reddy (1974:111) indicates that 1957 held the highest pre-independence record for 
numbers of man-days lost through strike action by organised labour. In that year, three 
strikes, involving 4,922 workers, cost the colony 20,825 man-days. This was almost 
double the total man-days lost in 1955 (10,457) and the figure remained unsurpassed until 
the early 1970’s when a massive upsurge in strike activity and a revival of labour 
militancy reduced it to a trifling statistic.1 The main contributing factor to the 1957 loss 
was a series of three strikes - two of them ‘unofficial’ in that they were not sanctioned by 
the union - in the sugar industry in July, October and December of that year by mill 
workers affiliated to the Chini Mazdur Sangh or Fiji Sugar Industry Employees 
Association (FSIEA). The first two strikes uncovered a challenge by more militant 
aspirants to the moderate leadership of the union. Both the colonial government’s 
attempted subversion of this challenge and, after militants assumed leadership of the 
union, its legislation against sugar workers’ right to strike were strategies designed to nip 
sugar labour militancy in the bud.
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The Strikes of 1957
The FSIEA had long held the reputation for being a responsible union. Since its 
formation in 1944, the union had been under the leadership of its founders, Pandit Ami
Chandra and Nand Kishore. After Chandra died in a plane crash in 1953 while travelling
to attend a British Council funded trade union training course, Kishore assumed the
Presidency. Both Chandra and Kishore were moderate men and the signing of wage
agreements for each crushing season at annual conferences between the company and the
union, which had become standard practice since 1947, was instituted by them (LCP 3 of
1958:2). In 1957, however, the amicable relations the union enjoyed with the company,
sustained by the union’s moderate leadership, were suddenly soured.
Militants in the union’s executive, taking advantage of Kishore’s absence from Fiji 
on a six month training programme, decided to press for a much higher wage -of 2s 6d an 
hour- and for a system of job evaluation for those receiving a higher wage (LCP 26 of 
1959:8). The union also became involved in efforts to extend its membership by recruiting 
skilled workers employed by the company on what was called its ‘Mechanics List’. These 
three issues - wages, job evaluation and representation - lay at the base of the industrial 
troubles of 1957. The latter two signified both a challenge to the company’s racially-based 
occupational and wage structure and a move to form a single union of sugar industry 
workers and for both these reasons they were vehemently opposed by the company.
As explained in the report of the Sugar Board of Inquiry of 1959 (hereafter called 
the Honeyman Commission), it had been the Company’s practice to
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‘divide its manual workers for the purpose of pay scales into two distinct 
occupational groups. The first and smaller group consists of its artisan workers and 
tradesmen who were and are paid on scales known as the ’Mechanics List’. The 
second and larger group were the other manual workers - unskilled and semi­
skilled - who are usually described as mill and field workers or simply labourers 
and are paid on scales known as the Labourers’ List’ (LCP 26 of 1959:2).
This division of manual workers on the basis of skill had a further, racially-based 
organising principle. Mechanics list employees, who originally had comprised an 
exclusively European occupational class, now predominantly comprised Part-Europeans 
(82 %) and Chinese (6%) who formed minority ethnic categories in the colony. Fijians and 
Indians made up the remaining 12 % and were thus disproportionately represented in this 
occupational category. Mechanics list employees numbered 327 and generally enjoyed 
better wages and conditions than those employed on the labourers’ list who represented 
the 2,400 lower-paid workers in the industry, and comprised mainly, but not exclusively, 
Indian wage employees of the company. A not insignificant number of Fijians were also 
employed on the labourers’ list.
The racially-based occupational structure, typical of colonial economies, was both a 
source of friction amongst workers and a means therefore by which they were kept 
divided on the basis of ‘race’.2 Indeed the occupational structure had given rise to a 
second union for sugar mill workers, the Fiji Sugar Skilled Workers Union registered in 
1951, under the exclusive control of ‘Part-Europeans’, who dominated the mechanics list 
(being clearly preferentially engaged as tradesmen trainees by the company) and evidently 
sought to protect their monopoly of skilled jobs via this union.3 The fact that some 
labourers’ list workers were doing mechanics jobs4 underlay the racist basis of this 
occupational arrangement and was both a major source of resentment and the reason the
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FSIEA now called for job evaluation at the mills. Under the circumstances, it is significant 
that the FSIEA was assisted in its endeavours to recruit mechanics list employees by two 
of the company’s workers in this category -Lui Ting (described as Fijian-Chinese) and 
John O’Neill (a ‘Part-European’), who held the positions of motor mechanic and 
blacksmith, respectively. The two men, and other Part-Europeans who were clearly 
employed on the company’s mechanics’ list, were to play a prominent part in the new 
militancy that emerged within the FSIEA from 1957 to 1959.
In fact, the representation issue divided Part-European sugar workers, thereby 
undermining the design of the occupational structure - to keep workers racially divided.5 
The company apparently involved itself in a covert effort to subvert the FSIEA’s 
intentions by encouraging the revival of the Fiji Sugar Skilled Workers’ Union (FSSWU) 
which had long been moribund,6 an effort which the colonial government appears to have 
aided. In March the Registrar General wrote to the defunct union giving it three months 
to show cause why its registration should not be cancelled. This clearly informed the 
inactive officers of the union that, technically, their union was still in existence and that 
indeed they were still recognised as the office-bearers. It doubtlessly encouraged their 
revival of the organisation later that month.
Despite the revival meeting, the FSIEA, a week later at a general meeting in 
Lautoka, reaffirmed that it was ‘legally ... competent to represent every member of the 
union including skilled workers..’ and resolved that if the company was not prepared to 
negotiate the union’s demands the union would ‘use all legal rights including a strike if 
necessary’. The struggle between the two unions for members amongst Mechanics list
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employees continued over the next two years. The Honeyman Commission’s finding two 
years later (in July 1959) that the Fiji Sugar Trademen’s Union (as the FSSWU renamed 
itself in 1958) represented ‘a substantial majority of employees on the mechanics’ list’ 
(no figures were given to support this) and its satisfaction that the union, since its revival 
had been ‘an effective body’ seems to be contradicted by the fact that only two years later 
the union was listed as having fewer than 50 members in the Labour Department’s annual 
report.7
It was the wage issue which precipitated the first strike in 1957. Officials of the 
FSIEA had precipitately agreed to a wage increase of 2s 6d a week for the 1957 crushing 
season, which was far short of the original claim for 2s 6d an hour. Militants, supported 
by ‘the bulk of workers’ reacted almost instantaneously - within 24 hours of the signing of 
the agreement, "a gang of 12 or 15 Fijians (began) driving employees away from the 
running machines at the Lautoka mill" (LCP 3;1958;2). The strike was thus as much a 
challenge to the union leaders who capitulated to company interests as it was to the 
company itself.
According to Mayer (1963:109), the colonial government brought out armed 
police - who fired five rounds at the strikers - to break the strike. Although no-one was 
injured, the resort to military force by the authorities signified that company interests were 
paramount. Five days later the strike was brought to an end with both parties agreeing to 
go to arbitration under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes (Conciliation and Arbitration) 
Ordinance. The arbitrator, D.M.N. McFarlane, was to determine whether the wage agreed 
to between the company and the Union was "fair and reasonable" having regard to all
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other conditions and, if not, what a fair and reasonable wage would be.
Immediately following the strike, however, a breakaway group gained control of 
the union. Certain union officials, amongst them the president and secretary, were 
dismissed and an acting president and secretary were appointed. The breakaway group 
demanded wider terms of reference for the arbitration tribunal, particularly to enable it to 
rule on the question of the FSIEA’s claim to represent members employed on the 
mechanics list. The group was denied recognition by the colonial government and its 
demands with respect to the arbitration tribunal were ignored.8 Its emergence was 
sufficiently worrying to cause the colonial government to intervene clearly with the object 
of neutralising the breakaway group. A Commission of Inquiry was immediately 
established to look into the affairs of the Association, especially into the meetings the 
breakaway group held during August and September in Rakiraki and Lautoka. The 
findings of the inquiry commission enabled the Registrar General to order the expulsion of 
O’Neill and the breakaway group’s publicity officer, Janki Ram, from the union - on the 
grounds that they were ineligible to hold office under the union’s constitution - and to 
declare all the actions of the breakaway group invalid. O’Neill and Janki Ram appealed 
against their expulsion but they withdrew their appeal after the Union’s executive 
committee amended its constitution in December to enable them to qualify for executive 
membership.
Both the inquiry and the expulsion order underlined the colonial government’s 
control over trade unions. That it could unilaterally institute an inquiry into the union’s 
internal affairs and use the union’s own rules to get rid of two of the leading figures in the
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breakaway group, testified to this. In a related development, the President of the FIWC, 
Mr B.D. Lakshman, resigned from the leadership of the FIWC following a no confidence 
motion passed in him by members of the FIWC executive in August. The reason for the 
no confidence motion was the role Lakshman had played in the unofficial strike by the 
mill workers in July (LCP 26 of 1959).9 Given the FIWC’s close association with the 
colonial government it is not unreasonable to suppose that some advice might have been 
unofficially conveyed to the FIWC executive. Losing his position as FIWC President 
effectively denied Lakshman a voice in the sugar workers’ dispute.
The breakaway faction which, it seems, was supported by a majority of workers, 
unambiguously represented a move by sugar workers to wrest control of their union from 
the moderate leadership that had long dominated it. If the first strike was in some 
respects a protest strike against union officials, the subsequent attempted coup by militants 
was subverted by the government’s direct intervention. The second strike was patently a 
reaction to this interference in the union’s affairs. Mayer (1963) certainly saw the second 
strike as a reaction by members of the union supporting the breakaway group to the 
investigating magistrate’s report and presumably to the Registrar General’s subsequent 
expulsion orders. That the workers and the union did not own to this - insisting that the 
strike was caused by the actions of two sirdars who intimidated workers in the lines - is 
not surprising given the powerless of unions vis a vis the state and the paradoxical fact 
that they could not afford to openly challenge the state. The sirdar incidents were 
evidently provoked to provide a pretext for the strike.10
The third strike in December was officially declared by the Union. It evidently
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represented a protest against the company’s decisions regarding the two sirdars. Although 
by this time Nand Kishore had resumed the position of president of the union, he was 
"compelled to some extent to throw in his lot with the militant Lautoka section"...as he 
was "given as his principal officers Janki Ram and O’Neill" both of whom, now 
legitimately made members of the union by a change in its constitution, were close 
associates of Lakshman (LCP 26 of 1959; 17). The strike began on December 2, continued 
over a number of days and was reportedly accompanied by ‘lawlessness’ and violence at 
two of the largest mills. During the strike sirdars and members of their families reportedly 
suffered considerably (LCP 3 of 1958:5). Two lorry loads of police (a special squad) 
arrived in Lautoka on November 29th before the strike actually began, clearly in 
anticipation of the workers taking action. The strike ended a week later when the union, 
together with the protem President of the FTWC, C.P. Bidesi, agreed to the establishment 
of a Commission of Inquiry and to the suspension of the two sirdars pending the result of 
that inquiry. The findings of the resulting Hyne Commission vis a vis the sirdars in effect 
vindicated the company by endorsing the conclusions of its own inquiry into the incidents.
The Events of 1958
The main events of 1958 concerned the continuing struggle by militants to gain 
control of the union, which they succeeded in doing later that year, and the colonial 
government’s enactment of the Industrial Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Ordinance in 
April. The militants’ struggle against the moderate leadership of Nand Kishore was 
recharged by the union’s acceptance of the 1957 wage agreement before the MacFarlane 
arbitration tribunal and its capitulation to a wage agreement for 1958 that again fell far 
below the union’s original claim.
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The McFarlane arbitration concluded its hearings on the 1957 wage case in 
February 1958. The award as announced was made on the basis of arguments presented by 
counsel for both the union and the company, who had concurred in ‘deem(ing) the 
agreement of July 1957 to be fair and reasonable’. McFarlane therefore endorsed the 1957 
wage agreement between CSR and the FSIEA. Lakshman would later denounce the 
arbitration as a "miserable farce" and accuse the Labour Department and the government 
of "being under the compete domination and direction of the Company" (LCP 26 of 1959). 
His public indictment of the Company and the government seemed to leave Union 
officials and counsel unchallenged. However, Lakshman was working behind the scenes to 
depose Kishore.
At a general meeting of the FSIEA held at the Embassy Theatre in Ba on May 4 
an attempt to shaft Kishore was made. The meeting had been called mainly to discuss 
what steps to take on the issue of representation of mechanics’ list employees; this the 
union had again included on its agenda for the 1958 conference to the chagrin of the 
company which again rejected it outright together with the claim for an hourly wage of 2s 
6d. Prior to the Ba meeting, the Lautoka branch held a meeting at which a series of 
resolutions believed to have been drafted by Lakshman, were adopted. These endorsed the 
demands for a 2s 6d wage, a system of job evaluation on lines adopted by the government 
for its PWD employees and asserted the "right to strike" as the "birthright of every worker 
in every democratic country". The last resolution, which with the others was published in 
the Hindi language newspaper Jagriti on April 11, appeared to be a response to the 
government’s introduction of a new Industrial Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) 
Ordinance that very month, evidently to deal with sugar labour militancy. At the general
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meeting at Ba, to which ‘five busloads of members., went or were taken from Lautoka’ 
(Lakshman’s base) a motion of no confidence was moved by a Mr Smith and seconded by 
one A Pickering (both ‘Part-Europeans’ and presumably employed on the mechanics list. 
However, the facts that the meeting had been disorderly and that Nand Kishore who was 
‘greeted with shouts calling for his resignation’, had ‘exercised his prerogative as 
chairman’ and adjourned the meeting to the company lines at Ba, meant that the legality 
of proceedings from that point onwards was in doubt. The union’s legal advisor 
maintained Kishore was still President but the dissident faction insisted that he had been 
deposed. Janki Ram wrote to Kishore on May 31st demanding he return all the union’s 
books since he was no longer president (LCP 26 of 1959:9).
Following the Ba meeting, Kishore took steps to try and consolidate his position. 
He sacked one of his Assistant Secretaries, Sam Rounds, for an undisclosed reason but 
probably for the fact that Rounds had stayed on at the Embassy Theatre and continued to 
take minutes of the proceedings after Kishore had departed. Kishore also replaced, 
although temporarily, Janki Ram as secretary. In the union’s negotiations with the 
company for a 1958 wage agreement, Kishore was also careful to avoid signing an 
agreement until he had received clear indications of acceptance of the company’s counter­
offer of a 20 per cent wage increase from the union’s branches. At a union executive 
meeting on June 1, which was not attended by either Lautoka or Nadi branches (the two 
branches which had not indicated their support for the company’s offer), the union agreed 
to accept the company’s offer and a wage agreement was subsequently signed. Shortly 
afterwards, however, Kishore resigned from the presidency for health reasons and the 
agreement became the subject of another dispute. Kishore’s resignation meanwhile left
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the way open for Lakshman although he did not assume the leadership immediately. He 
needed firstly to extricate himself from the presidency of the International Airport 
Employees’ Union which he did in July. At a meeting of the union’s executive in October 
which the Honeyman Commission would later remark was mainly attended by those who 
‘could fairly well be described as friends of Mr Lakshman’, B.D. Lakshman was elected 
President and Janki Ram general secretary (LCP 26 of 1959).
Lakshman’s assumption of the presidency concluded what had been a long drawn 
out struggle to wrest power from the union’s moderate leaders. The Honeyman 
Commission believed that Lakshman had been directing the FSIEA, through his supporters 
within it, for several months prior to his formal election. Lakshman had indeed publicly 
owned in May to having advised workers to depose Kishore but not to fill the presidency 
immediately. Lakshman’s hand was also believed to be behind the resolution moved by 
Lui Ting at an executive committee meeting on July 6, alleging ‘great discontent’ amongst 
Association members over the way the 1958 agreement was signed, recalling the 
agreement from the Company and requesting a date for renegotiations to commence (LCP 
26 of 1959).
With Lakshman now in the presidency the union stood firm on its position of 
rejection of the 1958 wage agreement and called for double the existing wage. The 
Company declined to enter into any discussions on the 1958 agreement however and 
informed the union in November that it regarded the agreement as binding. The union dug 
in its heels. Later that month Lakshman was authorised to warn the company that if it did 
not discuss the 1958 agreement the union would call a strike. Indeed a strike was called
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for November 29th but it was called off without explanation and the matter of the 1958 
agreement was implicitly dropped early in January 1959, when Lakshman asked the 
company to set a date for a conference to discuss a new wage for that year. Strike threats 
continued to be issued, however. When mill workers downed tools at Rarawai Mill in Ba 
in February 1959 Lakshman, at a meeting of the union’s Lautoka Branch, threatened to 
call a general strike to support them. The threat marred conciliation proceedings which 
were then in progress. The following month, on the eve of the scheduled conference with 
the company to decide on the 1959 wage agreement, Lakshman reportedly made a 
‘somewhat inflammatory speech’ at a general meeting of the union, demanding strict 
discipline from all union members and ‘obedience to his commands’ (LCP 26 of 1959 13). 
As the Honeyman Commission reported later :
‘According to a report of the meeting he received authority to command 
the services of 5,000 volunteers and to call strikes at all the five sugar mills 
in Fiji whenever he deemed that the occasion demanded’(LCP 26 of 
1959:13).
At its March conference with the company, the union pressed its claim for a basic 
wage of 3s an hour and a reduction of the working week from 48 to 40 hours a week 
throughout the year. The company refused to meet the union’s demands and proposed they 
go to arbitration under the 1958 Ordinance. The union declined to do this and the 
company alternatively proposed that an application be made for a wages council to cover 
the industry. Its subsequent application for a wages council was refused by the Governor 
in Council. For its part the union made a direct appeal to the Governor on April 23 when 
a deputation presented a memorandum setting out the union’s case for a 3s an hour wage. 
The argument was based on an estimation of the average family’s weekly food bill and the
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barest minimum diet - ie that set out in the prison ordinance - was used as the basis for 
calculating this. The union also argued that the company could not argue inability to pay 
and claimed that public opinion was behind the workers. The deputation described the 
workers’ living conditions as "dirt and squalor in the midst of plenty" (LCP 26 of 1959 
14) and expressed its opposition to the 1958 Industrial Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) 
Ordinance. A week later this ordinance was invoked to deal with the dispute. A Sugar 
Board of Inquiry, headed by Q.C. GG Honeyman, was appointed under Section 8 (1) of 
the 1958 Ordinance on May 1 to inquire into the "causes and circumstances of a dispute 
which is apprehended between the CSR Company Ltd and the FSIEA and to make 
recommendations for the maintenance of industrial peace in the sugar milling industry" 
(LCP 26 of 1959).
The Industrial Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Ordinance
Introduced in April 1958, the Industrial Disputes (Arbitration & Inquiry) Ordinance 
repealed the 1942 Industrial Disputes (Conciliation & Arbitration) Ordinance and made 
provision, as its name suggests, for both the establishment of arbitration tribunals to settle 
industrial disputes and for boards of inquiry to inquire into the economic and industrial 
conditions in the colony (Sutherland 1984:206). Clearly enacted to enable the colonial 
state to more effectively contain labour militancy, the new ordinance ‘deliberately omitted 
any statutory conciliation machinery’ (LCP 26 of 1959; 21) and was thus intended to 
enable the speedy and compulsory settlement of disputes. Under the new ordinance 
recourse to conciliation could only be had where parties to a dispute already had made 
provision for such conciliation proceedings in a previously concluded agreement 
(Sutherland 1984:207). As Sutherland notes, the likelihood of this was very small. More
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significantly, Sutherland points out that the provision for Boards of Inquiry to be 
established to investigate the wider implications of workers’ wage demands on the 
economy at large meant that henceforth workers’ wage demands would be considered in 
the context of what was held to be ‘the national interest’ (Sutherland 1984:209). The fact 
that the CSR, during the Honeyman Inquiry, implicitly threatened to discontinue its Fiji 
operations if worker demands for a 3s wage were awarded (LCP 26 of 1959;26,30) meant 
that companies henceforth could similarly effectively blackmail Inquiry Commissions, 
whose brief was to make an award that would not adversely affect the national interest. 
Although the Honeyman Commission insisted it was exercising independent judgement on 
the wage matter, based on the evidence before it, it recommended an increase of only 3d 
an hour which was a far cry from the union’s demand. Moreover, after receiving 
confidential information relating to the company’s operations in Fiji, in particular its 
‘profitability and expenditure on capital development’, the Commission was satisfied that 
the
‘rate of profit earned by the company on its capital invested in Fiji was not 
unreasonable and that the distribution of the gross income of the company 
after allowing for purchases of raw material, depreciation etc, was fair as 
between the workers and the general body of shareholders’ (LCP 26 
1959;25).
Despite the intentions behind the new ordinance, it would not prove to be effective 
in enabling the state to deal with either the 1959 oil workers’ strike or the 1960 cane 
farmers’ strike. Indeed, during both these strikes, the colonial state, realising the 
inadequacy of its industrial disputes legislation, sought wider emergency powers under the 
1920 Public Safety Ordinance to effectively deal with worker/farmer militancy. The more 
stringent controls introduced in 1961 came as a reaction to both increased militancy in the
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sugar industry and the ineffectiveness of existing disputes legislation.
The Sugar Industry Ordinance (No 53 of 1961) was inspired by the 
recommendations of yet another Fiji Sugar Industry Inquiry Commission, established in 
1960 under Sir Malcolm Eve, immediately following a prolonged strike by cane growers 
over the terms of a new ten-year cane contract. Designed to "protect this vital industry as 
a whole and to prevent its disruption for reasons attributable to sectional interests" (Acting 
Chief Secretary in a letter to the FTUC, 22.11.1966, FTUC Archives, FTWC File), the 
Ordinance provided for the establishment of a Sugar Board, headed by an Independent 
Chairman and comprising a Vice chairman and accountant. It also provided for the 
establishment of a Sugar Advisory Council on which growers, the company and the 
government were represented but it prohibited politicians or lawyers from sitting on the 
council. Most significant of all was a clause in the Ordinance which criminalised 
hindering :
‘the planting, growing, harvesting...transporting or crushing of cane..the
making of sugar at mills or transporting or storing of sugar’.
The penalty for an offence included imprisonment for up to two years. Although this 
clause would not be used against a strike leader until 1977, its inclusion in the ordinance 
acted as a major deterrent to strike action being taken by either growers or mill workers. It 
effectively denied sugar workers and fanners the right to strike, compelling them to refer 
disputes to the independent chairman for settlement. Should he fail to settle the dispute, 
the ordinance provided for the dispute to be referred to the Chief Justice who could 
appoint a person/s to adjudicate and make an award which could be made an order of the
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court by any party to the dispute and therefore become enforceable.
With a new law now in place to deter sugar workers from striking, the colonial 
government took steps to purge the FSIEA of its militant leaders. Lakshman, who by 1959 
had been re-elected to the Legislative Council in 1959 largely on the votes of sugar 
workers, had involved himself, albeit peripherally, in the oilworkers’ strike, during which 
he publicly uttered militant statements. In August 1960, at the request of an FSIEA 
member, the government commenced an inquiry into the affairs of the union.11 The 
FIWC President, Mohammed Ramzan was supportive of action being taken against 
Lakshman. He wrote to the government:
‘It is hoped you will do everything possible within your power to have the 
affairs of the SIEA (sic) fully investigated. Request for audit of books by a 
competent auditor is more than justified’ (Letter dated 29.5.61, Files of 
CMS, FTUC).
In 1962, following an inquiry which was conducted by Assistant Registrar-General, 
Vijay Singh, and, with the aid of the Industrial Associations’ (Amendment) Ordinance (No 
11 of 1962), Lakshman was expelled from the FSIEA. Singh’s report said there was "little 
likelihood of the affairs of the union being conducted in accordance with the law as long 
as the president of the union remained in office" (Report of the Commissioner of Labour 
1962;6).12 He recommended that "the future conduct of the affairs of the union by its 
office bearers and central executive be kept under close observation to ensure compliance 
with the rules and the Industrial Associations Ordinance " (FT 21.2.62). The amendment 
to the Industrial Associations Ordinance empowered the Registrar of Industrial 
Associations to expel an office bearer of an industrial association for acting in
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contravention of either the association’s constitution or the Industrial Associations
Ordinance. This greatly strengthened the hand of the colonial state and gave it a ready 
weapon with which to counter troublesome labour leaders.
Ramzan’s complicity in the purging of Lakshman from the FSIEA is not surprising. 
As Lakshman had done before him, Ramzan was playing the moderate and responsible 
role expected of the President of the FIWC. By 1961, as we shall soon see, the FIWC was 
also being threatened by an alternative and much more militant federation of labour 
unions. It was in its interests to support the endeavours of the colonial government to 
crush labour militancy and weed out undesirable leaders. As we shall shortly see, the 
FSIEA was not the only union subjected to an official inquiry and subsequently faced with 
the expulsion of its leaders in this period. Indeed, this was to become an effective method 
of purging the union movement of militants.
The 1959 Strike and Disturbances
The 1959 oil workers’ strike was led by the Wholesale and Retail Workers’ General 
Union. Registered in May 1958, the W&RWGU was the first general union to be 
organised since 1944 and its membership ranged across a number of industries, including 
the oil, tobacco, meat, garment and hotel industries. The founders of the W&RWGU 
included James Anthony, Mohammed (Apisai) Tora, Ratu Meli Gonewai and Michael 
Columbus - all of them young men in their early twenties. Lakshman, by some accounts, 
was also involved in some way in the formation of this union. Certainly some of his 
correspondence, sent out under the letterhead of the FSIEA early in 1959 is suggestive of 
both his involvement in the union’s formation and foreknowledge of its 1959 agenda.13
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From its very inception, the W&RWGU was militant and its leaders determined to win 
improvements in wages and conditions for its members by using direct action.
Through the efforts of the union, the oil industry became strongly organised - 75 
per cent of the 300 odd oilworkers employed at Suva, Vuda Point and Nadi Airport were 
financial members of the union when the first log of claims was laid before the oil 
companies in 1959. The union began negotiations with Shell Company (Pacific Islands) 
Ltd and Vacuum Oil Company Pty Ltd for an increase in the basic wage from $3/0/6 to 
$4/15/- in October (West 1960;46). The oil companies offered to increase the minimum 
wage by 9s 6d a week from January 1 1960 and to re-open negotiations in February on 
the union’s log of claims. The union, however, demanded that the proposed increase be 
given immediately and made retrospective to October 24 1959 and that its claim for 
overtime be accepted. When the company refused, the union, without notice according to 
the company, called a strike (FT 12.12.59).
The strike began early on December 7. Workers at Shell and Vacuum Oil 
installations at Walu Bay were instructed on how to peacefully picket within the law by 
Anthony and Gonewai. Police headquarters were informed at 7.15am that posters were 
being displayed and notices regarding the strike were being handed to people by Anthony. 
The Labour Department attempted to intervene but was told that the union " had no faith 
in the Department”. Later that day at a public meeting attended by several hundred strikers 
and members of the public Anthony appealed for support to non-W&RWGU members. 
The tenor of his address was militant:
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We can only succeed if we have solidarity and that is why I am asking you 
to help our cause. This is the first big strike Suva has seen and this is the 
chance we have been waiting for. If we don’t get our demands we will shut 
down the whole of Suva (LCP 10 of 1960).
The colonial government was advised that evening that tension was rising in Suva 
and the following day, after a meeting between the Governor, the Acting Attorney 
General, the Commissioners of police, army and labour and the public relations officer, 
the government issued a statement via the public media which was repeated several times 
on radio, informing the public that the strike should not have taken place and condemning 
the union for not making full use of negotiating machinery (West 1960:46). The union 
issued a counter statement, protesting at the government’s "siding with employers" and 
criticising the Labour Department for "lag(ging) behind the hopes and aspirations of the 
working community at large" and for "only tak(ing) notice of anything... when a strike is 
on". It added :
The declared policy of the Labour Department is to remain neutral in wage 
matters and when a strike is on we expect the Labour Department and the 
government to remain impartial (FT 11.12.59).
Later in the day, police despatched a half-unit of a riot squad to one of the oil company 
depots after a government car was impounded by striking workers (LCP 10 of 1960).
On December 9, bus and taxi drivers joined the strike together with 300 casual 
workers at Lautoka. The government and the oil companies met and decided to supply oil 
to four petrol stations in the city. Police-escorted tankers, driven by Europeans, made 
deliveries to these gas stations, which were put under police guard. The union
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telegrammed tine companies complaining that they were using "unfair measures to crush 
the workers’ right to strike" by using non-union labour and supplying petrol stations for 
general use. At least one gas station operator was threatened with assault if buses were 
supplied with petrol and Indian and Fijian drivers who attempted to get petrol were 
reportedly abused and obstructed. Talks held between the Commissioner of Labour and the 
union’s legal advisor, Andrew Deoki, produced no results (LCP 10 of 1960).
That afternoon matters became more serious. Anthony was to have addressed 
strikers at a vacant area near the bus station where large crowds were stranded for lack of 
public transport. Worried by the "crowds of unusual size" in Suva at the time - consisting 
largely of young men, "many of them sullen" - and by the atmosphere of tension and the 
presence of "some convicted criminals", police officers attempted to disperse the crowd. 
Police Commissioner Beaumont testified later at the special inquiry into the "disturbances" 
that followed that the crowd "showed defiance" and its mood was "ugly and aggressive" 
(LCP 10 of 1960). A police riot squad despatched to the scene announced there would 
be no meeting and refused to let Anthony speak. The crowd was ordered to disperse. 
When it failed to do so, police threw tear gas bombs into it. This provoked stone-throwing 
which resulted in more smoke bombs and then the situation descended into a general riot, 
with "hooligan elements" rampaging through the streets, smashing shop windows and 
looting. Violence continued through the night and into the next day when some 
"Europeans’ cars and some Europeans were stoned" (West 1960). The government 
snapped into action. Armed with safety regulations introduced under the Public Safety 
Ordinance, a curfew was imposed on the three main towns between 7pm and 5am, police 
were given arbitrary powers of search and arrest without warrants, outdoor gatherings of
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more than three people were prohibited and army, territorial and police reserves were 
called up (West 1960). Armed soldiers began patrolling streets alongside police. The 
government’s most effective action in neutralising the strikers, however, involved a 
surreptitiously orchestrated public meeting at which Fijian strikers, lured by rumours that 
Anthony and Tora were to address them, were directly appealed to, as Fijians, by their 
traditional chiefs.
One of the more perplexing, and worrying, features of the disturbances as far as 
the colonial government and Western observers were concerned was why the mainly Fijian 
rioters had vented their rage on Europeans - or the property of Europeans - in particular, 
when a "protectionist" colonial policy towards the native Fijians should have favourably 
predisposed Fijians towards Europeans generally. West (1960) aptly conveys the 
European assumption that their antipathy towards Indians should be shared by Fijians:
...the Europeans (in Fiji) have liked the attractive, friendly Fijians, and 
tended to dislike the Indians. Thus it is on the surface surprising that in a 
disturbed situation Fijians should have displayed anti-European sentiments 
and not that anti-Indian feeling which people have always expected and 
perhaps feared, and that where the Indians joined in the riots or simply 
looked on, it was in support of the rioters (1960:49).
That the strike represented class action by organised workers across racial categories and
that the main target of the riots was capital, were undeniable facts, as West noted:
The fact suggested by the riots is that Fijians and Indians might act together 
against Europeans who, few in number (6402 in 1956), provide most senior 
government officials and most of the capital investment in Fiji (1960; 49).
Yet the colonial government and its sympathisers told themselves otherwise, employing
the racial ideologies that were their own creation:
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The European tendency, and that of the Fijian chiefs, has been to imply that 
if the Fijians rioted, they must have been incited and egged on by alien 
anti-European provocateurs and by hooligans: by implication Indians or 
outsiders (West 1960;49).
Armed with such a perception, and with the clear intention of dividing workers 
racially, the colonial government gave permission for a public meeting to be held on 
December 10 and let the word go out that Anthony and Tora would address the meeting. 
Instead of Anthony and Tora, however, the crowd of between 2000 and 3000 people 
(mainly Fijians) were addressed by leaders of the newly-formed and chiefly-dominated 
Fijian Association who were also the nominated Fijian members of the Legislative Council 
(FT 14.12.59).14 Although the Association’s president, Ratu Edward Cakobau told the 
meeting there was no intention to "cajole the Fijians away from those who worked with 
them", all speakers expressed their deep sorrow, and especially their shame, over the fact 
that it was mainly Fijians who were responsible for the rioting, and pleaded with Fijians 
not to be "misled" and "used" by "others" (FT 14.12.59). The leaders urged Fijians in 
Suva to
use the Fijian Association as a channel through which they could get their 
leaders to make contact with the government, the firms and the City 
Council on matters affecting the Fijians (FT 14.12.59).
At a later meeting, convened the same day by Ratu Penaia Ganilau (as Roko Tui 
Cakaudrove) for people of the provinces of Bua, Macuata and Cakaudrove, other Fijian 
chiefs and Fijian Administration officers reiterated the warning to Fijians against taking 
"the advice of trouble-makers":
You were brought up in the proper way at your villages. Don’t follow other 
people. The people who have started this situation are the people who have 
blackened our names (FT 14.12.59).
119
These unequivocally communal appeals to working class Fijians to see themselves as 
Fijians rather than as workers, and to feel shame for having tarnished the good name of 
Fijians, were reinforced by an appeal to Fijian pride by the Fiji Times. In an editorial 
proclaiming that the "wave of insensate violence by young hooligans was essentially of an 
un-Fijian character", the newspaper declared:
there are no grounds whatever to suggest that anybody has succeeded in 
pushing the Fijian into the path which some non-Fijians, both inside and 
outside Fiji, would like them to follow for devious reasons (FT 14.12.59).
The underlying theme in the newspaper’s appeal to Fijians was that Fijians were a people 
whose reputation for "unwavering loyalty to the Throne" was widely known and that they 
were clearly being used by "others".
The racially divisive strategy that the colonial government employed with the aid 
of Fijian chiefs, paid off well. Not only was the strike settled as a result of a split in the 
W&RWGU executive but also, in the aftermath of the strike, several unions (including the 
W&RWGU itself) were rent by racial divisions, resulting in the formation of a number of 
racially-exclusive unions. The intervention by members of the Fijian chiefly ruling class 
exposed the interlinked interests of this class and the colonial state, by whose patronage it 
had been fortified. A rebellious, urban Fijian working class posed an obvious threat to the 
continuing authority of the Fijian aristocracy.
The settlement of the oilworkers’ strike on December 15 - with an agreement to 
refer the dispute to arbitration15 - was clearly the result of connivance on the part of 
Gonewai, the FIWC and Ratu Mara. Gonewai had taken "control of the strike" from the
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evening of the 11th, after Anthony apparently took ill and was confined to bed on the 
advice of a doctor. While Anthony slept, after taking some tablets Gonewai had given 
him, Gonewai took Tora to meet representatives of the oil companies at the FBC where 
they were presented with a draft agreement negotiated by the FIWC on the W&RWGU’s 
behalf. The fact that Anthony learned of this draft agreement much later suggests that the 
FIWC’s involvement had not been decided by the full W&RWGU executive and that 
Gonewai had been covertly working to secure a settlement. Indeed Gonewai told the 
Inquiry that had he not taken control of the strike when he did, it might have gone on for 
some time. Although Gonewai was generally happy with the draft settlement agreement, 
and had managed to get most other executive members to acquiesce, Anthony, when he 
learned of it, was not. However, the executive was now divided and Anthony and Tora 
were in the minority and under pressure to sign the FlWC-drafted agreement. Gonewai 
solicited the help of Ratu Mara and John Falvey and told them he had the support of all 
members of the executive except Anthony. Anthony and Tora were later that day 
pressured to sign the agreement by the rest of the union’s executive (LCP 10 of 1960).
Anthony told the Fiji Times on December 15 that he and Tora were "dissatisfied 
with the terms of the agreement" and had signed it "under extreme pressure from the 
remaining six members of the executive of the union". He said if sufficient money could 
be raised by public subscriptions he would go to London, with Tora if funds permitted, to 
discuss "social, economic and political conditions in Fiji" with the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies (FT 16.12.59). The following day, Anthony tried to hold a public meeting in 
Lautoka but was refused permission. He reacted to the refusal by tearing up a copy of the 
UN Declaration of Human Rights in front of the Police Superintendent at Lautoka. The
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following week he defied the authorities by holding two public meetings without seeking a 
permit, on December 21 and 23 at Lautoka and Suva, although these were held "behind 
closed doors" (FT 23.12.59). At these meetings, Anthony appealed for financial support to 
aid the union’s arbitration case.
Anthony, and B.D. Lakshman, also attempted to abort the Commission of Inquiry 
into the disturbances (LCP 10 of 1960). Lakshman was fined $10 for failing to appear at 
the Inquiry. Anthony and Tora appeared but made it clear they were not taking part in it 
of their own free will. Only Gonewai appeared happy to assist the Inquiry. The report of 
Commissioner Lowe, who conducted the inquiry, was released in February 1960. It was 
surprisingly sympathetic to the strikers. Lowe found that dissatisfaction from low wages - 
indeed inability to make ends meet - was a primary cause of mass support for the 
oilworkers strike; that delays by the oil companies in opening negotiations on wages and 
conditions had precipitated the strike; that the union had at one stage followed Labour 
Department advice, to no avail; that the government statement had inflamed the union and 
the distribution of petrol, following so soon after this statement, looked like an attempt by 
the government to frustrate the efforts of the strikers. Importantly, Lowe affirmed the 
union’s legal right to strike:
It cannot be questioned that they were legally entitled to strike, and without 
warning. There was and is no law in existence to the contrary (LCP 10 of 
1960).
However, Lowe condemned what he considered Anthony’s method of keeping the 
strikers within the law and out of trouble while being prepared to break the law by using 
"strongarm men" to further the ends of the union if necessary (LCP 10 of 1960). Other
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than flimsy circumstantial evidence (such as the presence of non-unionists in the unions 
office, two of whom were recognised as ex-criminals) there was nothing to support 
Lowe’s finding that Anthony had actively enlisted the help of "strongann men" to further 
the union’s cause.16 Indeed, the fact that the police had provoked the disturbances is 
clear even from a reading of the Fiji Times account of events. Commissioner Lowe’s 
report not only vindicated the police actions, it discredited Anthony for employing 
methods that could only be described as devious, and which brought trade unions into 
disrepute. Perhaps knowing that Anthony could not have cared less about Lowe’s 
judgement, the colonial government itself employed devious means to get rid of him. 
Early in 1960 it offered Anthony a scholarship to go abroad to study, which he accepted.
Disempowering the W&RWGU
With Anthony out of the way, the colonial government then took deliberate steps 
over the next two years to completely disempower the W&RWGU. First, it encouraged 
Ratu Meli Gonewai’s formation in March 1960 of a breakaway Fiji Oil Workers’ Union. 
Then, in 1961, it introduced a Wages Council (the first such Council in the colony’s 
history) to cover the Wholesale and Retail Industry. Later that year, the Registrar of 
Industrial Associations ordered an inquiry into the affairs of the union and its office 
bearers. All of these moves were part of a campaign to erode the power of the 
W&RWGU.
The Gonewai-led breakaway of oil workers in 1960 deprived the union of a 
significant number of its members. And the government’s introduction of the Viti Levu 
Wholesale and Retail Trades Wages Council in 1961 was patently aimed at further eroding
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the union’s base. The action not only flew in the face of the government’s, and the 
FIWC’s, declared policy that wages councils should only be established in industries 
where workers were not organised,17 it also ignored the long-recognised need for 
statutory wage fixing in the tailoring and transport industries, noted in several Labour 
Commissioner reports. The government’s claim that the W&RWGU
did not represent all workers employed in the industry and there were 
serious doubts about whether they had a majority (Labour Department 
Report 1961)
undermined the union, as did its report that the Wages Council was "unique in that not 
one of the W&RWGU representatives was a person engaged in the industry" (Labour 
Department Report 1961). Despite these two developments, the union remained 
undaunted. It enlarged its membership by organising butchery, tobacco, garment and hotel 
workers and called two strikes in 1961 and 1962 at Wahleys Butchery and Carreras Ltd. 
The 1961 inquiry was indeed called to try to stop the W&RWGU from operating as a 
general union.
The inquiry magistrate narrowly demarcated the classes of workers that the union
could enrol as members - ie only "those engaged in the business of selling commodities"
(FT 5.2.62) - and consequently ruled many of those enrolled as members ineligible for
membership. Tora vehemently rejected the findings of the Inquiry:
No union in Fiji can accept Mr McLoughlin’s findings because to do so 
would mean the death of trade unionism in this country (FT 5.2.62)
Like the inquiry into the FSIEA conducted in the same year, this inquiry also 
focussed on whether union officials were complying with the union’s constitution and with
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the Industrial Associations Ordinance and, like the FSIEA inquiry, it found a number of 
instances where they were not. The union’s refusal to comply with the Registrar’s 
directives relating to demarcation led to the expulsion of 14 union officials, including 
Tora, in 1962. Tora’s response was characteristically audacious. He told the Fiji Times:
I suppose [the Registrar of Industrial Associations] would know that the 
matter does not end here. We have started something and it should be 
known, not only to him, but also to those concerned, that we never stop 
halfway at doing things (FT 5.2.62)
The government responded with a second inquiry into the union’s affairs. The union’s 
deregistration in 1963 followed soon after this inquiry was concluded.
The W&RWGU’s deregistration showed the ultimate power of the colonial state 
over labour organisations. Although deregistration of unions that had become defunct was 
common enough, the use of deregistration to demolish a troublesome union which showed 
no signs of conforming to the model of responsible unionism, was not. The W&RWGU 
had displayed an intolerable degree of militancy not just by calling the strike of 1959, 
which had resulted in serious anti-capital rioting and the near-destruction of the Labour 
department’s own offices. In 1961 it had also formed a militant alternative to the FIWC 
and organised a demonstration march through Suva, in March of that year to protest 
against the Commissioner of Labour and against FIWC representation on the Wages 
Council. More seriously, it had challenged the state by defiantly rejecting the findings of 
an official inquiry and ignoring the Registrar’s instructions. By continuing to organise 
workers across a wide range of industries it was operating as a general union and this was 
anathema to the colonial government.
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The experience of the W&RWGU was not to be repeated. In 1964, the government 
introduced the Trade Union Ordinance to deal with the ‘problem’ of outsiders assuming 
leadership positions within unions and to curtail the operation of general unions. The 
ordinance replaced the Industrial Associations Ordinance of 1942 and added new controls 
on trade unions (Sutherland 1984). All trade unions were required to re-register under the 
new Ordinance. To qualify for registration, they had to meet the requirements of the new 
ordinance. These requirements included, amongst other things, the annual submission of 
audited financial statements, of three copies of all alterations to the constitution and rules 
and of all new rules (and of the constitution in force) and a list of all changes of officers 
and trustees made by the union in the preceding 12 months. The ordinance provided the 
Registrar with power to refuse or to cancel the registration of unions on specific grounds 
and laid down strict qualifying criteria for those holding office in trade unions to exclude 
persons with criminal convictions for fraud or dishonesty and illiterates. It made it 
mandatory for all officers of a union with the exception of the Secretary, to be, and to 
have been, employed in the industry for no less than a year. It also restricted trade 
unionists to holding office in only one union.
In addition to the Trade Union Ordinance, two other ordinances - the Trades 
Disputes (Arbitration, Inquiry & Settlement) and the Employment Ordinances - were 
introduced in 1964. The new Disputes law, which repealed the Essential Services 
(Arbitration) Ordinance and the 1958 Disputes Ordinance, made no provision for 
compulsory arbitration but rather "relied for its efficacy on punishment for breach of 
contract" (LCP 23 1965; 12). It required workers in essential services to give 28 (rather 
than 21) days strike notice and made provision for the Commissioner of Labour to
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conciliate in disputes. The most significant feature of the Employment Ordinance was its 
statutory provision for a Labour Advisory Board consisting of government, employers and 
unions, to advise the government on matters concerning labour and employment. Although 
a Labour Advisory Board had been in existence since 1947, the ordinance made statutory 
provision for such a body.
It is significant that FIWC representatives on the Labour Advisory Board 
approved the new Trade Union Ordinance. By 1963, the effect of FIWC’s cooption into 
government-convened consultative bodies like the Labour Advisory Board and Wages 
Councils could already be seen in the acquiescence of labour leaders within this peak body 
to new controls on labour and new strategies of cooption. The FIWC was in fact 
appraised of the new legislation early in January 1963 when a confidential copy of die 
draft legislation was sent by the Commissioner of Labour to Ramzan with the following 
instructions:
...the draft bill should be treated as confidential by your organisation since, 
until government has had a chance to consider the recommendations of the 
Labour Advisory Board, and to formulate its own views, especially on the 
provisions of the confidential clauses, it is considered that it would be 
premature for copies of the bill to be sent to any bodies other than those 
agreed to; to give fuller publicity at this stage to the provisions of the draft 
bill (Commissioner of Labour to Ramzan 3.1.63. FTUC Archives).
The FIWC approved of the bill and the only trade union opposition came from the Fijian 
Federation of Labour which organised a protest march of 250 people through Suva to 
Government House to present a petition to the Acting Governor opposing the draft bill 
which the Labour Advisory Board approved in July 1963 (Department of Labour Report
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1963:7). The effects of the new law, which encouraged establishment-based unions was 
seen in the larger number of small unions which emerged after 1964.
Before turning to consider other strategies employed by the colonial government to 
undermine labour militancy in the latter part of the 1960’s, we should briefly look at why 
the FIWC was so easily coopted by the colonial state in the aftermath of the 1959 strike.
The Fijian Federation of Labour and the Cooption of the FIWC
What is significant about the FIWC’s role following the 1959 strike is that it 
functioned to support the colonial state in the latter’s concerted efforts to undermine and 
erode the base of the W&RWGU. The FIWC’s active participation in the colonial 
government’s first Wages Council, despite Ramzan’s earlier statement that he did not want 
to see such councils established where workers were already organised, signified its 
cooption by the state in the strategy to weaken the W&RWGU. Its support of the 1964 
Trade Union Act, designed to curtail general unions, similarly aligned it with the colonial 
government. That the FIWC had interests of its own to protect is clear. These interests 
largely explain its actions in the years following the strike.
Hince (1971; 381-382) noted that the FIWC’s strong affirmation of state-favoured 
industrial unionism was based on both a reaction against general unions - which could 
consolidate unions across industry barriers into groups of greater numerical strength - and 
a reaction against the W&RWGU. Both of these concerns were related and had to do with 
the position that the FIWC assumed for itself, and was determined to maintain, as the sole 
peak organisation of trade unions in the colony. General unions, by combining workers
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across industries, posed a potential threat in that they could numerically present a solid 
force, especially under strong leadership, which might threaten the FIWC’s claim to 
represent workers across industries. The W&RWGU, for instance, sought to organise 
workers in the oil distribution industry, in the retail trade, in manufacturing, processing 
and the hotel and catering industries. In 1959 the union’s membership totalled around 
1000 (Hince 1971; 378). The goals and strategies of the W&RWGU were vastly different 
from those adopted by the more conservative FIWC leadership and when in 1961 the 
union formed the Fijian Federation of Labour (FFL), as a militant alternative to the FIWC, 
it directly challenged FIWC’s hitherto undisputed leadership of the labour movement.
Formed in 1961, the FFL’s founding affiliates were the W&RWGU, the Transport 
Workers Union (registered in May 1960) and the Government Wage Employees Union 
(registered in July 1960). Although, in retrospect, the FFL presented no real threat to the 
FIWC - it was denied recognition by the colonial government and ignored - the fact that 
it emerged at all and assumed a high public profile by staging demonstrations, set the 
FIWC leaders on edge and led them to support the colonial government’s efforts to 
undermine the FFL’s protagonists. As it happened, the FFL survived only as long as its 
founding affiliates did. All three unions which had formed the FFL had been deregistered 
by the end of 1964.18
Disorganising the last of the militant general unions
Militant general unions did not completely disappear from the scene, however. 
Apisai Tora went on to form another militant general union, the Airport & General 
Workers Union (A&GWU) in 1965 and, following the dismissal of three union members
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from the Korolevu Beach Hotel in 1965, the union called a strike. When management 
threatened to bring in scab labour from surrounding villages, several accommodation units 
or "bures" at the hotel were burned down and an attempt was made to set the hotel on 
fire. Tora was arrested and charged with inciting the strikers to arson. Although he was 
acquitted of the charge, six others of his union were imprisoned for the offence. 
Significantly, later that year, the government announced its intention to establish two 
further Wages Councils, in the Hotel and Catering Industry and in the transport industry 
and these were duly established in 1966. The Hotel and Catering Industry Wages Council 
clearly represented an attempt to erode the base of the A&GWU.
The union, however, seemed unperturbed and indeed grew more powerful in the 
following years. It amended its constitution and changed its name in 1966, and amended 
its constitution again in 1967, to allow it to enlist members from other industries, 
particularly the building industry which had no union.19 In 1967, the Airport Hotel & 
Catering Workers Union (AH&CWU) (as the A&GWU was now called) also won a 20% 
wage increase for its members employed by the government in the Airport Crash Fire 
Services following arbitration but was advised by the arbitrator not to use the case to seek 
similar increases for others of its members whether within or outside government. Ignoring 
this advice, the union brought claims for a 100% wage increase and numerous improved 
conditions concurrently against Qantas, Fiji Airways Ltd and two building and civil 
engineering firms later in the year. The Fiji Municipal Workers’ Union made an "almost 
identical" claim against the Suva City Council. Concerned at the "number and magnitude" 
of the claims and at the "probability of similar claims being lodged in other sectors", the 
colonial government quickly intervened (LCP 10 of 1968;9). It appointed a Board of
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Inquiry under the new Industrial Disputes (Arbitration, Inquiry & Settlement) Ordinance to 
inquire into the dispute and especially into the likely implications of the unions’ wage 
claims for the Fiji economy and the tourist industry.
The union responded with a protest strike by Qantas workers and gave 28 days 
notice that its members in the Airport Crash Fire Services would withdraw their labour in 
sympathy. Qantas workers stayed on strike for three weeks and both unions boycotted the 
Board of Inquiry which decided, in any case, that the unions’ claims could only be 
"disastrous for the economy of Fiji" (LCP 34 of 1967;8).20 The AH&CWU also held a 
six day strike without notice in two building companies in October that year and attempted 
to disrupt transport services by pressuring bus and taxi drivers to join the strike. This 
drew a stern warning from Chief Minister, Ratu Mara, who announced Public Safety 
Regulations and warned that the government would deal effectively with any disorder.
In 1968, following the breakdown of wage negotiations between the AH&CWU 
and Nadi hoteliers, Tora called the union’s members employed by Qantas and Nadi hotels 
out on a stopwork. In response, Nadi hoteliers and Qantas withdrew their recognition of 
the union.21 This resulted in Tora’s resignation from the union and deregistration 
followed four months later, in August 1968.22 It was not coincidental that, immediately 
following the union’s deregistration, workers in the hotel and catering and building 
industries as well as airline workers formed three separate unions, the Fiji Hotel & 
Catering Employees Union, the Building Workers Union and the Airline Workers Union 
respectively. The speed with which these unions were formed and registered and the 
Labour Commissioner’s approving comment in his report for the year suggest that some
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assistance from the Department might have been forthcoming in the formation of these 
organisations which conformed to the approved model:
The formation of these three unions is in line with and consolidates the 
pattern of development of industrially-based unions which has been 
successfully established in Fiji (Labour Department Report 1968).
So ended the era of general unions in Fiji.
Other Disorganising Strategies Employed by the Colonial State
Two other disorganising strategies employed by the colonial state in this period of 
ascendant militancy were the tacit encouragement of exclusively-Fijian, breakaway unions 
and the cooption of unions into state-sponsored joint consultative bodies. The former had 
the effect of fragmenting and weakening the union movement, the latter encouraged 
‘responsible unionism’ by engaging union leaders in discussions with employers and the 
government that went beyond negotiations for improved wages and conditions.
The fact that a number of exclusively Fijian unions emerged in the immediate 
aftermath of the 1959 strike suggests that various forces were at work to divide the trade 
union movement. The racially-divisive strategy employed by Fijian chiefs during the strike 
was motivated by the worry that militancy among urban Fijian commoners might 
eventually metamorphose into a challenge of chiefly authority and the traditional order. 
For the colonial government, a splintered union movement presented less trouble than a 
united, militant movement and "race" was an easy factor to encourage division around. 
The splits in the labour movement caused by breakaway Fijian unions were, moreover, 
conveniently used as a deterrence argument against militancy. As Sutherland (1984) put it,
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the official attitude seemed to be that such splits would continue to occur if union leaders 
"did not behave responsibly". The facts that between 1959 and 1962 six exclusively Fijian 
unions were permitted to register23 and that the colonial government remained silent on 
their emergence until 1962 (Sutherland 1984) suggests that there might even have been 
tacit encouragement of breakaway unions. The Labour Department’s first statement on 
breakaway unions, issued on August 17, 1962, certainly indicated a very ambiguous 
position : while claiming that it disapproved of the development of splinter unions and
advised those concerned that their actions only weakened the union movement, the
Department admitted it had given assistance to their formation because it "had a public 
duty to assist any group of employees... in all matters connected with labour relations" 
(LCP 15 of 1963:10).
The FIWC also maintained relative silence over the matter until Ramzan’s own 
union, the Public Works & Allied Workers Union (which later became the Public
Employees Union) was itself afflicted with racial division by the formation of the Fijian 
Engineering Workers Union in 1962 (renamed the Fijian Government Workers’ Union in 
1965). The division in the PW&AWU was the subject of much discussion and
correspondence between the FIWC and the government, especially after the latter granted 
"limited recognition" to the splinter union in 1963 (LCP 12 1964;7). The FIWC (Ramzan) 
wrote on at least two occasions to the Colonial Secretary to protest at the colonial 
government’s limited recognition of the Fijian Engineering Workers Union and accused 
the government of "encouraging breakaway unions" (Letters to C.S. dated May 13 and 
December 20, 1963, FIWC Files, FTUC Archives).
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Largely as a result of the pressure exerted by the FIWC, the Labour Advisory 
Board in 1964 took a stand on breakaway unions and the 1964 Trade Union Act included 
a clause that was intended to prevent the registration of a union where one already existed 
in a particular industry. This did not, however, eradicate exclusively Fijian unions - both 
the Fijian Government Workers’ Union and the Fijian Teachers Union (later Association) 
were able to register under the 1964 Ordinance (LCP 23 of 1966:24). What is more, the 
continuing conflict between the two government employees unions provided the context 
for a new mechanism of control introduced in 1965. In the latter half of that year, the 
FIWC implicitly abandoned its protests at the government’s effective recognition of the 
FGWU and its rejection of the suggestion by the government that the two unions should 
jointly negotiate with the government.24 In September the two unions were engaged in 
joint negotiations with the government and, as a result of this ‘breakthrough’ in the 
relationship between the two unions, a new machinery, the Joint Industrial Council, had 
been set up. The establishment of this new machinery signified an important achievement 
for the government for the JIC was conceived as more than a vehicle for negotiating terms 
and conditions of employment and it had been brought in as a consequence of the division 
amongst organised government workers. While a defeated Ramzan lamented that "a 
substitute" (for a single trade union) had had to be agreed to through which the goals of 
the trade union movement could be achieved, the government celebrated the formation of 
the JIC and commended the two unions for the "spirit of goodwill" which resulted in its 
formation (FT 23.9.65). More than a means of negotiating terms and conditions of 
employment, the Council was to be a
forum for the exchange of ideas and views, the results of which would lead 
to an increase in the efficient conducting of Government business and an 
improvement in the already good relations existing between both sides (FT 
23.9.65)
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The idea of "joint consultation" which lay behind the new machinery and which was 
clearly aimed at containing labour, had been publicly promoted as early as 1960 by the 
new (and first local) Labour Commissioner, John Amputch, who advanced the concept at a 
Rotary Club address (Sutherland 1984;329). Joint consultation of course required the 
cooperation of employers as well as unions. The formation of the Fiji Employers’ 
Consultative Association in 1960, six months after the 1959 strike, facilitated promotion of 
the idea among employers. FECA had been formed by leading employers who, as 
Kuruduadua put it "rightly realised the need to organise themselves against the might of 
the trade unions in Fiji" (Kuruduadua 1979). Its first director, J. Grundy, put it plainly to 
employers that:
Failure... to form and join employers’ associations, particularly in a territory 
such as Fiji, where there is developing political consciousness, is obstructive 
and selfish (FT 17.12.60)
According to Sutherland (1984), capital and the state determined to make joint 
consultation a reality. In the following years, efforts were concentrated on drawing 
organised labour into an "institutional arrangement where it could be more effectively 
controlled" (Sutherland 1984). That this was achieved largely through the cooperation of 
the FIWC is clear. Led by the example of Ramzan’s own union, the PW&AWU, other 
moderate unions affiliated to the FIWC entered into joint consultative councils or bodies 
with employers in their industries.
Conclusion
The militancy of labour unions which marked this period of colonial history, from 
1957 - 1969, represented a departure from the moderate, responsible unionism of the
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1940’s and early 1950’s. The colonial state’s responses to labour militancy and especially 
to the 1959 strike demonstrated that organised labour, combined in action across industries 
and racial categories, was recognised as something that had to be contained. The various 
(overt and covert) strategies outlined in this chapter that were used by the colonial state 
from 1957 - 1969 - including the enactment of constraining legislation and the subjection 
of unions to official inquiries and deregistration under them; the use of racially divisive 
strategies during strikes; the tacit encouragement of ethnically-based splinter unions (as 
breakaways from militant organisations); the establishment of wages councils to undermine 
unions; and the introduction of joint consultative machinery as the first formal mechanism 
for coopting moderate labour leaders - were all intended to stamp out militancy in the 
trade union movement. At the end of 1969, on the eve of Fiji’s independence, the colonial 
government may well have felt confident about having achieved its goal in this regard. 
The formation of FECA in 1960, as the employers’ counterpart to the state-formed FIWC, 
completed the basis for a more formal mechanism of containment which would be later 
put in place by the post-colonial state.
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Endnotes
1. The number of man-days lost in 1971, 1972 and 1973 were respectively 70,920, 
214,721 and 807,972.
2. The Honeyman Commission denied that the Company’s occupational arrangements 
reflected deliberate racial discrimination on the company’s part or encouraged 
inter-ethnic rivalry. In response to witnesses who alleged that they received lower 
pay "because their skins were black", the commission said it "deplored this attempt 
to introduce racial prejudice".
3. The Honeyman Inquiry report referred to "resistance" on the part of mechanics list 
employees to the greater recruitment of Fijians and Indians to skilled occupations 
in the industry (LCP 26 of 1959:2). Lui Ting also gave evidence that at its first 
meeting, the union resolved that only mechanics who were ‘Part-European’ would 
serve on the executive.
4. C.A. Eyre, giving evidence at the Honeyman Inquiry, spoke of workers on the 
labourers’ list being transferred to the mechanics’ list from time to time if they 
were found to be doing jobs of mechanics.
5. At least two busloads of workers (presumably workers employed on the Mechanics 
List and therefore largely Part-European) were taken by O’Neill to the FSSWU 
revival meeting at Ba for the likely purpose of "stifling the revival". They were 
barred from attending by ‘the President’ of the FSSWU, C.A. Eyre, who announced 
that "only financial members of the Union could take part"(LCP 26 of 1959;4). 
Clearly there had been a speedy campaign by Eyre to sign up financial members 
prior to the meeting in anticipation of conflict arising between supporters of the 
revival effort and those who were in favour of being represented by the FSIEA. 
Other Part-European members of the FSIEA were later involved in the move by 
militants to depose Nand Kishore from the FSIEA presidency.
6. Company involvement in the revival of the FSSWU, to which it extended 
recognition in 1951, is suggested by evidence given to the Honeyman Commission 
that some officials of the Company were seen in the vicinity of the revival meeting 
in Ba (LCP 26 of 1959:5). Although the Honeyman Commission rejected the 
suggestion of company involvement, it seems reasonable to suppose that the 
Company might well have encouraged the union’s resuscitation, given its strong 
opposition to FSIEA’s avowed intentions regarding mechanics’ list employees.
7. Lakshman claimed at the Honeyman Inquiry that the FSTU had only 18 members; 
Eyre told the Inquiry the union had 238 financial members at the end of 1938 (Fiji 
Times 2.7.59:3)
8. The arbitration hearing received no submission from those who were recognised as 
the legitimate officers of the union, but this was hardly surprising since union 
officials had signed the wage agreement - the workers’ wage claims were made in 
defiance of that agreement. The union finally made a submission to the arbitration
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tribunal in January 1958, by which time its leadership had changed and two 
members of the breakaway group, O’Neill and Janki Ram, were installed in the 
Executive as Vice-President and General Secretary respectively (LCP 26 of 1959).
9. The Honeyman Commission highlighted the role played by Lakshman, whom it 
saw as trying to gain a position of power in the FSIEA, and ‘his associates’ who 
sought to place him there. In 1957, Lakshman was President of FIWC, having 
assumed the position after Pandit Ami Chandra’s death in 1954. In that capacity he 
attended meetings between the FSIEA and the CSR in May and June 1957. 
Although there was no evidence of his having organised the strike he was 
identified as the drafter of a resolution committing the union to strike action passed 
at the union’s general meeting at Lautoka in May. Striking workers at Lautoka 
had also demanded his involvement the night they downed tools and even though 
this was consistent with their defiance of their own union officials, he seemed to 
know in advance about the strike and to be encouraging the workers. In a two hour 
address, he praised the workers for their action and, by his own admission, from 
that point onwards he ‘managed the strike’. The workers’ insistence that he be 
involved in negotiations with the company delayed settlement of the strike as the 
company refused, seeing Lakshman as a meddler in the union’s affairs and in 
company-union relations. Lakshman had had to persuade workers to accept the 
negotiations being opened without him which they did, resulting in the appointment 
of the McFarlane arbitration court. Lakshman was certainly identified as the key 
influence behind the breakaway move. Ting and O’Neill and Janki Ram were 
believed to be close associates of his. Circulars and correspondence sent out under 
the imprint of the Association by the breakaway group bore his address and phone 
number in Lautoka. These were all matters which the inquiry into the affairs of the 
FSIEA investigated. In December Lakshman sought the position of union 
president - nominated by O’Neill - but lost to Nand Kishore in the executive 
committee election (LCP 26 of 1959;7).
10. This seemed to be the conclusion of the Commission of Inquiry set up to 
investigate the alleged sirdir incidents. While finding that the bullying threats and 
high-handed behaviour on one of the sirdars indicted, albeit provoked by a worker, 
had gone beyond "permitted limits", Commissioner Hyne dismissed the argument 
that this had caused the strike as mere subterfuge, to "divert attention away from 
the real reasons" which "went much deeper". These real reasons were not, however, 
revealed or made clear by Commissioner Hyne. The Hyne Report made gratuitous 
suggestions of political elements outside the union, and indeed outside the country, 
at work. Such suggestions of a wider conspiracy were nothing if not indicative of 
the tenor of the times when worker militancy was linked to notions of communist 
influences from abroad and an imagined global political agenda (LCP 3 of 1958).
11. The inquiry was initiated as a result of a request from one DT Murgessan, who had 
seemingly organised a campaign to get the union’s affairs investigated by writing 
letters to the union demanding annual financial statements for the years 1958 to 
1960 and making inquiries into the collection of subscriptions and other levies at 
branch level. In May 1961 Murgessan asked the Registrar of Industrial 
Associations to hold an inquiry alleging a number of irregularities.
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12. The inquiry held Lakshman responsible for maintaining office bearers who were 
incapable or incompetent of performing their functions; for denying branches their 
constitutional right to annually elect their own office bearers and delegates to the 
executive; and for failing to keep the executive and the union generally informed 
of the financial position of the union. Lakshman was found to be the "de facto 
secretary and treasurer of the union" and acted wrongly in failing to hand over the 
books of account to the Treasurer while absent from Fiji for a period of several 
months, handing them over to his son instead, who had no authority to keep them 
(Report of the Commissioner of Labour 1962).
13. For instance, Lakshman wrote in February 1959 of the need to reorganise FIWC 
immediately because 1959 was "a critical year in which workers must either 
strongly organise or remain disorganised and take their place at the bottom of the 
ladder as hewers of wood and drawers of water". He later called the FIWC a 
"puppet body assisting the employers more than the workers" and called for a 
meeting of all trade unions in Lautoka to form a "proper Fiji Trade Unions 
Congress" (Letters from Lakshman (as President FSIEA) dated 7.1.59, 12.2.59, 
Chini Mazdur Sangh file, FTUC Archives).
14. The Fijian Association was founded in 1956 as an organisation committed to 
protecting "Fijian political rights under Fijian leadership". The Association was the 
dominant component of the Alliance Party, formed in 1966, which, representing a 
coalition of mainly chiefly Fijians and European (with some Indo-Fijian) business 
interests, assumed the reins of government shortly before independence and 
subsequently monopolised government for the next 17 years.
15. The settlement agreement was that the union’s log of claims be decided on by the 
arbitrators whose award would be binding for 12 months. Meanwhile the 
companies were to immediately increase the wages of all employees on $3/0/6 by 
10/6 to $3/11/0 and to make proportional increases, on a diminishing scale, to the 
wages of workers receiving more than $3/0/6 (FT 16.12.59).
16. Police testifying at the Inquiry tried hard to link Anthony with "known criminals"
and alleged that the violence on December 9 had been planned, stones having been
collected at Nasese that morning (LCP 10 of 1960).
17. Labour Commissioner Pearson in 1954 and 1955 expressly stated that such
councils should only be established as temporary institutions in industries where 
workers were not organised. On April 6, 1959, the FIWC President, Mohammed 
Ramzan, during the FIWC’s annual meeting with the Governor, firmly stated that 
he "did not want Wages Councils where the workers were organised but only 
where they were unorganised, such as shop assistants and bus drivers" (See Wages 
Council Legislation F36/6/3).
18. The report of the Commissioner for Labour 1964 recorded that both the
Government Wage Employees’ Union and the Transport Workers’ Union had been 
deregistered that year. The former union, which had been formed with the intention 
of representing all government wage workers except those in the PWD, which had 
its own union, had been subjected to an inquiry in 1962 following allegations that
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it had been accepting non-eligible persons as members. The W&RWGU was 
deregistered in 1963.
19. In 1963 a Wages Council had been established to cover the Building & Civil 
Engineering Industry. This was extended in 1965 to also cover the electrical 
engineering trade (Labour Department Reports, 1963,1965).
20. The Gould Inquiry in fact recommended that there should be a "wages pause" until 
there were signs of an upward trend in the economy.
21. It is likely that the hotels were advised by the Fiji Employers Consultative 
Association to withdraw recognition. In December 1967, FECA’s Director, Grundy 
wrote to the Fiji Trade Union Congress (formerly FIWC) General Secretary 
(Ramzan) enclosing a proposal for special legislation to protect the Tourist 
industry. The argument for the proposal was based on the fact that "some unions" - 
not members of the FTUC with whose affiliates the employers enjoyed "cordial 
and happy" relations - were responding to employers’ "reasonable" requests for 
proof that they did represent workers in a particular industry/enterprise by calling 
strikes. He suggested that some employers had "good reason to believe that only a 
minority of his workers were union members" and that the others were being 
"coerced into joining strikes" (Letter from FECA to FTUC, December 1, 1967; 
FTUC Files, FTUC Archives).
22. The union was deregistered on the grounds that it had wilfully contravened sections 
55 and 57 of the Trades Union Ordinance and had failed to keep accounts in 
accordance with the Ordinance (Labour Department Report 1968).
23. They included the Fijian Docks Construction Workers Union, the Suva and 
Lautoka Municipal Council (Fijian) Workers Union, the Fijian Domestic Restaurant 
& Allied Workers Union, the Fijian Hospital Wages Employees’ Union, the Fijian 
Teachers Association and the Fijian Engineering Workers’ Union (Sutherland 
1984).
24. In a letter dated June 11 1965 the FIWC Secretary said the FIWC "deplored the 
government action in giving the breakaway Fijian Government Workers Union 
partial or any sort of recognition at all" in the face of the strenuous opposition put 
up by the FIWC (FIWC Files, FTUC Archives).
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE POST-COLONIAL STATE AND THE RESURGENCE AND 
CONTAINMENT OF LABOUR MILITANCY 1970 - 1976
Pick yourself a key industry, insert yourself in the role of a trade union 
secretary, and in Fiji you’re on your way to being a boss of bosses. That 
may sound a trifle sinister, but in 1972 some antics on the trade union stage 
did seem touched by a Mafia-like element. A clutch of trade union dons 
showed that Fiji’s parliament is not supreme (Robert Keith-Reid, Fiji Times 
January 1973)
When I took over the Oilworkers’ Union I just went ahead and rocked the 
boat with the oil companies and in the first year, 1972 - 1973, I got a wage 
increase of virtually 54 per cent. And I was the envy of affiliates in the 
FTUC...we were all trying to reach that 52, 54 cents mark. I reached it 
before Tora and then we were all racing for the dollar mark and then again 
we were all rushing for the $1.50 mark and it was a race between Tora’s 
union, Veitata’s union and my union (Michael Columbus, Secretary, Fiji Oil 
& Allied Workers’ Union, 1985: interview).
Introduction
When independence came in October 1970, power was handed over to the Alliance 
Party, which had assumed the reins of government in the Legislative Council elections in 
1966. Formed in 1966 with the merging of three ethnic-based political associations, and 
headed by a high chief, Ratu Kamisese Mara, the Alliance Party represented a coalition of 
mainly chiefly Fijians and European (and some Indo-Fijian) business interests. Officially 
espousing a policy of multiracialism, the party was supported mainly by ethnic Fijians, 
"general electors"1 and a not insignificant number of Indo-Fijians.2
In the immediate post-colonial period, which this chapter covers, labour grew 
increasingly militant, especially in the blue-collar unions and particularly in industries 
dominated or monopolised by foreign capital. By late 1972 and early 1973 industrial
unrest and labour militancy had emerged as a major concern of the post-colonial state. It 
is significant that two of the most militant of union leaders that emerged in this period 
were ethnic Fijians, rather than Indo-Fijians, that the membership of their unions was 
largely, in one case exclusively, Fijian and that they acted without reference to the state- 
aligned trade union organisation, the Fiji Trades Union Congress (FTUC).
If political independence and the transfer of political power to a predominantly 
Fijian chiefly elite were seen by Fijian workers and their leaders as the dawn of a new era 
in which they could count on the state to allow them to push their wage claims, especially 
against foreign capital, by holding protracted strikes, they were to be sorely disappointed. 
Their militancy drew from the post-colonial state reactions similar to those exhibited by its 
predecessor. Its first strategy was to try to contain labour, and this was largely achieved 
by means of constraining legislation through the Trade Disputes and Counter Inflation 
Acts of 1973. In the latter part of the decade, which is covered in the following chapter, 
the post-colonial state’s strategy would be to formally coopt labour through the 
introduction of a national level tripartite machinery for wage setting. Crucial to the 
effectiveness of both strategies however was the cooperation and collaboration of a sector 
of the labour movement.
By 1970 a fairly strong labour movement existed in Fiji. In all there were 31 trade 
unions registered under the Trade Union Ordinance of 1969 and representing some 16,000 
workers (Hince 1971:1). An even stronger force existed in the combination of 54 firms 
under the Fiji Employers’ Consultative Association. To some extent the existence of these 
peak organisations of labour and capital set the stage for their incorporation in later years
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into a formalised tripartite arrangement with the post-colonial state. What precipitated that 
incorporation, however, was the resurgence of labour militancy in the early 1970’s and the 
consolidation of this militancy in the mid-1970’s under a new, alternative peak 
organisation of trade unions. The different implications of this resurgence of militancy for 
FECA, FTUC and the government led eventually to a shared interest in defeating it. Their 
responses to events covered in this chapter foreshadowed developments in 1977.
The first signs of militancy in this post-independence period appeared in April 
1971, just six months after independence, when a major strike by dockworkers began. 
Before the year was out a total of 55 strikes had taken place involving an incalculable 
number of man-days lost - the official tally of 6,987 did not include numbers of man-days 
lost during the month-long dockworkers’ strike because of the difficulty in assessing days 
lost in casual work. In 1972, the number of strikes totalled 47, and the number of man- 
days lost, 21,579. In 1973 a total of 69 strikes occurred and the number of man-days lost 
peaked at 116,998, the highest figure in the country’s history.
That the main struggles between labour and capital in the immediate post­
independence period were played out in foreign-owned enterprises is not surprising. The 
post-colonial economy was dominated by foreign companies, with a few key sectors being 
controlled by state-owned enterprises, and this was indeed reflected in FECA’s 
membership. Half of FECA’s members in 1970 comprised wholly-foreign owned 
enterprises, a further third consisted of local government or para-statal bodies. Only a sixth 
of its members in 1970 were locally-owned businesses.
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The early 1970’s, then, was a period of intense militancy within sections of the 
labour movement. This had two main effects. Firstly it invited the introduction of new 
legislative and institutional mechanisms for containing militancy. Secondly, it forced to a 
head a division which had existed for some years between militants and conservatives in 
the labour movement and resulted in a leading militant forming the Fiji Council of Trade 
Unions as a rival body to the FTUC. It was principally this latter development, the shifting 
allegiances that it caused, and the grave threat it thus posed to the very existence of the 
Fiji Trade Union Congress, that led the FTUC to collaborate more openly with the post­
colonial state, first in return for recognition, and later for exclusive participant status in 
tripartite arrangements.
In this chapter I discuss firstly, the resurgence of militancy and the state’s response 
through an examination of two significant strikes - by dockworkers in 1971, and by airline 
workers in 1972. These strikes, both led by militant Fijian unionists representing 
predominantly blue-collar workers, both in industries controlled by foreign capital and 
both taking place independently of the FTUC, aroused strong reaction. They were 
described by the press as having ‘slid the country towards the edge of a precipice by 
nearly closing its business life down’ (FT 1.1.73). The dockworkers strike was estimated 
to have cost the country $400,000 and to have wrought havoc as supplies bound for the 
country were dumped in neighbouring island ports and a shortage of food and other goods 
caused an inflation in the prices of consumer goods, requiring the state to intervene with 
hastily designed price control legislation. The airline workers’ strike in the following year 
resulted in international flights overflying Nadi airport and the consequent loss of 
thousands of dollars in revenue to the state. The leaders of the unions involved in these
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two strikes, together with the leader of the Fiji Oil & Allied Workers Union, formed the 
core of the militants and the legislative enactments in 1973 were primarily intended to 
contain their influence.
I also emphasise at the split that occurred in the labour movement late in 1972, 
resulting in the formation of an alternative, militant peak organisation of labour unions, 
and show the effect of this on the FTUC. Finally I look at the response of the state to 
both labour militancy and to the split in the trade union movement, focussing on the 
enactment of constraining legislation and the resurgence of consultative industrial relations 
between employers, moderate labour leaders and the state. Militancy by blue-collar 
workers in foreign-controlled industries, encouraged by changed political circumstances, 
signified a ‘testing’ by labour militants of the post-colonial, Fijian state. This militancy 
challenged the conservative foundations of trade unionism and when the post-colonial state 
did respond, it was with the tacit support of conservative labour leaders. What was most 
apparent in the period 1973 - 1976 was an intense struggle for control of the labour 
movement by contending factions of militants and conservatives. This struggle played 
directly into the state’s hands by leading conservative labour leaders into more open 
collaboration with it.
Labour Militancy on the Docks: the 1971 Dockworkers’ Strike
The first signs of renewed militancy within the labour movement appeared amongst 
dock labour. The month long strike by the Fiji Dockworkers’ and Seamen’s Union in 
April 1971 was the first major strike with which the post-colonial government had to deal. 
It is not surprising that militancy in the post-colonial period emerged first amongst the
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dockworkers who formed an exclusively Fijian occupational group. Fiji’s independence 
settlement had involved the institutionalisation of a political system which ensured the 
paramountcy of what was defined as ‘Fijian interests’. Control of the state was now in the 
hands of a Fijian chiefly elite although it ruled with the support of commercial interests in 
Fiji represented by European (and to some extent Indo-Fijian) business elites. The dockers’ 
militancy against foreign shipping companies represented a testing of the Fijian leadership 
of the post-colonial state and the efforts of Veitata to project the dispute as one between 
workers and the companies, as well as his concurrence with the idea of approaching the 
prime minister for a settlement, bear this out.
The history of the dockworkers union and the peculiar conditions under which 
workers for the docks were recruited were discussed in the previous chapter. The colonial 
government had not only formed the original unions that merged to form the FO&SU, but 
had portrayed the leadership of the original Dockworkers Union as exemplary. The union 
represented workers of five different shipping companies, four of which were foreign firms 
predominant in the Fiji economy: Carpenters (Fiji) Ltd., Bums Philip (South Seas) Co. 
Ltd., the CSR Company and the Union Steamship Co. of New Zealand Ltd. The fifth 
firm, Williams and Goslings Ltd. was a local company owned by local European, Don 
Aidney, who would become a leading figure in the Fiji Employers’ Consultative 
Association (FECA) in the 1970’s. The Fiji Dockworkers’ and Seamen’s Union, registered 
in 1965, represented seamen and both permanent registered dockworkers and a large pool 
of casual dock labourers. In the late sixties Taniela Veitata became the Union’s general 
secretary and under the leadership of ‘Big Dan’ the union became increasingly militant.
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The 1971 dockstrike began on April 8, when dockworkers at Suva refused to work.
A week later Lautoka dockworkers had joined the strike. The Union, which had been 
negotiating with the shipping companies since February 23 on its log of claims submitted 
in late January, had notified the companies on March 31 that it would not engage in 
further negotiations and warned that it would ‘resort on (sic) other courses of action’ 
within seven days if its demands were not met. The union was seeking a minimum wage 
of 62.5 cents an hour - a 95 per cent increase for dockworkers who were then receiving 32 
cents an hour. The union argued that because of their long term agreement expiring on 
February 1, dockworkers had not had an increase in four years.
Under provisions of the Trades Disputes (Arbitration, Inquiry and Settlement) 
Ordinance the Minister for Labour, Ratu Edward Cakobau, appointed a Board of Inquiry 
which began public hearings on April 13. When an appeal by the companies to the union 
to continue negotiations, enter into conciliation or resort to arbitration was ignored, the 
company made public an offer of a 6 cents an hour increase and announced it was willing 
to negotiate on other claims. The report of the Board of Inquiry, published on April 26, 
rejected the Union’s claim for a 95 per cent wage increase, saying it "knew of no case 
where a wage increase of this size had been implemented" and that any increase in excess 
of 8 per cent at the present time, on economic grounds alone, was unjustified (FT 
26.4.71). The Board argued for comparability between wages in different industries and 
said dockworkers should receive comparable treatment with workers in the Municipal 
Workers Union and the Public Employees Union, both of which had won modest wage 
increases earlier that year. It endorsed the 6 cents wage increase offer by the employers - 
which it said represented an 18.7 per cent rise and which exceeded all other offers made
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to trade unions that year - as not only the most reasonable but ‘the maximum the 
dockworkers could expect on grounds of comparability’. It added that to ask for more 
was to ‘demand special treatment over and above their fellow workers’ (FT 26.4.71).
While both the union and the companies were found to be at fault in the dispute, 
the Board expressed particular regret at the fact that the Union had not sought the services 
and advice of the FTUC. Veitata responded with the statement that his union was ‘quite 
capable of standing on its own feet’ and that it ‘did not need the help of the FTUC’, 
which comments hinted at dissension among labour leaders. Although the board of inquiry 
commented on the need for prices as well as incomes control, calling for a statement of 
policy and recommending the establishment of machinery for its implementation, saying 
it was:
‘unrealistic to expect trade unions to exercise restraint in wage claims
unless an attempt was made to control prices (FT 26.4.71),
in the dispute at hand, it was the wage recommendations which were highlighted. The 
Board of Inquiry’s endorsement of the 6 cents offer and the argument that relativity to 
other wage earners in the country was an important consideration strengthened the hand of 
the shipping companies and encouraged them to continue to resist the union’s wage claim. 
On April 28, at a meeting between the Union executive and the companies, the Union 
reduced its wage claim to 56.5 cents, but the employers refused to budge from their 6 
cents offer.3 The Union refused the employers’ offer and stood fast by its claim for a 
basic wage of 56.5 cents. On May 1, when Union officials offered to return their 
members to work and take the rest of its wage claim to arbitration if the employers
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offered a 50 cent minimum wage, this was rejected by the employers on the grounds that 
50 cents minimum wage was still considerably higher than the figure of 38 cents 
commended by the Board of Inquiry.
The Board of Inquiry, by coming out in favour of the 6 cents offer on the grounds 
of wages comparability or relativity, provided employers with a convenient and altruistic 
reason for rejecting the union’s claim - the interests of the national economy. It was not 
a question of what the companies could afford but of what the national economy could 
sustain. Though the argument was not new and had been used before it was being 
revalidated and legitimated. At no stage did the companies argue inability to pay. Nor had 
the Board of Inquiry considered this relevant.
Were it not for the fact that by the end of April new kinds of pressures were being 
brought to bear on the national economy as a result of the strike, the employers’ 
intransigence might have paid off. But the shipping industry was a vital one, on which 
depended essential supplies from abroad, including food. By the end of April stocks of 
many food items and other essential materials were beginning to run short, giving rise to 
price inflation by some unscrupulous shopkeepers, and necessitating the government’s 
intervention in imposing price control on a limited range of items. On May 1, as the 
strike entered its fourth week, the Fiji Times reported a ‘grave shortage of essential 
supplies and dislocation of industry’ as a result of the paralysis of the ports. The strike 
had so far cost the country $400,000. By this time both the union and the companies were 
engaged in a media campaign to mobilise public support for their respective positions.4
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The union’s case was strengthened by moral support from its New Zealand 
counterpart. The New Zealand crew of the vessel Waimate refused to sail from Lautoka 
port in a show of support and their union president, Bill Martin, made an appearance in 
Fiji and publicly endorsed the Fiji dockworkers’ union wage claim. This ‘interference’ was 
deeply resented by the Fiji Times, which, as we shall see, took a stance against the 
dockworkers during the strike. Martin was also reportedly present at a meeting between 
Veitata, the Minister for Labour and the Prime Minister.
On Monday May 6 the strike ended with the union agreeing to a 10 cents an hour
increase, raising the basic wage of dockers to 42 cents an hour. Other items in the
union’s log of claims were to go to arbitration. The wage increase, which represented a 
31.5 per cent increase and was considered a victory for the Union, was decided by the 
Prime Minister, Ratu Mara, who mediated in the dispute after the two parties failed to 
reach agreement and decided to appeal to him. In December 1971, Veitata managed to 
compound his union’s success by negotiating an 82 per cent wage increase for Fiji
labourers working on Japanese fishing vessels operating from Levuka. This increase
brought the wages of experienced seamen to $72 a month and probationer’s wages to $60 
a month and represented almost a 100 per cent increase for non-experienced seamen who 
were formerly paid $34 a month. Veitata justified the claim for a large increase on the 
grounds that the cost of living had risen over the previous two years by almost 100 per 
cent.
The dockworkers’ strike revealed a newfound militancy in the Dockworkers and 
Seamen’s Union, a development that was largely explainable both by the new leadership
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of the Union and by changed political circumstances. It also signalled the re-emergence 
of labour militancy. The demonstrated effectiveness of militancy and the achievement of 
what was considered a significant wage increase was to set a new pattern for other trade 
unions which made claims in the following two years. The strategy of taking prolonged 
strike action to enforce a wage demand marked a departure from the methods and 
strategies advocated by the FTUC and employed heretofore by organised labour. The 
FTUC was indeed conspicuous by its absence from negotiations and its silence over the 
dockers’ dispute. Veitata’s statement that the Union was "quite capable of standing on (its) 
own feet" and that it "did not need the help of the FTUC" was implicitly contemptuous of 
the FTUC. His rejection of the FTUC was reminiscent of the rejection by the Wholesale 
and Retail Workers’ General Union (WRWGU) of the Fiji Industrial Workers Congress 
(FIWC), during the 1959 strike.
The solidarity extended to the dockworkers by the New Zealand union was a new 
phenomenon which did not go unnoticed. The Fiji Times, raised questions about the 
involvement of Bill Martin:
Hopefully Martin’s presence and his statements do not mean overseas 
unions are going to attempt to intervene in industrial matters here (FT 
4.5.71).
Six years later "foreign intervention" in support of another dockers’ strike, would draw the 
state and capital (and some trade unionists) out into the streets in the forefront of an 
orchestrated, and unmistakably anti-labour, ‘popular march’.
The Fiji Times’ reaction to the 1971 strike was patently anti-labour. The 
newspaper’s unbridled invective against the union ran to a series of editorials which
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attacked the militants for continuing the strike; pronounced the wage claim "economically 
unsound" (FT 5.5.71) and strikes "immoral" and "evil" whose perpetrators should be 
punished (FT 6.5.71); and, insinuated that the dockers’ strike might have been encouraged 
by "militant, communist-influenced overseas unions" (FT 7.5.71). More significantly, the 
newspaper raised its voice against what it called a lack of effective machinery for settling 
industrial disputes, pointing out that provisions for conciliation and arbitration under 
existing laws depended on voluntary submission by both parties. The dockers’ strike, the 
paper said, had revealed a weakness in the country’s administrative structure - this was the
inability to handle industrial disputes quickly and to stop union organisers
from calling harmful strikes (FT 10.5.71).
What was being called for was some machinery that would outlaw strikes and see its users 
punished. The Fiji Times, as the leading voice of business interests in the country, would 
argue this point more forcefully in the following year, after the strike by airport workers.
But if the dockworkers’ strike revealed a lack of machinery for quick settlement of 
disputes, it threw up a new informal avenue - that of direct appeal to the Prime Minister 
for settlement. The parallels between Mara’s special talents in bringing around intractable 
Indian politicians in 1968 and unyielding dockworkers in 1971 were drawn out by the Fiji 
Times in an editorial on May 11. Just as he was projected as symbolising or personifying 
the political goodwill of Fijians towards other races -* reified as the official ideology of 
multiracialism - so his unique role as grand arbiter in serious industrial disputes would 
come to symbolise the tolerance and goodwill of the post-colonial state towards labour. 
This would play an important role in Mara’s personal orchestration of trade union support 
for the Tripartite Forum in the latter part of the decade.
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Mara’s intervention and settlement was seen as a victory by the Union. Later 
however, it was to prove something of a pyrrhic victory. Even as he announced the 
settlement in a national broadcast, Mara hinted that the stevedoring industry would be re­
organised. His rationale was to break the link between the companies involved in 
shipping and stevedoring and importing, which resulted in the periodic and unregulated 
price rises.
Yet what resulted from the Port Commission of Inquiry, set up in 1972, spelt the 
beginning of the end for the dockworkers’ union. The establishment of a para-statal body, 
the Ports Authority of Fiji (PAF) - to manage, control and operate the Fiji ports and 
rationalise port operations - resulted in the mechanisation of port operations and the 
retrenchment of large numbers of dockworkers. Dock labour, in fact, decreased in direct 
proportion to the level of mechanisation and, ironically, as the PAF, like other para-statal 
bureaucracies, grew, so did the numbers of its white collar, salaried, support staff (Swamy
1984).
The government reacted in other ways to curb militancy amongst dock labourers. 
In 1973 it successfully used the Trade Union Ordinance - as its predecessor the colonial 
state had done before it - to de-register the Fiji Dockworkers’ and Seamen’s Union. In the 
intervening months before a new union was registered under a new name, there were also 
deliberate attempts made by Alliance Party stalwarts to form a rival union for dock 
labour - a union which would exclude Veitata from leadership. Though this was not 
successful, it did cause some temporary splits within the ranks of dockers.
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If the dockworkers’ strike demonstrated labour militancy, it was confined to the 
dockworkers’ union. Its leadership showed no interest in advancing the cause of workers 
in other industries. It was simply confronting its own group of employers and pressing for 
wage increases it knew they could afford. The strike by the Airline Workers Union in the 
following year, by contrast, threw up an alternative national labour leader in the person of 
Apisai Tora, whose militant background and radical ideology led him not simply to 
confront the company but also to use the state’s existing arbitration machinery to the 
advantage of workers generally. An articulate hard-liner, a well-known trade unionist and 
by now a National Federation Party politician, Tora was also now Secretary of the Airline 
Workers’ Union. The result of the arbitration tribunal which sat on this dispute signified a 
moral as well as a remunerative victory for labour.
The 1972 Airline Workers’ Strike
The significance of labour militancy amongst airline workers lay in the fact that it 
threatened disruption of an important new growth industry - tourism. By 1972 tourism 
was recognised as Fiji’s second main industry. Not surprisingly the industry was 
dominated by foreign capital; indeed so much of the industry was foreign-owned and 
controlled that in 1972 it was estimated that only 29 cents in every tourist dollar spent in 
Fiji remained in the country (Rokotuivuna et. al. 1973; Sarny 1980).
Qantas Airways was more than an airline or international carrier of tourists to Fiji. 
It held direct shares in at least two luxury class hotels, the Mocambo and the Fijian, which 
enabled it to sell ‘package deal’ holidays in Fiji from Sydney. More significantly, Qantas 
provided ground handling services at Nadi Airport from all other international airlines.
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This was an extremely lucrative business and the extent of revenue derived was only 
realised when this operation was wrested from Qantas in 1982 and taken over by Air 
Terminal Services Ltd., a new local company in which the airport workers union and the 
government hold equity shares. Prior to 1982 this operation involved the airline in 
employing large numbers of local labour, skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled, who 
combined with workers of other airlines to form the Airline Workers Union in 1969.
It was an employment situation similar in many respects to that of the shipping 
companies and the dockworkers. In both cases the companies were foreign-owned (with 
the exception of a small shipping company, Williams and Goslings). The services they 
provided by means of local labour were in critical industries such that any disruption by 
workers was felt in the wider economy and this placed workers in a powerful position. 
The profits being made and transferred out of the country were considerable yet the wages 
paid were poor in proportion to the surpluses appropriated.
In January 1972, when the Airline Workers Union served a log of claims on 
Qantas, demanding $1 an hour or $40 for a 40 hour week and improved working 
conditions, they were led by Apisai Tora, the Union’s secretary. Tora was a key figure in 
the 1959 strike and in the mid-sixties had also been the protagonist in hotel workers’ 
strikes that had led to mass dismissals and the subsequent burning of hotel units at 
Korolevu. A known militant and an opposition political figure, Tora emerged in the 
1970’s as one of the ‘big bad men’ of the labour movement. When negotiations between 
Qantas and the Union deadlocked in February and conciliation talks proved futile the 
Union decided to back its claim with strike action in late March. It also reduced its wage
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claim to 50 cents an hour, but Qantas argued this was still excessive and would not 
compromise. The airline proffered an 8 cents increase instead. The Union had just 
successfully won a 30 per cent increase for its salaried members employed by Air India 
ten days after backing its claim with a threat of strike action. With this victory under its 
belt it was spurred to tackle Qantas.
On May 4 workers at Nadi withdrew labour. A Board of Inquiry into the dispute 
was immediately set up headed by Mr Justice Johnson, a former District Commissioner. 
On May 15 it determined that even the 8 cents increase offered by Qantas was too much. 
Tora rejected the report and the dispute continued until, following mediation by the 
Minister for Labour, the Union agreed to accept an interim increase of 10 cents an hour 
and to go to arbitration for the rest. The 10 cents an hour increase brought the basic wage 
for airline workers to 37 cents an hour.
The Arbitration Tribunal was headed by Mr Justice Hardayal Hardy, a retired Chief 
Justice from the Delhi High Court, and had two other members, a Qantas nominee, Dr Nit 
Conn and a union nominee, Mrs Alberta Anthony. The tribunal’s composition was 
significant for the Union had stipulated quite clearly that it wanted someone from a non- 
European country to head it, and this demand had been conceded. Tora’s representations 
demonstrated characteristic militancy with a touch of theatrics. In a dramatic show of 
contempt, he tore up the Board of Inquiry Report saying it "got what it deserved". He 
argued that Qantas was "not indispensable" and could leave if it wanted, and another 
airline could take its place. He also debunked the standard argument used by commissions 
of inquiry and tribunals against significant wage increases on the grounds that the country
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could not afford it, saying the argument was based on "double standards" and that a 
selective policy on wages forced "a large section of the population to subsidise an 
economic elite". Parliamentarians who were already receiving too much had just voted to 
given themselves a 300 per cent salary increase, he said. The government had made no 
attempt to control profits and low wages had meant "super profits to overseas-owned 
enterprises" (Sutherland 1984).
Tora’s most significant statements were made by way of a direct appeal to Justice 
Hardy, as a judge from a third-world nation, to sympathise with the aspirations of Fiji 
workers:
We felt that non-white people were and are the only ones who would really 
understand and appreciate the problems confronting non-white workers and 
their aspirations (Sutherland 1984).
Clearly Tora’s argument was that non-white workers in Fiji were being exploited by 
multinational companies abroad which treated their workers abroad far better.
Justice Hardy’s award on September 7 was sympathetic to the lot of Qantas 
workers. He found the airline had no provision for pension or retirement benefits, nor did 
it provide life insurance or allow for promotion to a higher scale for workers who had put 
in several years of service. Workers, he said, had "no sense of security" and lived lives of 
"perpetual indebtedness" (FT 13/9/72). More significantly, Hardy seemed to have taken 
the points raised by Tora. He rejected the opinions of previous arbitrators who had 
refused to make international comparisons when considering Fiji workers’ wages. An 
agreement between Qantas and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
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Workers provided for a basic wage of $5.42 an hour for American workers while Workers 
in Singapore, Malaysia, Manila and Fiji received considerably less. Qantas workers in 
Honolulu and mainland USA were therefore he said, receiving higher wages at the cost of 
workers in Fiji. Hardy added that he could see no reason why workers in Fiji should not 
progressively move to the level of wages in Honolulu.
Hardy awarded a further 8 cents to the airport workers, bringing the basic wage to 
50 cents an hour. Although this was, remuneratively, not the most successful award - the 
oilworkers would three months later achieve a 60 cents wage - the union had scored a 
moral victory. Their claim for a wage increase based on what their fellow workers were 
being paid by the same company abroad was validated and legitimated. Tora welcomed 
the judge’s award and heaped praise upon the "wise man from the east", saying his union:
bowed its head to the judge for destroying the argument that all wage
increases should be related to the Fiji economy (Sutherland 1984).
Although the Airline Workers’ Union victory was not condoned by the FTUC - 
Ramzan, the FTUC general secretary had in fact gratuitously offered comments which 
were implicitly critical of the union and supportive of the interests of capital and the 
state5 - Tora encouraged other unions to follow his lead. What Hardy had done, he said, 
was "open..the door for all Fiji trade unions in their battle to get a decent living wage". 
Other unions soon began to adopt a militant strategy and use strike action to achieve a 50 
cent wage. In the nine-month period between June 1972 and April 1, 1973 (when the 
government finally imposed a wage freeze), a number of important wage agreements were 
made involving increases in excess of 40 per cent.
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The Oilworkers’ Go-Slow
A union which especially profited from using the militant strategy was the Fiji Oil 
and Allied Workers Union which in fact publicly declared its intention to "top the 
dockers’ wage" and restore itself to its former position as leader in the fight for higher 
wages. This was a position from which, under the moderate leadership of Titus Philip 
Rehman, it had recently slipped, but which its newly elected secretary, Michael Columbus 
(who was also active in the 1959 strike), was determined to regain. An agreement 
between the Union and the oil companies was due for revision on August 31 1972 and 
Columbus announced that his union would seek a wage "to support a man, his wife and 
three children". This, he said, would be higher than the $18.40 a week that the 
dockworkers were receiving following a further negotiated 4 cents increase won in 1972. 
Oilworkers were then receiving 38 cents an hour - 4 cents less than the dockworkers had 
achieved by striking the year before. For a Union that had seriously challenged the 
colonial state by striking for better wages in 1959, they had fallen behind and in 1971 
were outranked by both airline workers and dockworkers (FT 12.8.72).6
The FO&AWU initially sought a minimum wage of $40 for a 35 hour week, but 
later reduced its claim to $40 for a 40 hour work. After negotiations with the oil 
companies ended in a deadlock in early December, the Union mounted a ‘go-slow’ on oil 
deliveries. Further negotiation between the parties and the Minister for Labour began on 
December 6 and the dispute was resolved with an agreement for a minimum wage of 60 
cents an hour for oil workers, to be paid with effect from October 1 of that year. This 
increase placed oilworkers in the lead in terms of wages, as can be seen from Table 4. 
They maintained this lead until 1974 when they achieved 85.7 cents an hour and put the
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gap between themselves and airline workers at 5.6 cents. From this point onwards an 
intense competition ensued between the three leading militant unions - oilworkers, 
dockworkers and airline workers - in what Columbus aptly described as a "race" for 
higher wages (Columbus 1985: interview).
Table 4: Wage Rates Paid to Unskilled Adult Workers in
Industries Covered by Industrial Agreements. 1972
Industry
Oil
Dock
Airline
Electricity
Government
Bank
Mine
Transport
Building
Sale and Distribution
Manufacturing
Hotel
Timber
Municipal
Telecommunications 
Garage and Engineering 
Pastoral
Rate per hour (cents)
60
46.5
45.5 
44 
42 
42 
37 
37 
36 
35 
32 
32 
31
30.25
30.49
29.32
19
Source: Annual Report, Ministry of Labour, 1972.
Accounting for the oilworkers’ successes in obtaining substantial wage increases in 
this period, Columbus said:
We looked at the ability to pay of the companies and at no time did they 
plead inability ... We said while the going is good, why not? (Columbus 
1985:interview).
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Although the oil companies never pleaded inability to pay, oil workers often had to resort 
to strike action to get what they wanted. According to Columbus, this was because the oil 
companies were accused of being too willing to give wage increases and so needed 
justification. In Columbus’ words:
You’d be surprised to know that in a lot of instances when I was 
negotiating with the oil companies I was told quite confidentially by the 
negotiators from the oil company [sic] side: "Michael, you’ll have to go on 
strike to get what you want. You won’t get it otherwise" (Columbus 
1985:interview).
Columbus’ account, which suggests differing responses by different fractions of foreign 
capital to union demands in this period, is supported by statements made by FECA. A 
brief look at FECA’s concern, in the context of capital’s response to labour militancy, is 
useful as it suggests reasons for FECA’s later willingness to enter a corporatist 
arrangement with FTUC and the state.
Capital’s Reaction to Labour Militancy
The fact that some foreign companies seemed to bow too readily to the demands of 
militant unions caused some tension among employers and elicited bitter reaction from 
FECA, which called for solidarity among employers against the increasing power of 
unions. FECA President, Don Aidney, a "leading spokesman for employers", condemned 
what he called "gutless firms", which were spoiling things for other longer term or longer 
established companies by giving in too easily to militant union demands. These firms he 
said were :
new to Fiji - possibly here for a limited contract and possibly with little 
expectation of staying here after that contract had been completed.. Often
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they do not seek advice, nor do they join industrial associations and sadly, 
although the things that they do rub off on all of us, usually they do not 
give a damn (FT 1.8.72).
In his annual report for 1972 the FECA president proposed a strategy for bringing 
industrial peace to Fiji. The strategy was based on "employers sticking together against 
militant union demands" (FT 1.8.72). Aidney called on employers to observe the 
conditions of agreements signed with various trade unions, acknowledge that strikes and 
walkouts without resort to the agreed channels of negotiation were clear breaches of 
contract, and refuse to negotiate until the terms of that contract had been restored. The 
key to success in his strategy was collective employer action against individual unions 
which broke contracts:
All employers must acknowledge that an illegal strike by a union against 
one of its members to an agreement is a breach of contract by the union 
generally and that all parties to an agreement with that union must react 
jointly. As employers you must stick together and behave as a responsible 
group (FT 1/8/72).
Aidney advocated a concerted crack down on militant unions by employers acting 
collectively to enforce the ‘legality’ of industrial agreements. It was in a sense the 
employers’ answer to sympathy strikes and it demanded employer solidarity. Aidney also 
alleged that much of the industrial trouble was ‘frankly racialist’ and directed at 
expatriates:
If anyone disputes this let them look at the targets of our recent strikes (FT 
1/8/72).
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His view of labour’s challenges to capital as ‘racialism’ was cast in the same mould of 
thinking that persistently saw workers, not as a class confronting capital, but as one ethnic 
category confronting another. Although Tora had also spoken of non-white workers, his 
intent was to show up the discriminatory practices of multinational companies employing 
labour in a developing state. It was inevitable that labour’s demands against capital would 
be pushed most forcefully against those foreign companies which could afford to pay their 
workers more and indeed, in other countries, did.
While FECA sought to consolidate its control over capital, the Fiji Times, exhorted 
the government to hold tripartite talks with labour and capital
in an industrial summit to work out policies which would be of mutual 
benefit to them as well as to the whole nation (FT 2.8.72).
The Fiji Times went on to suggest that settlement of major disputes be placed
in the hands of the central union and employers organisations, coordinated 
by the Minister for Labour (FT 2/8/72).
It made mention of the dialogue with Unions and business leaders that the Prime Minister 
had begun some time ago and said this should be continued and extended by
calling an immediate, major meeting of the top men in both groups to work 
out some sort of overall policy for the national good. The policy would 
transcend the existing provisions governing industrial disputes which seem 
effective only in the short term if at all. Such summit talks would surely be 
a valuable exercise in helping develop Fiji towards a more prosperous 
nation in which all can share the fruits of honest work and enterprise and be 
guaranteed a fair deal (FT 2/8/72).
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The significance of the paper’s statement was that it was the rhetoric of tripartism five 
years before it actually materialised. The fact that such ideas were being raised publicly 
as early as 1972 throws a different light on FTUC claims that it inspired the Tripartite 
Forum. That the press first articulated these ideas - which were much later translated into 
actual policy, also raises questions about the paper’s connections, not with capital which 
was always evident, but with the state. In fact the newspaper’s editor at this time, Len 
Usher, was a leading member of the governing Alliance Party.
Polarisation Within the Labour Movement and the Rise of the FCTU
Thirteen years after the 1959 strike then, militancy had made a successful 
comeback in the labour movement. The mood in 1972 was one of confrontation rather 
than of compromise. The accommodationist line was being discredited - the FTUC was 
publicly called a "tame cat" and "lame duck organisation" by Tora - and the strategy of 
striking was seen as bringing positive and immediate results. It was inevitable that, with 
this fundamental departure from the methods and strategies espoused and advocated by the 
FTUC ‘old guard’, there would be a battle for leadership of the trade union movement and 
that, if control of the FTUC was not wrested from the conservatives, an alternative radical 
peak organisation of trade unions would be formed. This is exactly what happened. The 
years 1972 and 1973 were certainly, as Kumar describes them, "the most difficult years 
for the FTUC as it found itself on the verge of disintegration". The split that occurred in 
the union movement late in 1972 was to have significant ramifications for trade union 
politics in the next five years (1974:24).
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The analysis of the split within the FTUC provided by Kumar (1974) focuses on 
the bid for the presidency of the FTUC by Tora in September 1972. The post became 
vacant when Sakeasi Waqanivavalagi resigned from it to take up a ministerial appointment 
in Mara’s cabinet. Waqanivavalagi, like Ramzan, the FTUC General Secretary, had stood 
for the national parliament as an Alliance Party candidate and had won a seat. The 
political involvements of both Ramzan and Waqanivavalagi publicly confirmed the pro- 
Alliance, pro-government leanings of the FTUC. Neither leader saw any contradiction in 
continuing to hold posts in the trade union movement while being government 
backbenchers. They withdrew from the labour movement only when they were given 
ministerial appointments.7
Tora had indicated that he would contest the position of FTUC president but was 
barred from doing so by a clause in the FTUC constitution disqualifying office bearers of 
unions which had not been financial affiliates for at least two years (Kumar 1974:24). 
Tora then apparently attempted to get the constitution changed to allow him to stand but 
failed (Kumar 1974:24). The post was filled by none other than Ramzan, who vacated the 
post of General Secretary (which was taken over by James Raman, Secretary of the 
National Factory and Commercial Workers Union) to assume the Presidency. This 
musical chairs manoeuvre seemed engineered to keep the FTUC in the hands of the old 
guard. Ramzan did not stay very long as president of the FTUC as, early in 1973, he too 
was offered a Ministerial appointment and so resigned. By the end of 1972 however Tora 
had withdrawn the Airline Workers Union from the FTUC and was predicting that it 
would be "only a matter of time before the whole FTUC disintegrates" (FT 6/12/72).
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The withdrawal of the AWU from the FTUC could also have been precipitated by 
the fact that the FTUC had initiated an inquiry into the AWU - an inquiry which, 
according to Sutherland (1984), was cut short by the Union’s withdrawal. The more likely 
reason for the withdrawal was that the FTUC was firmly under the control of 
conservatives. In January 1973, Tora was nominated by the Ministry of Labour to attend 
a three-month trade union course in Britain. As he prepared to go he announced plans to 
form the Fiji Council of Trade Unions (FCTU), which was established later in 1973, on 
his return to the country. It is significant that Tora was given the opportunity to go on a 
training course at this point, particularly as the FTUC leaders who had originally 
nominated him had spent two futile days trying to get the Minister for Labour to withdraw 
Tora’s name from the list of nominees once he had left FTUC and was publicly 
disparaging it.8 The fact that in the early months of 1973 two repressive laws in the form 
of the Trade Disputes and Counter Inflation Acts were being hastily prepared suggests 
there might have been good reason for the Minister for Labour not to heed the FTUC’s 
plaintive requests. Tora had only just returned to the country when the Trade Disputes 
Bill was announced. His absence and the haste with which the legislation was prepared 
and enacted do not appear to be entirely coincidental, the more so as the FTUC leaders, 
who were pursuing their own agenda, were not expected to put up opposition.
In the following years, the FCTU drew away from the FTUC some of the more 
militant and politically significant unions, both in terms of numbers and in terms of the 
industries they covered. Many of these were blue-collar unions, amongst them the 
Municipal Workers Union, the Building Workers Union, the Fiji Electricity Authority 
Employees Union and the Printing Workers Union. The Airline Workers Union was, of
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course, the FCTU’s founding member. Although neither the Fiji Dockworkers & Seamen’s 
Union nor the Fiji Oil & Allied Workers Union joined the FCTU, the latter union’s 
position within the FTUC in the early months of 1973 was considered very uncertain.9 
By 1974, Qantas Salaried Staff Association, Air Pacific Employees’ Union and the Sugar 
and General Workers’ Union had joined the FCTU. This gave the FCTU considerable 
clout. In 1976, according to Kumar, the FCTU was at peak strength. In the following 
year, however, the FCTU began to lose support and its affiliates defected back to the 
FTUC after it had entered into an exclusive corporatist relationship with the government 
and FECA to bolster its power and enhance its legitimacy. It is to the FTUC’s private 
negotiations with the government for exclusive recognition and monopoly control over 
labour appointments to boards and committees and training opportunities abroad that we 
now turn, with a view to highlighting the government’s successful cooption of the FTUC.
The Introduction of New Controls and the Cooption of the FTUC: the Trades 
Disputes and Counter Inflation Acts of 1973
By the end of 1972 the inter-linked crises of industrial unrest and inflation had 
emerged as the main concerns of the post-colonial state. Although rising inflation - which 
by 1972 had reached a double digit figure - was often blamed on the wage claims and 
strike action of unions, the value of real wages had in fact been significantly eroded by 
the higher costs of imported goods and by the inflationary effects of a hurricane in 1972. 
As such, workers’ wage demands in this period represented in large part an effort to 
restore wages to their previous level. By 1973, however, the post-colonial state was under 
pressure especially from capital to show strong leadership in managing the economy and
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industrial relations. Two laws, enacted in 1973, were clearly intended to curtail unions in 
their efforts to raise wages through a militant strategy.
The Counter-Inflation Act enabled the government to impose an immediate wage 
freeze and provided for the establishment of a Prices and Incomes Board to implement an 
incomes policy. The Trade Disputes Act provided the state with the means of cracking 
down on labour militancy. The architects of both laws were Vijay R. Singh and John 
Falvey, both lawyers and ministers in the Alliance government, and Mohammed Ramzan, 
former FTUC general secretary and president, and by now also a government minister 
(Columbus 1985:interview).
The Trade Disputes Act was brought in on the heels of a strike by building 
workers which began in mid-March when the Building Workers Union called all 5000 of 
its members out on strike to enforce a claim for the 50 cent wage (FT 14/3/73). The same 
day the strike was called, the Fiji Times, in an editorial, proclaimed it was Time 
Government Did Something’.10 The following day, March 15, the paper reported a 
statement by the Minister of Labour that Parliament might hold a special meeting the 
following month to pass new labour legislation. Mavoa was quoted as saying the 
government had been thinking of revising legislation for some time to meet modern 
conditions as most of Fiji’s labour laws were ten years or so old. The existing legislation 
had no provisions for compulsory arbitration or conciliation.
The government’s effective cooption of the FTUC on the matter of the two laws 
was a significant achievement which foreshadowed the later institutionalised cooption of
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the FTUC in the Tripartite Forum. That the FTUC’s cooption was achieved despite the 
fact that there had not been prior consultation with the FTUC on the new laws, indicates 
the desperation with which FTUC leaders sought the state’s favour.
The first the unions heard of the Trade Disputes Act was two days before the 
government’s intentions were made public, when the Minister for Labour informed the 
Labour Advisory Board, on which the FTUC had seven representatives. A draft Trades 
Disputes Bill was scheduled for discussion by the Board six days later on March 19. The 
FTUC was apparently taken by surprise by this move and wanted more time for 
widespread consultation on its proposals. It called an executive meeting for March 18, the 
day before the Board was scheduled to discuss the bill. On March 16, before the FTUC 
executive meeting was held, features of the bill were made public with unconcealed 
delight by the press which had obtained a leaked copy. Under the headline "Government 
Gets Tough With Unions", the Fiji Times reported that the new legislation would give the 
Minister of Labour powers to ban strikes and courts the power to goal union leaders for 
inciting illegal strikes.
The legislation, clearly aimed at taming labour militancy, made it compulsory for 
30 days notice to be given for strikes. It also required Ministerial approval before a strike 
could legally take place. Sympathy strikes and strikes in "essential industries" were 
outlawed. Essential industries listed under the act included air transport, port and dock 
services (including stevedoring) and supply and distribution of fuel services. It would 
therefore contain the three most militant unions. The Minister for Labour furthermore 
could declare strikes (or lockouts) unlawful in certain circumstances - e.g. when all means
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of reaching a settlement through procedures laid down in an agreement were not 
exhausted, when awards or agreements were still in force but either party had refused to 
comply with them, when strike action was not in support of a trade dispute within a 
particular industry or trade or when a strike (or lockout or boycott) was designed to coerce 
an employer in another industry directly or indirectly. From the first two of these 
circumstances it is clear that the state was seeking to enforce the legality of agreements 
between workers and employers by making them binding contracts that it was unlawful to 
break. Copies of all collective agreements regulating the terms and conditions of 
employment were to be registered with the Ministry. The second two circumstances 
underlined the state’s concern to curb ‘wildcat’ or rank and file strikes by workers, 
independent of the trade union leaders (Rokotuivuna et al. 1973:87). But the most 
significant new feature which the bill introduced was the power of the Minister to 
compulsorily refer a dispute to a Tribunal if it involved an essential service, jeopardised 
the essentials of life or livelihood of the nation as a whole or endangered public safety or 
the life of the community (Mavoa PR 5.4.73). The decision of the tribunal was to be final 
and binding on both parties.
The FTUC’s new general secretary, James Raman was reportedly upset by the pre­
emptive public disclosure and discussion of the bill, before the normal discussions in the 
Labour Advisory Board had taken place (FT 17.3.73). Although the ministry denied that 
it had been responsible for the leak and castigated the press for the breach of procedure in 
publishing the information, such a leak could only have assisted the government’s strategy 
of rushing through, without any real public debate, this repressive law. The leak allowed 
the government to deflect attention from the bill to the transgression by the press.
170
Following an FTUC executive meeting on March 18, Raman said workers would 
put a well-considered view to the Board. At the Labour Advisory Board meeting on 
March 19, however, Raman and his colleagues reportedly asked the government for more 
time so the provisions of the bill could be fully studied (Kumar 1974). The FTUC’s 
request was ignored. The bill was scheduled to go before Cabinet on March 21 and 
thence to Parliament. According to Kumar, its discussion by the Board was ‘a mere 
formality’ and the FTUC representatives on the Board were powerless to prevent the bill 
being rushed through (Kumar 1974). There is however, as we shall soon see, evidence to 
suggest that behind the closed doors of the Labour Advisory Board and within the even 
more secluded precincts of private discussion, the FTUC was negotiating a deal with the 
government.
Meanwhile events were moving quickly. The bill was printed in an Extraordinary 
Gazette on March 28 and scheduled for tabling in Parliament eight days later, on April 5. 
The government issued a clear reminder to unions and the public that seven days’ notice 
was necessary before any public meetings could be held. The Airline Workers Union 
nonetheless went ahead and called a 24-hour lightning strike in protest against the 
impending law (FT 28/3/73). On March 29, the Prime Minister made a public statement 
denying that the bill was anti-union or pro-employer and appealed to ‘the people’ to see 
the legislation as ‘in their best interests’.
Our economy is too vulnerable to be allowed to suffer from industrial strife 
and I am sure we will have the support of the people of Fiji in doing all we 
can to resolve this problem (Pacific Review 5.4.73).
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On March 31, in a radio broadcast the Minister for Labour, Jonati Mavoa, reiterated this
argument that the bill was for the "good of all", neither anti-union nor pro-employer but 
"pro-Fiji".
Government has already declared its intention to proceed with the Trade 
Disputes Bill. It is doing so confident that it has overwhelming support 
from the mass of the people whose best interests the government has at 
heart. The government believes that this legislation is for the good of the 
country - that it can make a substantial contribution to peace, progress and 
prosperity (PR 5.4.73).
Mavoa denied that the government was "getting tough with unions" pointing out that it 
was in fact the government’s declared policy to encourage the growth of ‘a strong healthy 
and responsible trade union movement’ (PR 5.4.73). Three days later, the Minister further 
rationalised that "the Pacific Way is to have a dialogue, not to have a clash" (FT 2/4/73). 
References to the "good of the country" and to the "Pacific Way" would often be 
reiterated in the future in the ideological campaign against labour militancy.
The substance of the FTUC’s considered view was never made public. But a 
statement made by the FTUC’s new president, lawyer Manikam Pillai, reported in the Fiji 
Times on March 17, suggests that it might have tried to bargain with the government over 
the matter of official recognition for the FTUC, a matter which had come to assume 
importance in the face of the FCTU’s establishment and defections from FTUC’s ranks to 
the alternative organisation. Indeed, in early January 1973, an FTUC delegation had met 
with the Minister for Labour and the Secretary, R.D. Dods, for two days in an effort to 
extract a commitment from the Minister to exclusively recognising the FTUC. At this
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meeting, Raman had told the Minister that the FTUC wanted "declared and not de facto 
recognition" and said the government should
write to Congress and declare that the TUC [sic] is the sole and only 
organised body in the country for workers (Minutes of Meeting held at the 
Ministry of Labour, January 10 & 11, 1973. op cit.).
The FTUC leaders had asked that "opportunities [for trade unionists] ... be channelled 
through the Congress" to "add to the value of the Congress and be a tangible benefit to 
persuade unions to affiliate with the TUC [sic]". Specifically the FTUC leaders asked that 
the FTUC alone be given opportunity to nominate candidates to boards and councils and 
select candidates for courses. In the words of Manikam Pillai, who assumed the position 
of FTUC President when Ramzan resigned to take up a Ministerial appointment, the 
FTUC wanted the government to "deal with the FTUC and no other organisation".11
Now, on the eve of the bill’s introduction, Pillai was reported saying that if the 
government gave the FTUC official recognition, the Congress would be in a position to 
ensure that as few industrial strikes as possible occurred (FT 17.3.73). He claimed the 
FTUC had influence among trade unions and adequate disciplining power but this was 
hardly plausible given the composition of the FCTU, whose militant affiliates included a 
number of unions controlling crucial industries. As the FTUC saw it, however, official 
recognition would confer legitimacy on the FTUC and ensure FCTU’s exclusion, both of 
which would undermine and eventually destroy the FCTU.
On April 2, before the bill was tabled in Parliament, the FTUC was invited to meet 
the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister for Commerce, Industry and Cooperatives. It
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was at this meeting that a concession to the FTUC was made - the holding in abeyance of 
a clause restraining sympathy strikes. The clause would not be brought into effect until a 
date notified by the Minister for Labour and not until he had consulted (i.e., advised) the 
Labour Advisory Board (Kumar 1974:61). The concession was announced as having 
arisen from the ‘helpful and constructive suggestions from the FTUC and others’ (Kumar 
1974:61). It was also at this meeting that, according to Kumar, the reason for the state’s 
rush to get the Trade Disputes Bill enacted was revealed:
The delegation was told that all prices and pay rates had been frozen with 
effect from 1st April 1973, as the first phase of a rigid policy aimed at 
curbing inflation. The freeze was initially to last for 3 months with the 
possibility of an extension while guidelines for a second phase were 
prepared and counter-inflation legislation (was) enacted by parliament 
(Kumar 1971:28).
The Trades Dispute Act was thus the instrument with which the state would contain any 
strike action by organised labour in response to the impending wage freeze and counter 
inflation policy. The specially-convened meeting, the concession to the FTUC, and the 
revelation of the pay and price freeze all suggest that the state was negotiating with the 
FTUC to accept the Trade Disputes Act. In the light of this, the FTUC-organised public 
protest rally, held the same day at Albert Park in Suva and the follow-up 24-hour general 
strike were merely a charade. They were described as such soon after by opposition 
members of Parliament, Karam Ramrakha and Tora. Indeed Ramrakha further indicted the 
FTUC leaders following criticism by Raman of the NFP’s general silence in parliament 
on the Act.12 According to Ramrakha, the National Federation Party had had reliable 
information that Raman was privately in favour of the bill ‘with certain exceptions and
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reservations’. He further alleged that at a meeting between the FTUC and NFP 
parliamentarians, Raman had
made it clear that he did not want any National Federation Party members 
to cany any brief in Parliament for the FTUC. So instead of asking the 
only parliamentary source to attack the bill, he was trying to alienate us and 
minimise our standing (Sutherland 1984:440).
FTUC officials at the time have a different version of what was exchanged at that 
meeting. They allege that some of the NFP parliamentarians to whom they turned for 
support on April 2, wanted a commitment from the FTUC of affiliation with their party as 
a precondition for opposing the bill in Parliament (Kumar 1974).
Whatever the story was, the fact that the FTUC was accorded ‘official recognition’ 
in April 1973, amidst the controversy over the Trades Disputes and the Counter Inflation 
Bills, strongly suggests that a trade-off did take place. Both Tora and Ramrakha attacked 
the government’s announcement of recognition and accused the FTUC publicly of 
supporting the Trades Disputes Act, of putting up token resistance to justify its existence 
and of "selling out" the workers of the country (Kumar 1971: ). The accusations were 
not mitigated by the Minister for Labour’s denial that the government and the FTUC had 
worked hand in glove or were linked in any way; or by his explanation that recognition 
had been conferred because the government felt FTUC represented the majority of trade 
unions in Fiji. Or indeed by his assurance that other unions and union organisations had 
the "same right of access to the government" (Kumar 1974).
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Regardless of the ambiguity in this "official recognition", the government’s action 
was significant. Formal recognition of the FTUC, which had historically enjoyed a close 
relationship with the colonial state since its formation (as the FIWC in 1951) meant, as the 
FTUC leaders knew it would, the complete exclusion of the FCTU from all consultative 
processes. As Kumar put it:
Recognition established [the] de facto relations during [sic] which the 
Government had consulted the FTUC on labour matters. It ensured that all 
workers’ representatives on statutory bodies would be FTUC nominees 
(Kumar 1974).
The fact is that, in practice, the FTUC had always been informally consulted by the post­
colonial state, and worker representatives on statutory bodies had always been FTUC 
nominees. Writing in 1971, Flince noted that:
the Fiji Trades Union Congress is an accepted agency for union-government 
consultation. In addition to close and continuous informal discussion and 
communication, Congress representatives sit with employer and government 
interests in the Labour Advisory Board, the Apprenticeship Council, 
Manpower Resources Council, the Fiji Provident Fund [sic] and other 
advisory and executive agencies of government (Hince 1971:387).
Whereas the FTUC had been satisfied with such informal relations in the past and 
recognition had never been an issue, circumstances had changed with the formation of 
FCTU. Recognition was seen as critical to FTUC’s very survival. There was now a need 
for the FTUC to be publicly legitimated as this would bear on whether trade unions 
aligned themselves to the more militant FCTU (which took confrontational action) or to 
the political unionism of the more conservative (and government-aligned) FTUC. It was
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for this reason that the FTUC traded acceptance of the Trades Disputes Act for official 
recognition.
Columbus confirms that FTUC leaders did negotiate recognition of the FTUC in 
return for acceptance of the Trade Disputes Act. It was, he says, FTUC’s anxiety over 
FCTU’s emergence which made its leaders ‘prepared to do just about anything’ to get 
recognition.
..there was panic in the FTUC. They felt that if recognition was not 
forthcoming Tora would most likely get more unions joining him..because it 
was a very very critical period...the unions were trying to decide what to 
do...(Columbus 1985:interview).
What would have attracted other unions to Tora’s organisation? According to Columbus:
Tora was militant...and he got what he wanted..and people were inclined to 
become..you know..everyone was militant..that was a militant period 
(Columbus 1985:personal interview).
The Persistence of Militancy
The Trades Disputes Act did not immediately have the effect of restraining strikes. 
Indeed the number of strikes in the year of its enactment escalated to 69 and the number 
of man days lost through strike activity reached the record figure of 116,998 - a figure 
which remains unsurpassed. Moreover, Tora, the leading militant, was undaunted by the 
new law. In August, three months after the law was passed, his union defiantly held a 30- 
hour sympathy strike to enforce a claim for a superannuation fund from Qantas. The 
strike resulted in 19 international flights overflying Fiji and a substantial loss of revenue 
not only to Qantas but also to the state in forfeited landing fees.
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The government’s response displayed a curious disinclination to use the weapon of 
the new law. Instead non-union labour was brought in to keep the airport open while the 
government tough-talked through the press, saying "when it told the union it would not 
tolerate further stoppages it meant what it said" (PR 16.8.73).Qantas was directed to serve 
dismissal notices on its 154 striking employees and not to agree to the superannuation 
fund. And the airline was given the services of the Fiji police force to deliver dismissal 
notices to the workers at their homes. Tora reacted with outrage, called on the Minister of 
Labour to resign and challenged the government to prosecute him and the union executive 
rather than dismiss the workers. Tora’s challenge was pertinent. It was significant that 
the state, rather than use its newly introduced law to crack down on the strike leaders, was 
resorting to trying to break the strike with scab labour and encouraging the company to 
fire its employees. The government, having passed its law, did not yet trust the legitimacy 
of its use.
Tora also accused the government of persecuting FCTU-affiliated unions. Two
other strikes then in progress by FTUC-affiliated unions had not been declared unlawful.
One of these was by the Sugar and General Workers’ Union which was striking for a
$1.00 an hour wage from the Fiji Sugar Corporation, the para-statal company which had
taken over milling operations from the CSR. This strike had been called by rank-and-file
members of these unions and both its president (Manikam Pillai, who was also then
FTUC’s president) and secretary (Ram Dayal) denied that the strike was official. Tora
also accused the FTUC, which had remained silent and implicitly condoned the
government’s action in bringing in scab labour, of
toeing the government line and failing miserably in its duties to maintain 
the freedom of the trade union movement’ (PR 23.8.73).
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Despite the government’s action, the AWU did succeed in this strike. Before the month 
was out Qantas reinstated all the dismissed workers to their jobs - apparently on the 
advice of the Australian Labor Government (PR 30.8.73).
The following year, 1974, was no less quiet on the industrial relations front. The 
number of strikes totalled 83, 21 in the building industry alone which was suffering a 
serious recession, with many workers being laid off. It was a measure of the effectiveness 
of the new law that strikes were shorter in duration, reducing the number of man-days lost 
by almost 50 per cent. In terms of wage gains, 1974 showed the highest ever recorded 
increases in wages and salaries. The mean hourly wage rate stood at 61.22 cents an hour 
by the end of that year (PP 28 of 1977) but oilworkers, airline workers, dockworkers and 
municipal workers were receiving much more than the mean average - 85.7, 80.01, 75.5 
and 74.3 cents an hour respectively (PP 1 of 1975:15). The fact that, despite the Counter- 
Inflation Act and the Trades Dispute Act, trade unions were continuing to strike and 
continuing to win increases, sometimes in excess of the guideline set by the PIB, stirred 
employers to raise their voices in protest.
In August 1974, the outgoing president of the FECA, Don Aidney, in his report to 
FECA members, criticised the government and the unions for the current industrial unrest 
and said the strike record in the country had worsened since the passage of the new law. 
He criticised the government for not using the law in instances where it should have, and 
the Minister for not using the power he had under the Act to declare strikes unlawful. 
Aidney also complained that employers were often made to accept union demands even if 
they exceeded the guideline limits, that arbitrators appointed to settle disputes had little
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industrial background or experience and that employers were becoming more cautious as 
arbitration findings were generally ‘without appeal and always had repercussions on other 
industries’. Aidney’s statements, which were reported in the Fiji Times on August 2, drew 
a surprisingly savage response from Labour Minister, Mavoa, who called Aidney’s 
statements ‘irresponsible’ and curiously defended the right of Fiji workers to higher 
wages:
For a great many years employers in Fiji have enjoyed the advantage of 
cheap labour. But they have to realise that our people are more 
sophisticated today and have contacts with the rest of the world that enable 
them to compare their conditions with the [sic] of workers doing similar 
jobs overseas. The picture that emerges does not always convince them that 
right is always on the employers’ side (PR 8.8.74).
Mavoa said employers should take a long hard look at themselves. He said strain did not 
arise in industrial relations if there was good will on both sides and good will was not 
always in evidence on the employers’ side. While employers expected workers to behave 
by the code they did not do so themselves, he said, citing the case of the Master Builders 
Association’s refusal to submit to arbitration. Mavoa assured FECA that, but for the 
Disputes Act, the strike record would be higher still and he challenged Aidney to cite 
instances wherein the state had pushed employers to accept union claims in excess of the 
guideline.13
This public altercation between the government and employers, indicating a pro­
union stance on the part of the government, was clearly indicative of the new drive to win 
the confidence of the unions. Although, by this time, the government had the FTUC in its 
pocket, the FCTU was seriously eroding the FTUC’s support and therefore its claim to
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representing the trade union movement. Posturing a pro-union stance was aimed at both 
keeping a majority of unions within the fold of the ‘responsible’ union movement and at 
winning back defectors to the FCTU. This strategy would be augmented later by its formal 
cooption of the FTUC into the Tripartite Forum.
In 1975 the number of strikes dropped to 46, with 57,373 mandays lost. In 1976 
major strikes in the oil, sugar and mining industries in the early part of the year led the 
Fiji Times to complain that "the strike syndrome has become endemic" (FT 24.4.76). The 
conflict between the FTUC and the FCTU intensified in this year and a serious struggle 
for leadership of the labour movement was in evidence (Howard n.d.). The Trade Union 
(Recognition) Act passed that year, which made provision for the compulsory recognition 
of trade unions which could show proof of attaining more than 50 per cent of eligible 
members was clearly enacted to curb strike activity by obviating the need for ‘recognition’ 
strikes, which were frequent. Significantly, Tora’s assumption of the leadership of the Fiji 
Sugar & General Workers’ Union and the state’s takeover of port operations, both of 
which events occurred in 1976, meant that two crucial industries, now managed and 
controlled by the state, were in the hands of militant unionists. During the year, Veitata 
survived what he later alleged were efforts by "enemies of the union" within the PAF 
management to break the unity of the FWW&SU (FT 3.6.77) and Tora defied both the 
Trades Disputes and Sugar Industry Acts.14 The situation was poised for an 
unprecedented confrontation between militant unions and the state as employer. This took 
place in 1977. But first, the state would formally coopt the moderate and pliant union 
leaders of the FTUC. With their sanction, militant unionists and their organisations could 
be then dealt with, with impunity.
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In the next chapter, we turn to consider the peculiar conditions of 1977 which 
provided the state with political reasons for establishing a corporatist machinery, the 
Tripartite Forum; the response that the Forum’s institution invoked from the militants and 
the counter response this drew from the state; and, finally, the contradictions of the 
tripartite arrangement and the reasons for its eventual abandonment in 1984.
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Endnotes
1. This was the official "ethnic" classification given to those of European, Chinese, 
Polynesian and other descent. It included those classified as "Part-European" and 
basically covered all who were neither Fijian/Rotuman nor Indian.
2. Independence was attained following intense negotiations between Alliance Party 
and the predominantly Indo-Fijian Party, the National Federation Party. The 
independence settlement, represented by the 1970 Constitution, entailed a 
compromise on NFP’s demand for "common roll" (one man one vote). A system of 
racially-reserved seats (22 each for Fijians and ‘Indians’ and eight for "general 
electors"), was combined with a complex electoral system, based on a combination 
of communal and national (cross-voting) constituencies. This racially-based 
political system was to encourage ethnic politics in the post-independence period. 
For a substantive analysis of ethnic politics in Fiji, see Sutherland (1984) and 
(1992); Robertson & Tamanisau (1988) and Naidu (1988).
3. The companies did however make a package offer which included an agreement to 
pay attendance money of $9.12 a week to every dockworker registered with the 
Labour Utilisation Board who reported for work as required, whether work was 
available or not. This would have given the 550-odd registered dockworkers a 
guaranteed 24-hour-week wage, instead of the 48-hour-week wage the union 
wanted.
4. On May 3 Veitata called on the companies through the Fiji Times to make a 
‘realistic wage offer’ and claimed the union had ‘mass support’. It had, he said, 
received $2000 from other unions and from the public at large. Veitata also 
announced that he had nothing against the government and added that the 
government, by introducing price control indicated it was ‘on the union’s side’. 
Veitata also raised the matter of profits being made by the foreign companies 
involved in the dispute and asked whether this was more disastrous for the 
economy. The same day the Fiji Times carried a statement, signed by all five 
companies, and published as a full page advertisement ‘for the information of the 
people of Fiji’. The statement reiterated the concern for the economy:‘Employers 
are prepared to resume collective bargaining but they are not prepared to 
voluntarily agree to demands which in their opinion would have the gravest 
repercussions on the economy’ (FT 3.5.71).
5. Ramzan told the Fiji Times that in collective bargaining, "everything boils down to 
what the economy of a country can afford to pay and provide (FT 14.9.72)
6. Columbus was quoted in 1972 as saying: "Our union set the standard for higher 
wages after (the) 1959 strike. A wage arbitration awarded a new basic weekly 
wage of nearly $10 - which was high for Fiji in those days" (FT 12.8.72).
7. The interplay between trade union and national politics that resulted from 
the political affiliations of leading unionists of both moderate and militant 
persuasions assumed greater significance in later years as the period of 
Alliance rule extended and the party’s monopoly of the post-colonial state 
(and its resources) began to be accepted as permanent.
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8. Minutes of Meetings between FTUC and the Minister for Labour, January 10 & 
11, 1973, Tripartism File, FTUC Archives.
9. Indeed, FTUC leaders suspected that Columbus, the FO&AWU Secretary, was 
inclined towards joining the FCTU. Although they had earlier included his and 
Tora’s names on a list of nominees for a trade union training course in the UK, in 
March the FTUC Executives directed the Secretary for Labour to "withhold [his] 
name... until further notice (Letter from Raman to Secretary for Labour, 26.3.73 
Tripartism File, FTUC Archives)
10. In January the Fiji Times, in an editorial, had challenged the government to take 
action against union militancy by suggesting that "mafia-like trade union dons" 
were "ruling the roost" showing that "Fiji’s Parliament is not supreme".
11. Minutes of Meeting with the Minister for Labour 10 & 11 January 1973 op.cit.
12. Of the opposition parliamentarians, only Apisai Tora, the trade unionist, 
substantively criticised and spoke at length on the Trades Disputes Bill. Tora 
described the Bill as an instrument to aid foreign and local big business by keeping 
wages depressed. He accused employers of prolonging strikes, citing the case of 
the building workers union that year when the Master Builders Association refused 
further negotiations and "tried to starve the workers into submission". Tora said 
Fiji was completely employer-oriented and that instead of providing machinery to 
force employers to the conference table and hold them there until a settlement was 
reached, the government was introducing legislation to shackle and hamstring trade 
unions. But Tora’s most incisive comment on the legislation was that through 
means of the law "industrial disputes would acquire a marked political character - a 
dispute [sic] against the government...The government would no longer be able to 
present a face of paternal impartiality to the workers (PR 19.4.73).
13. The FECA reply to Mavoa rejected the Minister’s statement that employers had 
enjoyed cheap labour arguing that employers had "consistently paid wages 
comparable with government and had always endeavoured to adhere to government 
guidelines and development plan objectives" (PR 15.8.74). It claimed wage rates 
for unskilled workers in Fiji were "higher than almost every other island territory 
in the South Pacific" and listed a number of strikes and stoppages which could 
have been declared unlawful by the Minister under the Trade Disputes Act. It also 
provided evidence of pressure having been used on employers to accept union 
claims. FECA made similar complaints to the Parliamentary Select Committee on 
the Counter Inflation Act which was appointed in July 1974.
14. In the first case, he proclaimed that not a cent of the $500 fine imposed by the
court on the General Secretary of the Fiji Municipal Workers’ Union (an affiliate 
of the FCTU), would be paid (FS 17.7.76). The FMWU leader had been
prosecuted under the Trades Dispute Act for taking part in an unlawful strike. In 
the second case, Tora called two strikes in the sugar industry threatening to cripple 
the industry during the first (FS 21.7.76) and proclaiming, during the second, that 
"no amount of legislation is going to frighten or cow us into submission" (FS 
3.8.76).
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CHAPTER SIX
CORPORATIST POLITICS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE TRIPARTITE FORUM
1977 - 1985
The Tripartite Forum really buggered us...in particular the oilworkers, and I’m 
prepared to say this quite openly. As far as the Tripartite Forum is concerned, the 
oilworkers lost more than anybody else. And I think that might also go for the 
dockworkers but I don’t want to speak for the dockworkers. Before we used to get 
17 per cent, 20 per cent, 22 per cent increases...
Michael Columbus, Secretary, Fiji Oil & Allied Workers Union (Personal
interview: 1985)
The involvement of the trade union movement in the Tripartite Forum must not be 
understood as a means of restricting the movement or militancy of trade unions or [as] 
a substitute for collective bargaining. All these elements are live [sic] and vibrant and 
the trade union movement is not subservient to commands from any quarter. The Forum 
is merely a moderating mechanism...
James Raman, FTUC National Secretary, September 1984
Introduction
In December 1975, the 24th Annual Conference of the FTUC adopted a statement on 
tripartism for submission to the Prime Minister. The statement implicitly promised that 
"smoother industrial relations", the "elimination of negative and harmful industrial strife" and 
the achievement of "enhanced productivity" would result from the institution of a tripartite 
relationship in Fiji.
A working tripartite relationship between government, employers and trade unions 
will help to minimise the kinds of class conflicts which today plague a number of 
countries, both developed and developing, and prove gravely injurious to their 
socio-economic health and national solvency... One of the major results of 
effective tripartite institutions in our society would be to give our working 
population a concrete sense of involvement in the economic planning and policy­
making processes and of being co-owners and co-beneficiaries of the productive 
efforts of our nation. (Statement on Tripartism from the 24th Annual Conference, 
December 1975, FTUC Archives).
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The language and ideas in the statement were undoubtedly inspired by Devan Nair, 
Secretary General of the Singapore National Trade Union Congress, who attended the 24th 
Conference as chief guest and waxed lyrical about corporatist arrangements involving the SNTUC 
and the state in Singapore. Couched in the rhetoric of national development, social democracy 
and consensus decision-making, the appeal to the government for the institution of tripartism gave 
no hint of the FTUC’s real motives. Yet it was precisely these which spurred the organisation’s 
leaders to seek the institution of a corporatist arrangement.
By 1976, not only were close relations between FTUC and the government very apparent,
but a general consensus on both the importance of responsible unionism and on tripartism was
being publicly articulated. During the FTUC’s 25th Annual Conference that year. Prime Minister
Mara spoke on the subject of tripartism. His published message to the Conference reiterated the
‘Pacific W ay’ ideology of responsible unionism:
... trade unionism was an alien concept in Fiji, implanted, fostered and assisted by 
the administering power. And we should not forget this. But as with so much we 
have inherited in this way, we have made our own adjustments, adapted the 
system to our multiracial society and ended up with what we like to think is a Fiji 
style of trade unionism. Where we have succeeded it has been in following our 
Pacific Way - dialogue, tolerance, goodwill and harmony. Where we have failed 
it has been where we have followed the Western Way of confrontation and 
intolerance (FTUC Silver Jubilee Report, 1976).
M ara’s denunciation of labour militancy as inappropriate to Pacific culture and society 
evoked the admonitions of Fijian chiefs to Fijian workers during the 1959 strike. Militancy was 
‘bad form’, it ran against the grain of Fijian upbringing and, most importantly, it reflected 
manipulation by outsiders. Former FTUC Secretary General, Mohammed Ramzan, now a Minister
186
in Mara’s Cabinet, in his message to the FTUC Conference, foreshadowed the tripartite
partnership that was formalised the following year:
Fiji has been ravaged with far too many strikes. Inter-union rivalries is [sic] a 
cause for concern. All these are damaging the very image which trade unionists 
have striven to build. Maybe the time has come for the movement to do a lot of 
soul-searching. As one of the founders I would like to see the movement progress 
and prosper. Every action must be within the framework of national interest. Self- 
interest must be subordinated to general national interest (FTUC Silver Jubilee 
Report, 1986).
Immediately following the 25th Conference, Mara convened a meeting between the 
leaders of FECA, FTUC and representatives of his government. This meeting is considered by 
some to have effectively laid the foundation for the Tripartite Forum which was formally 
established in May the following year.1 Through the Forum, which formally incorporated the 
FTUC as the tripartite partner representing labour, the government clearly sought to emasculate 
militant unions and to generally subordinate the interests of workers to the ‘national interest’.
The Tripartite Forum was the crowning achievement in the post-colonial state’s strategy 
of cooption. Not only did it represent the first institutional mechanism for the state’s containment 
of labour, but a section of organised labour was openly complicit in its establishment. More than 
a consultative or advisory machinery, the Tripartite Forum committed its partners to honour all 
agreements made. Through the Forum, ‘voluntary’ wage restraint was achieved though a 
con sensually-determined national wage guideline which the tripartite partners undertook to 
enforce among their members, and much industrial conflict was defused through the intervention 
of special committees set up under its auspices. As a result, the early tripartite years - 1977-1981 
- were years of moderate wage increases, relatively trouble-free industrial bargaining, greater 
recourse to institutional means of dispute settlement, and consensus (rather than confrontational)
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politics where organised labour was concerned.
By late 1982, however, the tripartite accord was showing signs of strain. The 
government’s failure to persuade its labour partners in the Tripartite Forum that year to agree to 
a wage freeze to counter the effects of deteriorating terms of trade and of a massive growth in 
the public sector wage bill (both of which factors caused a fiscal crisis for the post-colonial state 
(FEDM 1984;viii), soured its relations with the FTUC. By the end of 1984 the honeymoon was 
over. The unilateral imposition of a wage freeze in November that year implicitly signalled the 
end of tripartism. Thereafter the relationship between organised labour and the state became 
highly confrontational. The FTUC’s subsequent withdrawal from the Forum in protest at the wage 
freeze, and its announcement of a national strike, drew threats from the government that it would 
proclaim an emergency, call out the "disciplined forces", carry out a mass sacking of civil 
servants and deregister unions (Island Business February 1985:14). An open and bitter conflict 
raged between the FTUC and the government, one which, two years later, reached a crisis in the 
electoral victory of an FTUC-sponsored Labour Party (in coalition with the NFP).
What is the explanation for the post-colonial state’s creation, and subsequent dismantling, 
of the Tripartite Forum? What did the corporatist machinery represent? In this chapter I show 
firstly how political events in 1977 threatened those in control of the post-colonial state and 
provided the Alliance government with a strong reason to formally co-opt the FTUC. The 
resultant Tripartite Forum, and the institution of the first annual wage guideline, are portrayed 
as political mechanisms for both marginalising dissidents and containing labour militancy.
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Secondly, I discuss the main contradiction inherent in the Tripartite accord which had begun to 
surface by the end of the decade. The contradiction was that while tripartism successfully eroded 
the power and militancy of blue-collar unions, it ironically strengthened the hand of white-collar 
unions, particularly in the public sector and notably the Fiji Public Service Association (FPSA). 
The economic (and political) implications this entailed for the post-colonial state provide 
explanations for the death and burial of the Tripartite Forum in 1984.
I argue that the Tripartite accord was primarily born of political expediency; that it was 
largely a response to the Alliance government’s crisis of legitimacy in 1977. By 1982, the 
Alliance government was facing the beginnings of an economic crisis and, by 1983, it was being 
strongly advised by the International Monetary Authority (IMF) to control wages, by a wage 
freeze if necessary, to ‘safeguard (its) fiscal and external payments position’ (IMF Staff Report 
for the 1983 Article IV Consultation; 11). With a new mandate to govern, following the 1982 
elections, and with the corporatist arrangement no longer working to its advantage, the new 
Alliance government was now eager to be rid of the Tripartite Forum. Its subsequent deprecation 
of the Forum as "too narrow an association to represent the national interest" was intended to 
both discredit and justify marginalising, the FTUC. The National Economic Summit, convened 
by the government in January 1985 and involving a broad range of interest groups, represented 
a new legitimising mechanism, one in which organised labour would play a peripheral role. We 
turn now to firstly consider the political context in which the Forum was born.
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The Tripartite Accord and the 1977 Political Crisis
The particular interests that organised capital and a section of organised labour had in 
eroding labour militancy predisposed them, as we have seen, towards a corporatist relationship 
with the post-colonial state. FECA, as the peak organisation of capital in Fiji, concerned with 
protecting its long-term interests, sought to control ‘gutless firms’, and enforce solidarity among 
employers. The FTUC, whose credibility and support had been seriously weakened by the 
militants’ successes as well as by the formation of an alternative peak body of labour unions, was 
bent on regaining legitimacy and power by means of an exclusive and formal relationship with 
the state. By 1977, the Alliance government of Ratu Mara had its own reasons for formally 
coopting the FTUC into a corporatist arrangement.
In April that year, a general election had produced a freak electoral victory for the 
National Federation Party. A racially-based electoral system introduced under Fiji’s independence 
constitution, and the entrenchment of a colonially-inspired doctrine of ethnic Fijian paramountcy, 
together favoured the retention of political power in the hands of the Alliance Party, dominated 
by Fijian chiefly and commercial interests. Although the Alliance leaders officially espoused a 
policy of ‘multiracialism’, support for the party, especially amongst commoner Fijians, was often 
mobilised by direct communal appeals and by tacitly invoking the ‘bogey’ of Indian political 
domination. The party’s electoral defeat in 1977, caused largely by the vote splitting efforts of 
the more openly conservative but commoner-led Fijian Nationalist Party, as well as by the drift 
of a not insignificant number of traditional Alliance supporters to the National Federation Party
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(NFP),2 dealt an unprecedented blow to the party’s chiefly rulers. Mara’s reappointment as Prime 
Minister in a caretaker government by fellow high chief and Governor General, Ratu George 
Cakobau, pending a second election scheduled for September, gave the party an opportunity to 
try to regain legitimacy before the September elections. The party sought to do this, on the one 
hand, by establishing a new consensus-based corporatist machinery involving employers and 
unions, and, on the other, through the punitive use of state power against ethnic Fijian opponents 
considered responsible for the Alliance’s defeat.3
The formal establishment of the Tripartite Forum in May with the voluntary participation 
of the moderate and Alliance-leaning leaders of the FTUC, and the consensual setting of the first 
wage guideline, were measures intended in large part to specifically deal both with the Alliance 
government’s ‘crisis of legitimacy’ and with militant Fijian labour leaders aligned to rival 
political parties who had challenged the status quo of Alliance rule. Events that immediately 
followed the establishment of the Tripartite Forum strongly suggest that these were the political 
motives which underlay the institution of the new corporatist machinery. We firstly look at these 
events with a view to exposing the state’s underlying political agenda.4
The First Tripartite Wage Agreement : Reaction and Counter-action
The announced details of the first tripartite agreement, signed in May 1977, conveyed a 
broad concern with national economic and social development. The Forum was portrayed as the 
embodiment of a shared concern by employers, responsible union leaders and the government to
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strengthen the economy so that there would be more wealth to share (implicity with workers). 
The agreement committed the tripartite partners to minimizing unemployment and redundancies; 
setting wage guidelines as an incentive to new investment; working towards greater security of 
employment for workers; ensuring industrial peace for the nation; reviewing the income tax 
system to find ways of alleviating the tax burden; and devising schemes to raise productivity 
(Kangwai n.d.). Four committees were set up under the Forum to work towards achieving these 
objectives; the Remuneration Guidelines Committee, the Investment Committee, the Productivity 
Committee and the Taxation Review Committee. Two further committees were established to 
facilitate the provisions of the agreement - a Consultative Committee (chaired by the Prime 
Minister) whose brief was to try to settle industrial conflicts before they erupted and an Advisory 
Committee to which any party in an industrial dispute could refer and receive advice on items 
in their log of claims, including the employer’s ability to pay. The Consultative Committee, later 
termed the "Firebrigade Committee" would play "a crucial role in defusing potentially explosive 
situations in [sic] the Labour/management relations scene" (Raman 1985).
For unions which were not party to it, the most significant aspect of this first Tripartite 
Agreement was the Agreement on Voluntary Remuneration Guidelines which imposed on all 
unions a 10 per cent ceiling on wage increases for a 12 month period. The fact that wage 
agreements made by the Tripartite partners were to be imposed on all trade unions, both within 
and outside of the FTUC, underlined the value of the corporatist arrangement to the Alliance 
government in obtaining FTUC consent both for wage restraint, and, implicitly, for what would 
follow.
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Public announcement of the first wage guideline drew expectedly strong reactions from 
militant unionists both within and outside the FTUC but only two of these, Apisai Tora and 
Taniela Veitata, openly challenged the guideline and new machinery. Their subsequent repression 
on the eve of a second national election in September 1977, by an interim Alliance government 
which had been trounced at the April polls of that year5, owed much to the fact that they were 
both prominent political figures whose campaigns for rival parties were considered to have 
caused the Alliance’s defeat. In addition to being General Secretary of the Fiji Sugar and General 
Workers Union and leader of the FCTU, Tora was also a prominent NFP politician who had 
played a significant role for the party during the April elections. As head of the party’s "Taukei 
Committee" he had actively engaged in a campaign to woo ethnic Fijians away from the Alliance 
and, although the chances of winning ethnic Fijian support on a significant scale for the NFP in 
this, as in other, elections were poor, Tora’s collaboration with the Fijian Nationalist Party (of 
which Veitata was a prominent member) in an anti-Alliance campaign, undoubtedly contributed 
to the party’s defeat in April (Howard 1991:94,96).6
Tora’s challenge to the Forum began with a half page newspaper advertisement in which 
he strongly denounced the "arbitrarily imposed wage increase limitation" arrived at by "the so- 
called tripartite group" (FT 18.5.77). Evidently unmindful of its purpose, the Fiji Times warned 
that the new machinery would not work without all the sugar unions as well as "the powerful 
Building Workers’ Union", which were in Tora’s camp, and advised that, as the government 
could not simply "wish away" the FCTU, it try to bring Tora to the Conference table and draw 
him into the Tripartite Forum as a partner. That this was not pursued lends credence to the view
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that the Forum was intended to exclude and thereby neutralise Tora, while subjecting FCTU 
affiliates to wage agreements made by the FTUC. This strategy of forcing back FCTU affiliates 
within the fold of the moderate and state-favoured FTUC, the only organisation through which 
they could hope to influence the government, was to prove successful.
The FS&GWU was then in the throes of negotiating a wage increase from the Fiji Sugar 
Corporation, the state-owned company which had bought out the CSR Company’s milling 
operations in Fiji in 1973, and the announcement of the wage ceiling caused a breakdown in 
negotiations and provoked "an extended stop work meeting which [Tora added] may be extended 
indefinitely". While Tora accused the FSC of hiding behind the TPF guideline, insisting that the 
10 per cent ceiling was voluntary not mandatory and that the FCTU was neither consulted (about 
it) nor a signatory to it, FSC’s chief executive argued that the FSC, as a member of FECA and 
as a company in which the state was the major shareholder, was committed to maintaining the 
10 per cent limit.
Tora’s defiance of both the first wage guideline and of the Sugar Industry Act resulted, 
suiprisingly, in an initial victory for the FS&GWU. On May 22, both parties agreed to a 7 per 
cent interim pay increase and to settlement by arbitration, in which the arbitrator was not to be 
bound by the guideline (FT 23.5.77). The union’s victory undoubtedly owed something to Tora’s 
public challenge, as FCTU leader, of the government’s exclusive accord with the FTUC. 
Encouraged by the victory, Tora went on to lend support to Taniela Veitata and the dockworkers 
in their less successful challenge of the wage guideline a month and a half later.
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Refusing to be bound by the 10 per cent guideline, Veitata, as industrial advisor to the 
Fiji Waterside Workers and Seamen’s Union (FWW&SU), called a strike on July 5 to back the 
union’s demands for a 30 per cent wage increase, and the sacking of four top executives of the 
Ports Authority of Fiji (PAF) who were deemed ‘enemies of the union’.7 Established in 1976 
to administer the ports, the PAF was a statutary body, and the FWW&SU was thus locked in 
dispute with the state as employer, as Tora and the FS&GWU had been a month or so earlier. 
When efforts to use the new tripartite machinery to help resolve the dispute failed, Prime 
Minister Mara warned that he would not allow a dockers’ strike to close the pons. Veitata 
counter-warned that he had the full support of the New Zealand Seamen’s Union, the Australian 
Waterside Workers Union and the International Transport Federation (ITF) and that any ship 
worked in Fiji by strike breakers would be blacklisted throughout the ITF countries (FT 5.7.90). 
The strike was declared illegal, an arbitrator appointed to settle the dispute, and the dockers 
ordered to return to work. Veitata, however, refused to comply with the order or to submit to 
compulsory arbitration.
The Mara government then launched a public campaign against Veitata, the FWW&SU 
and its overseas supporters. Australian and New Zealand trade unions were warned by Mara that 
his government would "not tolerate sinister foreign interference in local labour matters" (FT 
7.7.77) and the FWW&SU’s attempts to involve foreign unions were labelled "a conspiracy 
against our people" which Mara declared his government would "resist with all the resources in 
our power" (FT 7.7.77). Governments of other Pacific countries were solicited for support in the 
fight against what was deemed to be a "conspiracy in the name of regional trade union solidarity"
195
(FT 13.7.77). After the FWW&SU revised a decision to return to work on July 14, in protest at 
the arrest and detention of 17 New Zealand crew of the Neahere (who clashed with police at 
Lautoka wharf after failing to remove their ship from her berth), the government’s anti-union 
campaign intensified, and was readily supported by the tripartite partners.8
Affronted by the NZFOL’s and the International Transport Federation (ITF)’s failure to 
consult the FTUC on the strike, FTUC general secretary, James Raman, sharply criticized foreign 
unions, particularly the New Zealand Federation of Labour (NZFOL), for interfering in Fiji’s 
affairs (FT 16.7.77). Although the FWW&SU was an FTUC affiliate, Raman condemned the 
strike, alleging that Veitata had a political agenda.9 The strike, he said, was
no longer to further the cause of workers but was aimed at bringing down the
government and challenging the law of Fiji. (FT 16.7.77)
These statements of Raman’s reflected the FTUC’s recently consolidated accord with the 
government and the allegience it now showed towards the state. Pledging unqualified support for 
the government, Raman said "circumstances dictate that we should express our loyalty" (FT 
16.7.77). Two days later, Raman justified his siding with the government instead of with the 
union by portraying the FTUC’s position as loyalist and nationalist in the face of "enemies both 
within and outside Fiji" (FT 18.7.77). That his primary concern was to defend the Tripartite 
machinery which the FTUC had helped create, and which was indeed crucial to its survival, was 
made clear in Raman’s warning that the FTUC would take ‘disciplinary action’ against the 
FWW&SU and ‘any other affiliate who damaged the tripartite machine’. The dockers’ strike, 
Raman alleged, was directed at "destroying the [Tripartite] Agreement" (FT16.7.77). Like their 
labour partners in the new accord, FECA leaders also announced that they were prepared to stand
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up and be counted amongst those supporting the government and, implicitly, the nation, and 
suggested that Fiji find other countries willing to supply it with (imported) goods:
We must not be left in the situation where we can be dictated to by people in
New Zealand and Australia. (FT16.7.77)
Only Tora, on behalf of the FCTU, offered support to the dockers’ union and expressed 
surprise at the FTUC leader’s statements. To the hue and cry over ‘foreign interference’, Tora 
rejoined:
"the illegitimate Alliance Government of the day should realize that trade unions
operate on a system of international solidarity". (FT 16.7.77)
On July 19, the day after Veitata called off the strike and agreed to go to arbitration, a 
massive protest march through the streets, ostensibly organized by a non-political actor, 
‘housewife’ Leibling Marlowe, brought out thousands of Alliance Party supporters in what was 
both an unmistakably anti-union demonstration and an exercise in publicly legitimating the 
Alliance leadership. The facts that major business houses closed their offices and stores to allow 
their staff to join the demonstration against "foreign interference" and that the staff of several 
government schools brought their students onto the streets to take part in the march were proof 
of the march’s orchestration by the government and its business supporters.10 The involvement 
of several FTUC leaders in the march underlined the divisiveness inherent in corporatist politics. 
The government’s monopolization of public media and the power of adverse, anti-union 
propaganda which dominated the press 11 ensured that a counter-march, organized by the 
FWW&SU ten days later, drew only a small crowd.
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The political campaign against the FWW&SU was escalated by the government’s resort 
to the law. Just days before the arbitration case was due to begin, Veitata and eight other leaders 
of the FWW&SU were served with charges under the Trades Disputes Act.12 In protest, Veitata 
pulled the dockers out on a strike, alleging that the government seemed more interested in 
prosecuting the union’s leaders than in the arbitration.13 Veitata’s subsequent arrest and 
detention in custody provoked Tora, two days later, to call the FS&GWU out on a sympathy 
strike. Tora and seven other officials of the FS&GWU were themselves then arrested and charged 
with offences under the Sugar Industry Act
The government’s resort to using repressive anti-labour legislation enacted years earlier, 
but never invoked until now, reflected its determination to crush political opposition before the 
September elections, while enforcing a climate of public opinion that favoured the new tripartite 
arrangement and spumed labour militancy. Neither of the trade union leaders received any 
sympathy from the press. On the contrary, they were both accused by the Fiji Times of staging 
"politically-motivated” strikes (FT 5.8.77) and the newspaper became the main vehicle for anti­
union and pro-government propaganda.14 The newspaper was also the means by which 
orchestrated public outrage over the strike, which culminated in Leibling Marlowe’s 
‘spontaneous’ march, was expressed. The deliberate escalation of the FWW&SU dispute through 
an intensive propaganda campaign against ‘enemies’ within and outside Fiji, also paved the way 
for ‘justified’ use of the law both against Veitata and Tora.
The Alliance government certainly made political capital of the dockworkers’ strike. By
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casting the FWW&SU in the image of a seditious organization conspiring against the people of 
Fiji, Mara whipped up a unifying nationalist fervour which provided both justification and a 
cover for eliminating its two main political rivals. Veitata’s public vilification as an anti­
nationalist, and his prosecution and incarceration (for six months) for offences under the Trade 
Disputes Act politically neutralised him, as was intended.15 The prosecution of Veitata, like that 
of the FNP leader, Sakeasi Butadroka (who by September had been gaoled for offences under 
the Public Order Act) was expected to keep the FNP out of the September elections altogether 
(Naidu 1988: 258).16 Although Tora was not actually gaoled until after the elections (on 
October 11 for 12 months) his detention in custody during the elections deterred him from 
gaining political support.17
Veitata’s goaling was followed by the suspension of FWW&SU’s registration for failing 
to submit annual accounts. This further use of the law against the union, despite the facts that 
police were still in possession of all its records (having seized them in a raid on the union’s 
offices), and that the trial and subsequent gaoling of union leaders had made it difficult to comply 
with the law, was evidently punitive.
The prosecution, conviction and imprisonment of leaders of the FWW&SU and the 
FS&GWU under the Trades Disputes and Sugar Industry Acts represented the severest crackdown 
by the state on militant unionists in Fiji’s labour history. Primarily aimed at subduing and 
neutralising Veitata and Tora, the crackdown represented both a punitive response to dissident 
Fijian labour militants considered responsible for the Alliance’s electoral defeat in early 1977 and
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a determination to contain labour militancy in crucial, state-managed industries which were 
critical to the interests of the state and its beneficiaries.18 The threats posed to the chiefly- 
dominated state by dissident Fijian labour militants aligned to rival political parties and 
controlling unions in state-run enterprises made it imperative that they be severely dealt with. The 
severity of the crackdown also suggested a concern to crush commoner Fijian leaders opposed 
to the status quo of the chiefly-dominated post-colonial state. It was this configuration of interests 
that lay behind the establishment of the Tripartite Forum, the institution of the Wage Guideline 
and the state’s harsh crackdown on Tora and Veitata. Against the ‘national development’ rhetoric 
of tripartism and its emphasis on responsible unionism, and with the FTUC as a partner, the 
crackdown could be justified as a necessary holding to account of irresponsible, and indeed 
subversive, unionists who were putting national interests at risk, rather than as political 
victimization of non-Alliance labour leaders.
The government’s more covert repression of labour militancy at the Vatukoula mines the 
same year, and its apparent sympathy with the mineworkers, provides a useful contrast in 
containment strategies. Although the Fiji Mineworkers’ Union (FMU) also engaged in strike 
action to try to compel the Emperor Goldmining Company (EGM) to accede to its wage 
demands, this union did not constitute a direct threat to the Alliance government, as the mining 
industry was not state-managed and the FMU leader was politically affiliated to the Alliance 
Party. The strategy of containing labour militancy in the mining industry had to be, and was, 
both more covert and duplicitous. As we shall see from a brief consideration of the handling of 
the FMU strike of 1977, the consequences proved ultimately more devastating for
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mineworkers.19
As events turned out, the Alliance government’s repressive strategy in 1977 proved 
effective in bringing to heel Fijian political dissidents in the trade union movement. Both Tora 
and Veitata later capitulated to the forces of Fijian conservatism and eventually abandoned trade 
unionism completely. Tora’s desertion took place soon after his release from gaol.20 A bitter 
split between Tora and Dinsukh Lai Morarji, a younger labour militant in charge of the powerful 
Qantas Salaried Staff Association, whose members controlled ground handling operations at Nadi 
Airport, resulted in Morarji’s defection with several other FCTU affiliates to the FTUC (Howard 
1984). The disaffiliation of the FS&GWU in 1979, after Tora lost control of its leadership, put 
the final nail in the FCTU’s coffin (Kumar 1974:39) and it was disbanded shortly afterwards. 
Having lost his trade union base and with the faction of the NFP which he supported now 
marginalised politically,21 Tora cultivated relations with the Alliance Party whose leadership was 
more than happy to accept him. He became a Vice President of the Fijian Association, stood as 
an Alliance candidate in the 1982 elections and was given a ministerial portfolio in the 
subsequent Alliance government.
Veitata’s co-option took a rather different form. His union was firstly offered shares in 
the Sofrana shipping company and Veitata, as union representative, became a member of the 
Board of Directors of the company. He further benefitted from Alliance patronage when he was 
made a member of the PAF Board. The conflict of interests that this engendered effectively 
neutralised him as a militant. Ten years after their challenge of the post-colonial state in 1977,
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Tora and Veitata reappeared as militant ethno-nationalists whose campaign of destabilizing the 
first non-Alliance government (a Coalition of the FTUC- sponsored Fiji Labour Party and the 
NFP) provided the pretext for the military coup of 1987.22
We turn now to look at the tripartite years and particularly at the operation of the wage 
guidelines and their effects on wage movements in the period 1978 - 1984. I then discuss the 
growing polarisation within the Tripartite Forum between organised labour and the state and look 
particularly at the confrontation that was forced to a head between the government and the FPSA 
in 1984. It was this conflict in the main, between the state as employer and the largest, and by 
then most powerful and militant, trade union which precipitated the government’s dismantling 
of the Forum.
Contradictions and Effects of the Tripartite Forum
In 1984, the Fiji Employment & Development Mission (FEDM) extolled the virtues of 
the Tripartite Forum, saying it
must be judged a considerable success in a world where the need for incomes 
policy is widely acknowledged, but where examples of its successful 
implementation are few (FEDM Report, 1984:286).
The FEDM noted that despite its remarkable success, the system had "come under severe strain
in recent years". It attributed two out of three "threats" to the Forum to employers (which
included the state). In the Mission’s view, employers threatened the system in two ways. There
were those who sought to break the power of trade unions and wanted to impose a legislated
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wage freeze; and there were the "new businesses" which were opposed to unionization and 
evaded wage and industrial safety regulations. The third threat, in the Mission’s view, came from 
Fiji’s "deteriorating economic circumstances" which it said made "even modest wage 
claims...excessive" (FEDM 1984:286).
The FEDM assessment highlighted in a nutshell the main contradiction in the corporatist 
arrangement which, by 1984, had become all too apparent.23 This contradiction was that the 
tripartite machinery had served to strengthen rather than constrain trade unions, especially in their 
pursuit of wage increases. The setting of national wage guidelines, although aimed at controlling 
wages, worked in effect to practically guarantee annual wage increases in line with cost of living 
rises. Unions sought annual wage increases up to the guideline as a matter of right. This did not 
present a major problem until after 1981 when such increases coincided with a falling national 
income (FEDM 1984). With deteriorating terms of trade in the early 1980’s, annual increases 
in the government wage bill came to be strongly resisted. A growing tension within the Tripartite 
Forum, primarily between labour and the state-as-employer, became evident. The artifact of the 
Alliance government, the Tripartite Forum became the proverbial albatross around its neck and 
the wage freeze imposed at the end of 1984 represented the state’s forcible and unilateral 
resolution of this contradiction.
The contradiction arose from the corporatist arrangement itself and particularly from the 
false premise on which it was based, which was that organised labour and the state had a mutual 
interest in maintaining the Tripartite Forum. Implicit in this assumption was a denial of the
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primarily short-term political objectives that lay behind the Forum’s institution as far as both the 
FTUC and the government were concerned. In fact, once these short-term interests were served, 
the Forum began to be related to by organised labour and the state in fundamentally different 
ways, reflecting the fundamentally opposed interests of workers and employers. The FTUC began 
to effectively use its bargaining power within the Forum to advance the interests of organised 
labour. This meant resisting government appeals to the unions to sacrifice or forgo wage 
increases in the national interest. The matter of wage restraint became increasingly critical to the 
state in the 1980’s as Fiji entered a recession. Finding itself unable to persuade its labour partners 
within the Forum, the government became uninterested in consensus politics.
Yet, to be fair to the FTUC, nothing in any of the statements made by the FTUC in its 
early appeals for the establishment of a tripartite relationship suggested that wage restraint was 
what it would trade with the government for exclusive participation in a formal tripartite 
arrangement. Raman later claimed that the agreement to accept voluntary wage restrictions was 
made following:
"a serious look at statistics by Forum partners which revealed a definite decline 
in employment levels as well as stagnating investment".
Explaining FTUC’s consent to wage restrictions, Raman said:
By mid-April, 1977 it was resolved that voluntary restrictions on pay increases 
would assist the situation and the workers’ side reluctantly agreed to consider 
this in exchange for undertakings from the employers for maintaining 
employment at current levels while government was expected to review the system 
of taxation and provide some relief. (Report of September 9,1977 to ICFTU/APRO 
op.cit.).24
Two points are noteworthy in Raman’s explanation: firstly, the initial reluctance on the
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part of FTUC leaders to agree to wage restrictions suggests that they did not expect this to be 
their part of the bargain. As such, the FTUC’s commitment to wage restraint might have been 
expected to be partial and qualified - being dependent on its appraisal of the non-remunerative 
gains to be made by labour in exchange for such restraint. The facts that the primary function 
of the Forum became one of establishing annual wage guidelines (Howard 1984:7) and that the 
FTUC engaged in hard-bargaining with its tripartite partners each year before reaching agreement 
on the guideline, makes the factor of FTUC’s commitment to wage restraint a significant one.
Secondly, the state’s portrayal as an independent third party, mediating in the capital- 
labour relation ignores the particular interest of the state as employer in wage restraint.25 
Although wage restraint was undoubtably to be in capital’s favour since it would minimize the 
wage demands of a number of leading militant unions controlling industries in the private sector 
(eg. FO&AWU and the Airline Workers Union), it was also in the interests of the state as 
employer. Significantly, it was the state, not capital, which in 1977 had a direct and urgent 
interest in restraining wages especially in industries which it managed and which had come under 
the control of labour militants. From 1982, it was the state, and not capital, that organised labour 
found itself at loggerheads with over the matter of wage restraint. We turn now to consider the 
effects that the guidelines had on wage movements between 1978 and 1982.
The Wage Guidelines 1978 - 1982
The 1978 Tripartite Agreement set a 7 per cent across the board wage ceiling within
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which unions were free to negotiate increases. The two-year agreement for 1979/1980 similarly 
set an across the board wage ceiling of 7 per cent. In 1981 however, out of concern for the 
growing wage discrepancies that across the board increases were causing, three ceilings were 
fixed to allow poorer paid workers to negotiate for higher increases.26 The average increase 
allowed for the year was 10.8 per cent. In addition, the 1981 agreement allowed unions whose 
workers earned $1.11 or less an hour to negotiate further increases to bring their wages up to 
$1.27 an hour in 1981. This was aimed at "narrowing the gap between unskilled categories of 
workers" (Agreement on Voluntary Guidelines for 1981). In 1982, a 10 per cent wage ceiling 
(across the board) was agreed to and unions whose members were earning $1.27 or less were free 
to further negotiate increases to take them up to a basic wage of $1.40 an hour. The 1983 
agreement again set several wage ceilings for different categories of workers and made the same 
special provision for lower-paid unskilled workers.27 The average increase allowed in this year 
was 5.3 per cent.
From the following table it can be seen that in the seven year period 1977-1983 then, the 
guidelines set by the Forum’s Remuneration Guideline Committee sanctioned a 57.1 per cent 
wage increase overall. In the same period inflation increased overall by 60.3 per cent. In four of 
those seven years, the guidelines actually fell slightly below the rate of inflation, as the following 
table shows. According to the Fiji Employment & Development Mission, the effect of the method 
of determining the wage guideline - using the previous year’s rate of inflation - was that it 
produced "real wage increases when inflation is falling, and wage reductions when it is rising" 
(1984:226). Thus, the Mission explained, "when inflation accelerated after 1978, real wages fell,
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only to rise again after 1981, with the renewed decline in the rate of inflation" (Ibid). The facts, 
pointed out by the FEDM, that up until 1981 wage costs did not rise (1984;227) and that real 
disposable incomes from wages and salaries fell by 4% between 1975 and 1981 (1984:219),
suggest that until 1981, the Tripartite Forum was functioning well insofar as the interests of
employers (including the state as employer) were concerned.
R em uneration G u id e lin es  and R ate o f i n f 1a t io n  1977-1983
Year . RGC G u id e lin e s { % ) In fla tio n (% )
1977 10 7.0'
1978 • • 7 ' •Xo.tlSIC ' ■ . 6 .1  '•
197 9 ::A • 7 • 7 .7  • .
. . . • 1980 ' . IllI:::li!lll*lBlllII 14. 5
1$81 10 . 8 11. 2
1982 ' ■ 10 7 . 0 .  • MMfl Hl
; -.:1983::S;;| 5 .3 6 .8
• Total':#'-: : 57 . 1
S o u r c e : Think F i j i F ir s t ,  A Wage G u id e lin e  fo r  1986,
• Government P u b lic a t io n .
The interests of militant blue-collar unions were not as well served by the Tripartite 
Forum. Although wage increases up to the maximum allowed by the guideline were easily won 
by larger, stronger unions, especially those in the public sector and in foreign-owned industries 
in the private sector (Howard 1984:8), the guidelines operated to restrain what would otherwise 
almost certainly have been higher wage demands, especially by the latter. Columbus’s complaints 
that the Forum "really buggered" the oilworkers bears this out. Since, according to Columbus, 
the oil companies in the past had not been averse to granting the FO&AWU the wage increases
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it sought for its members, it is very likely that the oilworkers lost more than any other category 
of workers through the Tripartite Forum. Other militant unions like the FWW&SU, the FS&GWU 
and the various airline workers’ unions were similarly constrained by the guidelines and by the 
entire tripartite machinery, which induced moderation and non-conflictual industrial relations.28 
These unions were also now fettered by the incursions into industry made by the state, which 
meant that they now had to negotiate directly with the state-as-employer, whose interests as 
employer ran counter to their own.29 The polarisation within the Forum between organised 
labour and the state that this engendered, particularly after 1981 when the post-colonial state (as 
employer) began to strongly resist the demands for wage/salary increases, especially those made 
by the largest and most powerful public sector union, is what we now turn to consider.
Our focus is on the conflict that emerged between the Fiji Public Service Association 
(FPSA) and the government. This conflict exposed the major contradiction in the corporatist 
arrangement and it was primarily to forestall further public sector wage and salary increases 
demanded by the FPSA that the government imposed a wage freeze late in 1984, thereby 
effectively disbanding the Tripartite Forum.
The Ascendancy of the FPSA and the State/Labour Conflict of the 1980’s
Described in 1984 by Howard (1984:10) as "the most important union in Fiji", FPSA 
became the major (labour) protagonist in the state/labour conflict that began festering in the early 
1980’s. The fact that a formerly conservative white collar union of civil servants rose to oppose
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the Alliance-controlled state within the Tripartite accord period seems paradoxical. Leckie’s 
history of the FPSA (formed in 1943 by disgruntled European and local civil servants whom the 
colonial government had not classified within the senior division of the service when 
implementing the controversial "Barton" report) notes the "striking feature of (its) leadership" in 
the 1960’s - that many of them later assumed senior positions in the civil service or become key 
figures in the post-colonial government (1986; 1988; 1991).30 As Leckie later makes clear, the 
striking feature was the extent to which the FPSA, in the decade before independence, coopted 
members of the emerging Fijian (chiefly) elite which was then being groomed to take over 
political leadership, knowing they had influence and could easily deal with the colonial 
government. For most of its early life, FPSA perceived itself as less a trade union than a 
professional organization (Leckie 1991). The post-independence expansion of the public sector 
dramatically increased the FPSA’s membership (from 3,448 at the end of 1972 to 6,545 in 1979), 
making it the largest single union in Fiji. Even so, until the mid-1970’s, the union was still very 
passive. So much so, that its application for membership of the FTUC in the early 1970’s was 
at first spurned by leading militants.31 The FPSA was accepted into the FTUC in 1973 and the 
identification with the wider trade union movement that this engendered significantly changed 
its "essentially moderate, loyal" image and saw it adopt a "far more aggressive approach" (Leckie 
1986:30).
In November 1973, in their first ever strike (to enforce a claim for increased wages which 
the government had indicated it would not pay), FPSA members in the civil service refused to 
answer calls or process any work for the government (Leckie 1991). The action was successful -
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an arbitration court awarded them a salary increase. Almost annually, after 1976, the FPSA 
successfully backed its wage and salary claims by strike threats. The strategic use of strike 
threats - no general civil service wide strike ever occurred - to back the "carefully documented 
and strongly argued submissions" which won the FPSA its cases (Leckie 1991), lent a militant 
image to a union which had proved itself masterly at negotiating. The FPSA’s industrial 
successes were rewarded with greatly expanded membership, which augmented its financial 
resources, making it the most affluent of all trade unions in the country. By 1975 it had a full 
time secretariat and, by the end of 1979, its accumulated funds stood at $482,727, and it was 
handling more grievances per year (248 in 1983) than any other union in the country (Howard 
1984).
By the early 1980’s, the FPSA was playing a key role in both the FTUC and in the 
Tripartite Forum, and was showing a more militant face. Indeed, it may be said that the FPSA 
assumed the mantle of militancy earlier worn by blue-collar unions under the leadership of 
militants such as Tora and Veitata, who had by now been effectively coopted. In 1982, following 
the dismissal of five staff, FPSA members employed in the National Marketing Authority (NMA) 
forcibly took over the NMA offices in what was described by the press as "an act of anarchy" 
(Howard 1984). The FPSA also called a work-to-rule slowdown in the Ports Authority in the 
same year. In October 1983 and again in July 1984, FPSA strikes by civil aviation workers 
forced a closure of Fiji’s international airport. The growing militancy and power of FPSA 
exposed the main contradiction in the Tripartite accord and precipitated an unprecedented conflict 
between organised labour and the post-colonial state.
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By 1982, the recession that hit the Fiji economy after a brief boom in 1979 and 1980, was 
evident in the virtual freeze on hiring in the civil service, the "substantial reduction" in the 
government’s unestablished workforce, and rationalisations in the private sector that entailed the 
laying off of large numbers of workers (Howard 1991:148). When, in May that year, during the 
annual tripartite talks to set a wage ceiling for 1983, Prime Minister Mara proposed a wage 
freeze, FECA, and later the National Federation Party (NFP), supported the proposal, arguing that 
wage increases, even within the limits of the guideline, had caused discrepancies between urban 
wage workers and non-waged, rural dwellers and were causing hardship for companies facing 
financial difficulty (Howard 1991). The simultaneous concern for the incongruent interests of 
non-waged rural dwellers and struggling companies became the mainspring of official 
justifications for the wage freeze, when it was later imposed. Although the Fiji Employment and 
Development Mission later confirmed that wage differentials between organised and non- 
organised workers had widened dramatically after 1980 (1984:228), it also made the point that 
far from "appropriating an inordinate share of the benefits of material growth" in earlier years 
(1984:219), wage earners actually took much of the strain imposed by the economic downturn 
between 1979 and 1981 (1984;228). 32 As such, the arguments of the FPSA’s militant General 
Secretary since 1970, Mahendra Chaudhry, who publicly rejected the 1982 wage freeze proposal, 
appeared justified.
Chaudhry alleged that workers were being asked to make sacrifices while employers 
enjoyed uncurtailed profits. More significantly, in what was perhaps the first public expression 
of trade union disaffection with the corporatist arrangement, Chaudhry called the Tripartite Forum
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a "vehicle for restraining the incomes of workers" (Fiji Times 9.5.82). This bitter response from
the FPSA leader to the government’s proposal highlighted the government’s probable purpose 
in proposing a wage freeze - to forestall the implementation of a Public Service Review Team’s 
Report (the Nicol-Hurst Report), which was to take effect from January 1983, and to avert cost 
of living adjustments to civil servants salaries for 1983, both of which were estimated to incur 
a further $10 to $20 million in the government wage bill (Howard 1985). In short, the concern 
was to avoid the consequences of a significantly increased wage and salary bill for the state. By 
1983, wages and salaries (personal emoluments) totalled F$38 million and comprised about 45% 
of the government’s annual expenditure (Howard 1984:10). As the conflict between FPSA and 
the government over the implementation of the Nicol-Hurst recommendations deepened, the 
FPSA made the decision, in December 1982, to go on strike.
Meanwhile, a general election in July 1982, which had seen a strong (albeit late) coalition 
between a resuscitated NFP 3j and a newly-formed, Western-based ethnic Fijian party (the 
Western United Front-WUF) put up a strong challenge to the Alliance Party, had resulted in an 
unequivocal electoral victory for the Alliance. Nevertheless, the coalition’s eleventh-hour 
dissemination of an Australian television (Four Corners) news programme which exposed the 
Alliance’s commissioning of a secret election strategy paper by Australian political and business 
consultants made it a close call for the Alliance. Only artful manipulation of the politically- 
damaging programme for its own ends and a politically unsophistocated electorate saved the party 
from what might otherwise have been a mortal blow. Now, with 28 seats in hand (out of 52) - 
two short of the 30 Ratu Mara insisted his party be given or else he would resign (Fiji Times
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18.7.82) - the new Alliance government (still under the leadership of Mara) was prepared to 
show far less tolerance of any opposition and a greater inclination to subjugate, rather than 
negotiate with, opponents.
In May 1983, the FPSA declared a dispute over the Nicol-Hurst issue. In August,
following an agreement to go to arbitration, the government asked civil servants to forgo the
COLA agreed to during the June 1982 talks of the Forum, claiming its inability to pay the $4.5
million involved (Howard 1991:150). Chaudhry refused, saying that the guideline agreed to for
1983 had shown considerable restraint, and adding that a third of the money would return to the
government in taxes (Howard 1991:150). According to Howard (1991:149),
Chaudhry had argued for some time that Fiji’s relatively high wages had 
contributed to economic growth and favoured expansionary economic policies on 
the part of the government.
The FTUC now came out in support of the FPSA, with Raman accusing those advocating a wage 
freeze (which included FECA) of making workers the "whipping boy" for factors for which they 
were not responsible (FT 13.9.83).
Contrary to both Chaudhry’s and Raman’s views, however, external advisors to the 
Alliance government were arguing forcefully that upward wage movements resulting from 
tripartite wage agreements were exacerbating Fiji’s budgetary and external imbalances, that public 
sector wages in particular were too high, and that Fiji’s wage policy needed to be adjusted to a 
less favourable world economic environment. The role played by IMF advisors in particular, both 
in prompting the government to take decisive action to counter pressures from the unions (and
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especially the FPSA), and in providing economic justification for doing so, was significant. 
Indeed, the government’s surprise announcement of the wage freeze in November 1984, "without 
any prior warning" (Howard 1991:152), came a year after it was actually discussed with IMF 
economic advisors. And, in announcing the wage freeze, the Minister for Finance quoted from 
an IMF report that stated that Fiji salaries were 15% too high (Howard 1991:152).
The Role of the IMF
In its various confidential reports to the Fiji government since 1977 (when IMF missions 
first began visiting Fiji), the IMF had consistently argued that Fiji’s high wage costs posed a 
major constraint to its economic development From 1983, when the agency began to send annual 
missions, the government’s wage policy became the central issue addressed by IMF teams. While 
acknowledging the contribution that the Tripartite Forum had made to slowing the fast growth 
in real wages that had characterised the period 1973-76, the 1983 IMF Report held the Tripartite 
Forum responsible for the "higher than warranted" (by the underlying economic situation) real 
wage increases since 1977, which were the product of annual wage guidelines that ‘persistently 
compensated" wage earners for rises in import prices (IMF Report 1983; 10).34 While discussing 
the "complex issue" of wage and salary adjustments in the public sector and noting the pressures 
on the government to meet substantial wage and salary increases for public sector workers (as 
a consequence of the 6% wage guideline for 1983, a likely further 10% following arbitration on 
Nicol-Hurst dispute, and an earlier agreement to backdate the award), the report disclosed that 
if a new understanding could not be reached with the unions on wage restraint, and
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pressures remained excessive, the government would consider the imposition of 
a wage freeze for up to two years in order to safeguard the fiscal and external 
payments position (IMF Staff Report for the 1983 Article IV Consultation;! 1).
It added that the Minister of Finance possessed the authority, under the Counter Inflation Act, 
to issue an order controlling wages throughout the economy for an indefinite period. The IMF 
team expressed the view that such "decisive action" was necessary, or else cutbacks in public 
sector employment might "become inevitable to preserve appropriate fiscal discipline". It also 
advised altering "the institutional arrangements for wage determination so that higher import 
prices are not reflected in wage increases".35
That the IMF considered public sector wage increases excessive and unwarranted, and the
Tripartite Forum’s procedures for wage fixation the underlying fault, was made even more
explicit in a special paper entitled Wage Developments in Fiji 1970-1984 that the IMF presented
to the Fiji government in October 1984. Arguing that
the protection of real wages through indexation in recent years while incomes in 
the sugar sector have fallen and industrial costs have risen have contributed to 
Fiji’s budgetary and external imbalances
the report claimed that "since 1977, real wages of central government employees [had] increased 
substantially faster than the wages of other employees". Government employees, the report said, 
had not only been "partially protected from the decline in real private sector wages that occurred 
in 1980-81", but increases awarded to government workers in recent years had accentuated the 
difficulties of the sugar sector, which had been hit by declining world prices between 1981-84, 
incurring losses for the state-owned FSC in 1983-84. Outlining the budgetary implications of 
wage and salary increases for public sector workers, the report went on to say
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the growth in wage and salary payments has been a major contributing factor to 
the deterioration in the Central Government budgetary position in recent years.
Wages and salaries increased to 53% of government current expenditure and 44% 
of government total expenditure in 1984. In terms of GDP, the government wage 
and salary bill rose from 10% in 1981 to 13% in 1984. The increase in the 
government wage bill accounts for the bulk of government spending in relation 
to GDP in these years (p7).
The report estimated that the "exceptional increases" that government employees had been 
awarded (through the Nicol-Hurst Review) meant an increase of 17% for government employees 
in the 1982-84 period, compared with an increase of 5% for all employees (pp6-7).
By the time this IMF report was presented to the government (in October 1984), the 
FPSA had successfully pressured the government to meet backpay obligations for January and 
February 1984 (which were paid in March) - with the rest to be paid "in installments in cash and 
government bonds" - and had won its case for COLA (for 1983) which had gone before the 
Tripartite Forum’s own Inability to Pay Committee in August (Howard 1991;151). With the 1984 
COLA yet to be implemented, the state was in a critical situation. In the words of Howard 
(1991:151):
The unions clearly had outmanoeuvred the government. As unionists proved 
increasingly adept at using the [tripartite] system, the government seemed to be 
changing its mind about its utility (Howard 1991:151)
Dismantling the Tripartite Forum
The announcement by the Minister for Finance, during his budget speech of November 
9, 1984, of an immediate wage freeze which, the Minister claimed, would "save the government 
$14 million, reduce the level of imports and contribute to economic recovery" (Howard 1991; 152)
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signified the ultimate power of the state over labour. The immediate and outraged reaction that 
it drew from the FTUC leaders signalled the beginning of the end of the state/labour accord as 
far as the FTUC was concerned. Chaudhry called the freeze "a stab in the back" as it flew in the 
face of the tripartite accord and contravened the 1984 COLA agreement which had been signed 
by Prime Minister Mara (Howard 1991:152). Chaudhry accused the government of helping 
manufacturers "line their pockets" and of "making a complete mockery of the 1984 Tripartite 
Forum Agreement" (Howard 1991). When informal talks sought by Raman with Mara proved 
unsuccessful, the FTUC decided to call a series of public meetings to discuss a proposed general 
strike to protest the wage freeze.
Mara’s address to Parliament shortly afterwards, reaffirming support for the Tripartite 
Forum, while confirming the wage freeze, only angered the FTUC more, since the government 
had not even discussed the freeze with its labour partners in the Forum. When Raman announced 
that FTUC would not participate in the Forum while a freeze was in place (Ibid), the government 
responded by proposing an ‘economic summit’ for February 1985, to which trade unions would 
be invited to participate, a proposal which only drew scorn from the FTUC, which decided, in 
response, to call a national strike (Howard 1991:152). As the FTUC proceeded to hold public 
meetings around the country to discuss the freeze and plans for a week-long national strike, 
scheduled to start on February 12, the government reacted. In a news conference, Mara called 
the proposed strike a threat against his government and said to break the strike he would be ready 
to proclaim an emergency, "require the help of the disciplined forces (the army and police) and 
as other options might sack civil servants en masse and, where possible, deregister unions"
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(Islands Business, February 1985; 14). Then, in an effort to win over public opinion and assume
the moral highground, Mara also launched a propaganda campaign with the printing and
distribution of a glossy broadsheet aimed at justifying the wage freeze to the public at large.
Headed "Think Fiji First" and "Why a Wage Freeze Will Help our Country", and featuring
touching photographs of rural workers, the broadsheet proclaimed
In recent weeks, the Government and people of Fiji have witnessed a growing 
threat to thecountry from a planned national strike. A group of union leaders have 
attacked the government’s plans to improve Fiji’s financial position. They are 
opposing moves to make more money available for helping the poor, the 
unemployed and the struggling farmers. They have insulted the Prime Minister, 
one of the greatest supporters of the unions. In their campaign against the 
government, they hope to cripplethe nation by calling a national strike. After that 
they want to take over the Government of the country by forming a Labour Party 
(Think Fiii First n.d.)
By portraying the FTUC as a "selfish minority intent on bolstering its own interests by opposing 
moves to help the poor, the unemployed and the struggling farmers"(Islands Business, February 
1985)", and using the analogy of Fiji as a family (with the government as its head), the 
propaganda sheet justified the government’s use of its "legal powers" to enforce "a plan for 
improving the family finances" so that "the less fortunate brothers and sisters would have an 
opportunity to improve their income" (Think Fiji First). The broadsheet discussed, in some 
detail, Fiji’s balance of payments problem and the danger of "becoming bankrupt", arguing that 
it was better to make adjustments now than to be forced to do so, later, by the IMF.
Although the FTUC’s national strike plans were effectively abandonned when two 
cyclones struck later in January, government’s plans for a national economic summit in February 
went ahead. Two hundred delegates, including trade unions representatives from the FTUC, were
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invited to take part. The FTUC announced that it would not attend the summit but would hold
its own summit (which it did, in May 1985). The National Economic Summit (NES) served as
another legitimating exercise in which the government justified the wage freeze as necessary to
ensure that the benefits of development were spread more evenly amongst the people. In a paper
entitled The Wage Freeze: Summary of Government Position, that portrayed a picture of wage
and salary earners doing well while fanners and other, weaker sections of the society suffered,
it emphasised the government’s responsibilities:
The government knew a freeze would not necessarily be popular in some quarters.
But governments must govern. A government cannot abdicate or ignore its 
responsibilities just because a policy may not be popular. (NES Information Paper, 
January 1985).
Claiming that it had consulted the FTUC on the wage freeze, but that its arguments had "seemed
to fall on deaf ears", the government paper went on:
The government believes in the processes of consultation and dialogue. But in 
following these principles it does not forfeit the right, indeed the responsibility, 
to exercise its authority in a way it believes is in the best interests of the nation 
and particularly the weakest within it
The Formation of the Fiji Labour Party
Meanwhile, at the first of the FTUC’s public meetings, in Lautoka, on December 5 1984, 
Chaudhry and other FTUC leaders had raised the idea of forming a Labour Party to counter the 
"ganging up of the government and the opposition against workers" (Howard 1991:154). 
Although Raman, who had long been an Alliance supporter initially demurred, pressure from 
within his own union and from other FTUC leaders nudged him towards supporting the idea of
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the party’s formation (Howard 1991:154). An executive meeting of the FTUC on December 15
unanimously endorsed the proposal and directed the FTUC’s Management Board to draw up a
party manifesto in time for the FTUC biennial conference in May 1986. Seven months later, on
July 6 1985, the Fiji Labour Party was formally launched. In his address to party members, the
new party’s president, Dr Timoci Bavadra explained the party’s formation:
As the economic crisis worsened through the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, the 
unions tried their best to work with the government in seeking equitable solutions.
The unilateral imposition of the wage freeze last year indicated clearly that the 
government was no longer willing to discuss matters with the representatives of 
the working people of Fiji. As responsible trade unionists, we felt compelled to 
react strongly to government policies that threaten the wellbeing of our members 
and, in fact,of all Fijians [sic]. We recognised that it was time for the working 
people of Fiji to form their own political party rather than continue to rely on the 
goodwill of existing political parties that increasingly had demonstrated that they 
represented only the narrowest of interests" (cited in Sutherland 1992:175).
The party’s formation, and its subsequent victory in Suva City Council elections in 
November the same year, and unexpectedly good performance in a by-election for a 
parliamentary seat in December (in which it polled better than the NFP, losing to the Alliance 
by only 241 votes), sent alarm bells ringing. In June 1986, the governmment announced that it 
was withdrawing the ‘sole recognition’ (as the ‘official representative body of the trade unions 
and organised labour’) it had extended to the FTUC in 1973, and advised the FTUC that it would 
no longer appoint their nominees to boards or committees or consult it on any important 
industrial issue. Under the tripartite arrangement, the government appointed FTUC and FECA 
nominees on a range of tripartite boards and councils, including the Labour Advisory Board, 
seven Wages Councils, the Fiji National Training Council and the Trade Union Advisory Council, 
as well as the various subcommittees of these bodies (FT 13.6.86). Explaining the decision, the
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chief labour officer said:
Government is of the view that ...office-bearers of the Congress have become 
active participants in an opposing political party and as the boards, councils and 
committees must be an integral part of and not be in conflict with the policies of 
the Government, those whose interests are in opposition to Government policy 
cannot be represented on these bodies (FT 13.6.86).
This final nail in the Tripartite Forum coffin drew an angry reaction from the FTUC 
whose leaders accused the government of trying to ‘punish’ FTUC for the formation of the FLP 
(FT 14.6.86) and frighten unions away from supporting it (FT 22.6.86).
Employers, meanwhile, seemed unperturbed at the raging conflict between the government
and the FTUC. FECA's boss, Ken Roberts, dismissed suggestions that the government might also
withdraw recognition of FECA, on the grounds that FECA represented only a very small sector
of the business community saying this was unlikely as:
We support tripartism and we have seen its result in a satisfactory form of 
industrial relations... (Fiji Times 13.6.86).
The suggestion in this comment that the FTUC had departed from the spirit of the tripartite 
accord, resulting in the withdrawal of government recognition, was made plainer in the FECA’s 
boss’s next sentence, which revealed acceptance, both of the government’s action and of its right 
so to act:
It is rather sad that the labour leg of this tripartite stool has to be removed at this 
stage (Ibid;emphasis added).
The amputation of the ‘labour leg’ of the ‘tripartite stool’ formally dissolved the tripartite 
accord and the entire tripartite machinery established in 1977 between the Alliance government, 
the FTUC and FECA and ushered in a new, and conflict-ridden, era in labour/state relations in
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Fiji; an era that began with the election of an FLP (in coalition with the NFP) government in 
April 1987, and its subsequent overthrow in a military coup, less than a month later.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that the Tripartite Forum was a strategic arrangement, 
primarily bom of the (separate) political interests of both a section of organised labour and the 
post-colonial state. The FTUC’s interest in entering an exclusive corporatist arrangement with 
the government had to do with its need for recognition and legitimacy given the emergence of 
a rival peak organisation of militant unions. The state’s primary motive in instituting the 
Tripartite machinery was equally political and had to do with eroding the power of militant 
unionists who threatened the political status quo both by their ability to win large wage demands 
and by their political appeal (as Fijian union politicians) to an urban, Fijian working class 
constituency. Recalcitrant Fijian labour leaders aligned to rival political parties presented a 
political threat to the ruling Alliance Party which had monopolised the post-colonial state since 
independence, encouraging disaffection among urban workers, and especially among commoner 
Fijians which undoubtedly translated into support for alternative political parties. The unexpected 
defeat of the Alliance government in the general elections of April 1977 left no doubt about the 
political implications of mobilising disgruntled Fijian workers for the chiefly-led Alliance 
government. The creation of the Forum between the two general elections of 1977 enabled an 
interim (Alliance) government whose legitimacy was in question to move against key political 
opponents under the guise of cracking down on subversive labour militants.
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Through the new tripartite machinery, the Alliance-controlled state successfully put paid 
to its political rivals and defeated both blue-collar militancy and the FTUC’s challenger, the 
FCTU. Ironically, however, the Tripartite Forum came to strengthen the Alliance government’s 
moderate trade union partners. It was this contradiction, inherent in the corporatist arrangement, 
that led to the Alliance government’s abandonment of the Tripartite Forum in 1985. The 
contradiction had first begun to manifest itself towards the end of the 1970’s but, by 1984, it was 
presenting a serious problem for the post-colonial state. Tripartism had particularly strengthened 
white collar unions representing public sector employees. It was the FPSA in particular which 
by the early 1980’s had come to dominate the Forum and demonstrate increasing militancy in 
pursuit of their wage demands. The wage demands of the FPSA directly challenged the state as 
employer and aggravated the economic crisis now facing the post-colonial state. Persuaded by 
the arguments of the IMF that wages and salaries of Fiji workers were 15% too high, that the 
tripartite system was working to the particular advantage of public sector workers, and that 
"government influence [was] necessary to force more realistic thinking about what is possible in 
the way of national wage increases" given Fiji’s stagnant economy (FT 17.4.76), the government 
began to take steps towards dismantling the tripartite mechanism. The process of dismantling the 
Tripartite Forum which began with the imposition of the wage freeze in December, was 
completed with the withdrawal of the state’s recognition of FTUC as the official representative 
of the trade unions and organised labour.
Although in many respects the Tripartite Forum certainly did represent the crowning 
achievement in the post-colonial state’s strategy of cooption, its effectiveness as a co-optive
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strategy was extremely short-lived. Certainly it achieved its original purpose in eliminating the 
problem of militant unionism that posed such a threat to the Alliance government in the 1970’s. 
Only five years later, however, the corporatist arrangement was no longer serving the function 
of constraining organized labour. Indeed, it appeared to have strengthened the trade unions and 
to have bred new militants, especially within the formerly moderate FPSA, who now successfully 
used the tripartite machinery to their advantage. This explains its abandonment and destruction 
beginning in 1984.
The bitter conflict that ensued between the former labour and state partners in the 
Tripartite Forum in the process of the state’s dismantling of the tripartite system had profound 
and far-reaching consequences for Fiji. The defeat of the Alliance Party in April 1987 by a 
coalition headed by the FTUC-sponsored Fiji Labour Party (now in partnership with the NFP), 
was followed by a military coup less than a month later, which ousted the Labour-NFP Coalition 
government on the pretext of "protecting Fijian interests". Following a second coup on September 
25 1987, Mara and other Alliance leaders were restored to power in an interim government which 
ruled for five years by decree. The anti-labour policies and practices of the interim regime, which 
included the introduction of draconian labour decrees stripping workers and trade unions of long- 
held rights and enabling even greater control by the state, and the open welcoming of such 
policies by employers, signified the finality of the old tripartite accord between the state, labour 
and capital. Yet, ethnic-based and political divisions within the labour movement today which 
are being fostered by the post-coup state, could well see the emergence of a new corporatist 
arrangement, with a section of organised labour participating.
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Endnotes
1. There is some discrepancy in accounts of the Forum's 
formal establishment. Some FTUC reports refer to the 
Forum in as having been established effectively with the 
meeting in December 1976. Another refers to a meeting in 
January 1977. A Labour Department paper on the Future of 
the Forum, dated 29 July 1985 says that the Forum was set 
up in May 1977.
2. According to Naidu (1988;:257), the Alliance electoral 
defeat was caused by the inroads that both the NFP and 
the FNP made into Alliance-held constituencies. The shift 
of former Indo-Fijian supporters away from the Alliance, 
partly in response to the Alliance's rejection of the 
Street Commission Report in 1976, cost the Alliance some 
national seats. More significantly, the Alliance lost two 
crucial seats in the Fijian communal constituencies - one 
to the FNP and the other to an independent candidate. 
Support for the FNP, which campaigned for the 
'repatriation' of Indo-Fijians to India, mainly dervived 
from growing economic dissatisfaction amongst commoner 
Fijians, especially in undeveloped provinces. 
Scapegoating the Indo-Fijian commercial class (and all 
Indo-Fijians) for Fijian poverty had its roots both in 
the colonial practice of divide and rule which was 
predicated on fostering distrust between Fijians and 
Indo-Fijians, and in the racial ideologies constructed by 
the colonial state for that purpose.
3. The way in which Mara was reappointed Prime Minister in 
a caretaker government by fellow high chief and Governor 
General, Ratu Sir George Cakobau, suggested chiefly 
collusion. Mara twice rebuffed approaches from NFP 
leader, Siddiq Koya, to form a Coalition government and 
then proposed to the Governor General that he be 
appointed to form a wholly Alliance caretaker government 
until fresh elections could be held. This was 
subsequently communicated to NFP leaders in a rival 
faction to that supporting Koya, with the message that if 
the NFP did not form a government Mara's proposal would 
be implemented. Later that afternoon (following two 
elections within the NFP which finally agreed on Koya's 
leadership of an NFP government) and just 15 minutes 
before Koya was scheduled to be sworn in as Prime 
Minister by the Governor General, Mara was appointed PM 
by Cakobau. (source?). This "constitutional coup" as it 
were by the Governor General, acting in his own 
deliberate judgement, although somewhat justified by the 
NFP's evident disunity and reticence to assume power,
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left Mara's caretaker government in a position of 
questionable legitimacy.
4. The 1978 Budget speech of the Finance Minister the Forum 
on grounds that the "national cake" had to apportioned in 
an orderly manner lest "an uncontrolled scramble for this 
limited piece [sic] of cake [lead] inevitably to a 
reduction in its size with consequent and increased 
difficulties to all, particularly those least able to 
look after their sectoral interests" (FEDM 1984;217).
5. The second election returned the Alliance Party to power.
In the interim, Fijians were drawn back into bloc-racial 
voting with warnings of the illustrative threat of Indian 
domination when Fijians split their vote.
6. According to Howard, Tora was the only Fijian candidate 
who was not opposed by the Nationalists, and relations 
between Tora and the FNP during the election were close. 
Further, Tora's party assisted the FNP by providing 
financial support and transport for its supporters to the 
polling booths (1991;96).
7. In a full page story on the "poverty of dockworkers" 
Veitata, as the FWW&SU industrial advisor, justified the 
union's demand for a 3 0 per cent wage increase on the 
basis of the gross earnings of the PAF. He provided 
figures on PAF's annual income and demanded that 
dockworkers be given a larger share of the $4.20 an hour 
paid by the shipping companies to the PAF for every 
productive hour worked by a docker (FT 3.6.77)
8. The seamen, who were striking in sympathy with the FWW&SU, 
were later prosecuted (FT 14.7.77). Intercessions by the NZFOL 
and the International Transport Federation to have the seamen 
released and the charges dropped, together with the picketing 
of Fiji Visitors Bureau offices in Auckland by members of the 
NZ Semane's Union were denounced as "interference" by foreign 
unions. Later, in a communique to Devan Nair, the President of 
ICFTU/APRO in Singapore, Raman described the actions taken by 
the NZFOL as "tantamount to an attempt to hold the judiciary 
of an independent, democratic developing country to ransom". 
(Report on Incidents and Events Connected with or Arising from 
the Recent Industrial Action Involving the members of the 
FWW&SU September 9, 1977 FTUC Archives).
9. Raman sought in fact to discredit Veitata in his earlier 
mentioned communique to Devan Nair by describing him as 
"a prominent member of the newly formed political 
group[sic], the Fijian Nationalist Party which is 
advocating the total expulsion from Fiji of some 350,000 
who are not of ethnic Fijian origin".
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10. This orchestrated march demonstrated clearly that the 
whole issue of foreign interference was a "lot of 
nonsense", as alleged by the NZFOL President, Tom 
Skinner. Skinner said the whole row had been "built up 
as a political stunt before the General Elections for a 
new government" (Raman's Report of September 9 1977 to 
ICFTU/APRO op cit.)
11. Neither Veitata nor Tora received any sympathy from the 
press. On the contrary, they were both accused by the 
Fiji Times of staging "politically-motivated" strikes (FT 
5.8.77) and the newspaper became the main vehicle for 
anti-union and pro-government propaganda. Letters of 
support for the government from the Tailevu Provincial 
Council and, later, from 22 branches of the Fijian 
Association, a constituent body of the Alliance Party, 
had been published in the press, giving the impression of 
wide endorsement of the government's stand. The newspaper 
was also the means by which orchestrated public outrage 
over the strike, which culminated in Leibling Marlowe's 
'spontaneous' march, was expressed.
12. The Fiji Times had earlier reminded its readers that the state 
had the power under Fiji's labour laws to prosecute and gaol 
or fine those involved in an illegal strike (FT 6.7.77)
13. Although the Deputy Prime Minister, Ratu Penaia Ganilau denied 
that priority was being given to the prosecution of the 
unionists at the expense of a quick decision by arbitration 
on the dockers' pay claim,
Veitata's allegation was not unfounded. Proceedings of both 
the arbitration hearing and the trial against the union 
leaders were scheduled to run concurrently with the 
arbitration being held after hours. Veitata had objected, with 
good reason, to this. The arbitration court was then adjourned 
to allow the trial to be completed.
14. Letters of support for the government from the Tailevu 
Provincial Council and, later, from 22 branches of the 
Fijian Association, a constituent body of the Alliance 
Party, had been published in the press, giving the 
impression of wide endorsement of the government's stand.
15. Veitata and seven of the FWW&SU officials were gaoled on 
August 6 for six months for calling the dock strike.
16. Butadroka was convicted and goaled before the September 
elections for making inflammatory racist statements. He 
contested the elections however, conducting his campaign 
from prison and, although he did not win a seat, the
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party managed to retain 15 per cent of Fijian votes 
(Naidu 1988:258) .
17. Tora was convicted of "hindering the making of sugar". He 
lodged an unsuccessful appeal to the Fiji Supreme Court 
in December against his conviction and sentence but in 
197 8, upon subsequent appeal to the Fiji Court of Appeal, 
he was aquitted.
18. Para-statal companies like the FSC and the PAF provided 
the crucial means for the state's own accumulation of 
capital. As Naidu (1985:14) puts it, these companies are: 
"the avenue of accumulation for the governing class and 
an aspirant middle class within the apparatus of the 
state".
19. The FMU was completely destroyed through the successful 
cooption of FMU Secretary Navitalai Raqona and 
union/state aquiescence to Company blackmail in 1977. The 
company's closure of the mine in February 1977 in direct 
response to a strike by miners for a $1.50 wage resulted 
in the government rallying to the company's aid: EGM was 
immediately offered financial assistance with a low 
interest loan of $2 million and asked to re-open the mine 
'in the national interest'. The striking workers, who 
were paid off by the company, were forced into submission 
and begged for their jobs back, even at a reduced wage. 
A special government inquiry committee subsequently asked 
the miners to take a 5 per cent pay cut - something which they were compelled to accept since their union and the 
FTUC had already given an undertaking that they would 
accept the outcome of the inquiry. For this 'resolution' 
of the miners' strike on the eve of the April elections, 
Raqona was rewarded with an Alliance ticket. Although he 
stood in both elections in 1977 he failed to gain a 
majority. Raqona's co-option by the Alliance leaders 
eventually cost him his union. When in January 1978 the 
company began implementing a shock decision, announced in 
Melbourne in December 1977, to lay off 1000 of its 1300 
miners, Raqona called on the government to take over the 
mine and called his workers out on strike but 
precipitately ended it when the government announced it 
would nationalise the mine. The 77 0 workers who were 
served with termination notices by the company were asked 
to accept alternatives that had been arranged for them as 
an interim measure, pending negotiations on the takeover, 
which they did. A mass exodus took place as hundreds left 
the mine. In May, Raqona again unsuccessfully stood on an 
Alliance ticket in a by-election. The same month the 
government quietly abandonned the nationalisation plan. 
A reading of newspaper reports on the abortive
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negotiations with the company suggests that the 
nationalisation announcement may have been a complete 
hoax which Raqona and the rest of the miners fell for. 
The union was deregistered later in 1978 for failing to 
submit proper accounts.
20. Tora's abandonment of the NFP and his participation in 
the 1982 elections on an Alliance ticket was rewarded 
with a Cabinet position in the Alliance government 
following the elections. His radical transition towards 
conservatism was completed in 1987 when, following the 
Alliance's electoral defeat, he publicly led a militant 
ethno-nationalist movement which engaged in orchestrated 
efforts to undermine the newly elected NFP/Labour 
Coalition government. Although Veitata did not change 
his political party affiliation, he too played a leading 
role in the orchestrated destabilization of the 
NFP/Labour Coalition government. Thus both turned their 
organizing skills and militant rhetoric to the services 
of the chiefly-dominated Alliance state and the 
destablization campaign they conducted by mobilizing 
Fijian peasants and workers through racist propaganda and 
fear-mongering provided the pretext for military 
intervention in May 1987. Tora and Veitata were both 
rewarded with Ministerial positions in the military- 
installed post-coup Administration which currently rules 
Fiji .
21. Following the April 1977 elections, and as a consequence 
of the bitter leadership wrangle which cost the party the 
chance to govern, the NFP split into two factions - the 
Flower and Dove factions, named after the election 
symbols they each used in the subsequent September 
elections in which they fought each other for seats. The 
Flower faction emerged the victor and the Dove faction, 
led by Prime Minister aspirant Siddiq Koya and supported 
by Tora, became marginalised.
22. Both assumed ministerial positions in the military- 
installed post-coup (Alliance) Interim Administration in 
1988. Veitata's position as Minister for Employment and 
Industrial Relations in an openly anti-labour government 
is particularly ironic and underlines his total 
abandonment of unionism.
23. A further contradiction was that through the effectiveness 
of its trade union partners, the Tripartite Forum 
generally encouraged a policy of labour market regulation 
in favour of workers. By 1984 this was conflicting with 
the state's tacit encouragement of new industries based
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on the exploitation of non-unionized labour. Although in 
the 2-year agreement for 1979/1980 the Forum partners 
undertook to give "special consideration to pioneer 
industries in their infancy and to industries and sectors 
which have genuine difficulties", in 1981, the Tripartite 
partners agreed to establish a Wages Council for the 
Manufacturing sector by September that year and to narrow 
the gap between unionized and non-unionized workers. 
They recommended that wages in industries that would be 
rregulated by this Wages Council be no less than 60% of 
union wages in comparable industries. In the following 
three years the government came under increasing pressure 
from its Tripartite labour partners to regulate wages in 
other non-organized industries.
24. Raman admitted however that "within the FTUC ranks there were 
those who were not in favour of any restrictions" but claimed 
that a "general consensus of opinion" resulted in their 
acceptance (Report of September 9, 1977 to the ICFTU/APRO
op.cit.) .
25. This portrayal of the state is implicit in the tripartite 
exchange of favours Raman describes: the unions exchange
wage restraint for employer-guaranteed job security; the 
state undertakes to review taxation and "provide some 
relief", presumably to workers although tax relief (ie. 
tax incentives) to capital is also implicit in the 
undertaking.
26. The 1981 agreement allowed workers earning wages/salaries 
of $3818 or less to negotiate for a 14 per cent increase 
or $420, whichever was the lesser; those earning between 
$3818 and $8251 were allowed increases of up to 11 per 
cent (or $660, whichever was the lesser) and those 
earning more than $8250 were to be allowed a maximum 
increase of 8 per cent (or $1200, whichever was the 
lesser).
27. The ceilings were : 6 per cent for those on
salaries/wages of up to $5000; $300 on salaries/wages
between $5001 and $6000; 5 per cent or $500 (whichever 
was the lesser) on all wages/salaries above $6000.
28. The years following the establishment of the Tripartite 
Forum certainly showed a significant decrease (except for 
1979 and 1980) in the number of strikes. From a total of 
64 strikes in 1977, the figure had declined to 33 in 
1978, and to 41, 44 and 9 in 1981, 1982 and 1983 
respectively. With the general reduction of strikes,
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there was also a significant decline (except for 1978) in 
the numbers of workdays lost, with a mere 2,877 workdays 
lost through strike activity in 1983 compared with 57,373 
in 1977 (Sutherland 1992;141). The main reasons for 
reduced strike activity were that the new tripartite 
machinery, with its special committees, operated to 
defuse a lot of industrial conflict and arbitration 
became a common means of settling disputes. The 
appointment in 1983 of a Permanent Arbitrator underlined 
the importance of arbitration in industrial dispute 
settlement.
29. The state's takeover of the sugar industry and of port 
operations has already been mentioned. In 1982 the state 
also took over ground handling operations at Nadi Airport 
although in this takeover the new company, Air Terminal 
Services Ltd was uniquely structured to give the 
Federated Airline Staff Association (FASA), under the 
militant leadership of Dinsikh Lai Morarji, a one-third 
share in the company (with the Government and the Civil 
Aviation Authority of Fiji (CAAF) holding an equal share
of the remaining shares).
30. Former FPSA leaders cited by Leckie include RAtu George 
Cakobau (First local Governor General in the post-colonial 
state), Ratu Mara (Prime Minister from 1970-1987), Jonati 
Mavoa, Ratu Edward Cakobau and later Charlie Walker (all 
Ministers in various Alliance governments).
31. Columbus tells of how Tora was opposed to the FPSA joining the 
FTUC because of the farmer's conservatism and the fear that it 
might, by its numbers, come to dominate and control the FTUC 
and make it even more conservative).
32. According to the FEDM, the wages of agricultural workers, 
after rising to an average of 82% of non-agricultural 
wages between 1974 and 1980, fell dramatically to 60%, 
and then 55% by 1982 (1984:228).
33. The split into two factions that followed the April 1977 
elections and which had seen the two factions competing 
for seats in the September elections had left a legacy of 
bitterness and disunity which NFP's new leader, Jai Ram 
Reddy, (former leader of the 'Flower faction') sought to 
contain. Several 'Dove faction' party members were so 
embittered that they left the party and joined the 
Alliance (Howard 1991;109).
34. The EEC-funded Fiji Employment and Development Mission's 
warnings about the problem of basing the wage guideline 
on the previous year's rate of inflation has already been
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mentioned. The FEDM proposed abandoning the formula used 
for wage indexation in favour of one which would not have 
the same distorting effects.
35. The IMF staff team's actual advice was that more flexible 
use of exchange rates and a change in the institutional 
arrangements for wage determination so that higher inport 
prices were not reflected in wage increases could "bring 
about the desired shift of income to the export sector 
and agenerate a supply response that would strengthen the 
balance of payments".
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSIONS
The thesis began by showing the essential role played by the early colonial state in 
Fiji in procuring bonded labour for plantation, and later mining and merchant, capital. The 
coercive nature of labour policies of the early colonial state ranged from the use of law to 
force workers to fulfil employment contracts to the state’s outright suppression of strikes 
and subversion of efforts by workers to organise themselves.
I argued that although, from 1942, a coercive labour policy was replaced by a 
policy of formally encouraging responsible, moderate trade unions and promoting 
collective bargaining between workers and employers, contradictions nevertheless existed 
between the colonial state’s policy and practice. Between 1942 and 1969, the colonial state 
put in place a number of laws aimed at controlling and limiting the power of trade unions 
and containing labour militancy. The thesis has argued that the colonial state also 
employed other mechanisms - institutional and ideological - to continue to contain and 
control organised labour.
I further argued that the post-colonial state employed very similar mechanisms to 
control organised labour and contain militancy after independence. The post-colonial state 
was perceived rather differently by organised labour in the early post-colonial period, 
which saw the resurgence of militancy mainly amongst ethnic Fijian labour in key, 
foreign-owned industries and appeals by union leaders to the Fijian political leadership to 
settle strikes in their favour. Yet, the transfer of power to the Alliance Party, dominated 
by a chiefly and commercial elite, made little real difference to the state’s response to
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workers and trade unions. Labour militancy drew from the post-colonial state responses 
similar to those of its predecessor. In the early years of independence, the post-colonial 
state set in place legislative and institutional mechanisms to contain militancy primarily 
among blue-collar, private sector unions controlling foreign industries. By the middle of 
the first decade of independence, several industries which were under the control of 
militant unions had become state-owned and militant unions not only challenged the state 
as employer, but also organised the formation of an alternative and more militant peak 
organisation to the more moderate state-accepted FTUC.
I argued that the formation in the latter part of the 1970’s of the Tripartite Forum - 
as a corporatist arrangement concerned with national wage-setting, dispute settlement and 
labour policy formulation - appeared at first as a major achievement in cooption for the 
post-colonial state. With the consent of moderate trade unions, the new machinery 
achieved considerable wage restraint and industrial peace. Designed to marginalise and 
erode the power of militant unionists controlling enterprises which were now state-owned, 
the tripartite accord was entered into by moderate trade union leaders and the post-colonial 
state for different, but similarly political, reasons.
The Tripartite Forum was short-lived and I argued that this was because, once their 
short-term interests in entering the tripartite accord were served, the state and organised 
labour pursued their fundamentally opposed interests within it and, in the later years of the 
Forum’s existence, organised labour was able to do so with much greater success than the 
state. The re-emergence of militancy, this time among the state’s labour partners in the 
Forum, constituted a double challenge to the state as employer and to the political
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leadership that had forged the Tripartite accord.
The post-colonial state’s abandonment of the corporatist arrangement in 1985 with 
the imposition of a wage freeze, in contravention of a tripartite wage agreement to which 
the Prime Minister had been signatory, provoked a bitter and open conflict with the labour 
movement. The response of the labour movement, particularly the formation of the Labour 
Party, which subsequently won the national election in 1987 in coalition with the National 
Federation Party, was countered by a resort to extra-legal power, on the part of leaders 
and supporters of the Alliance Party. Prominent Alliance leaders, among them former 
labour militants, Apisai Tora and Taniela Veitata, were responsible for the destabilisation 
campaign which provided the pretext for Col. Sitiveni Rabuka’s military coup. Rabuka, 
who restored Ratu Mara to power in December 1987 as Prime Minister of an interim 
government, later revealed the names of other leading Alliance Figures who, he said, had 
approached him to do something, following the election of the FLP/NFP Coalition 
government.
The military coups of May 14 and September 25 1987 which ousted the 
Labour/NFP Coalition and ultimately restored an (interim) Alliance government, were not 
only aimed at organised labour but also the FTUC-formed FLP’s electoral victory which 
represented organised labour’s gaining control of state power. The undisguised anti-labour 
policies and practices pursued by the military-installed post-coup administration (in 
particular, the introduction of repressive labour decrees and the fostering of ethnic Fijian 
unions) were intended to permanently divide workers and emasculate and control their 
organisations.
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While the post-coup developments do signify the end of Tripartism as it existed 
from 1977-1985, sharp divisions within the labour movement today could well lead, as 
they did in the 1970’s, to the institutionalisation of a new corporatist arrangement by the 
authoritarian post-coup Fijian state, with either voluntary or compulsory participation by 
representatives of organised labour.
It may be concluded then, that Marxist theories which depict the state as generally 
performing a critical function in capitalist social relations, especially in regards to 
containing class conflict by controlling and subordinating labour, have been shown to be 
relevant in the case of both the colonial and post-colonial state in Fiji. The equal 
importance of the state’s ideological and repressive roles in this regard are amply 
demonstrated in, on the one hand, the consensually-based strategy of cooption and other 
covert strategies, and in the more openly repressive responses to labour militancy on the 
other.
The particular interests that those in control of the post-colonial state have in 
maintaining its legitimacy and their power as a ruling elite or governing class have also 
emerged as an important factor in this analysis of state/labour relations in Fiji. The ruling 
elite’s own interests are often not acknowledged in the funcdonal-for-capital view of the 
state. The evidence presented in this thesis would appear to suggest that, in the Fiji case, 
the institution and dismantling of the Tripartite Forum had as much to do with protecting 
the interests of the state and of those who control it, as it had to do with advancing the 
interests of capital.
236
The idea of corporatism as a strategy of labour subordination generally detrimental 
to the interests of labour as a whole, is difficult to establish in the Fiji case. Certainly, the 
Tripartite Forum as a corporatist machinery, was intended to subordinate and dominate 
labour and in certain respects, in the earlier years of the Forum’s existence, it did do this. 
Yet, it is also undeniable that certain unions, if not labour as a whole, were actually 
strengthened by the tripartite system and were able to make the corporatist experiment 
work overwhelmingly in their favour - with the result that it had to be dismantled.
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